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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the representations of the self as a cultural agent, both reacting 
to and actively shaping codes of social and artistic respectability, as displayed in the 
diaries of the canonical Victorian writers Lady Elizabeth Eastlake, Henry Crabb 
Robinson, George Eliot, George Gissing, John Ruskin and Gerard Manley Hopkins. It 
analyses the impact of wider ideological and social imperatives on the diarists’ 
subjective experience and reads their tendency to silence the self as a symptom of the 
cultural pressure to merge their private and public persona. These diaries represented 
a forum in which the diarists perpetually negotiated their own value within the 
Victorian ideology of productivity and thus not only reflect their inner world but also 
the cultural climate of the nineteenth century.  
Chapter One traces the selected diarists’ reluctance to reveal private 
information, as well as their tendency to foreground professional productivity, to the 
social pressure to efface emotions relating to the self and to only cultivate those that 
nurtured the community. It identifies the similarities between the compulsive self-
discipline advocated in the psychological discourse of the period, particularly 
Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the Will (1859), and the willingness to both live 
up to and actively shape the cultural codes of respectability that Elizabeth Eastlake 
and Henry Crabb Robinson display in their diaries. Chapter Two compares and 
contrasts the desire for maximal professional productivity as exhibited in George 
Eliot’s and George Gissing’s diaries. Both worked obstinately in order to increase 
their own value: whereas Eliot sought to redeem her ‘guilt of the privileged,’ Gissing 
desperately needed to increase his financial solvency through literary output. Chapter 
Three discusses the ways in which John Ruskin’s diary helped him block out 
unrespectable and painful private experiences through transforming his obsessive 
 3 
desire to appropriate and “feel” visual experience into a professional task. Chapter 
Four shows that Gerard Manley Hopkins—because he was acutely concerned by his 
cultural otherness caused by his homosexuality—not only sought refuge and 
validation by joining the Jesuits, but by narrowing his realm of experience to nature, 
merged the private and the public self into the figure of the professional, asexual, 
dutiful and disinterested observer.   
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis reads the diaries of the Victorian cultural commentators Lady Elizabeth 
Rigby Eastlake (1809-1893), Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867), the novelists 
George Eliot (1819-1890) and George Gissing (1857-1903), the critic, philosopher 
and artist John Ruskin (1819-1900) and the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) 
as the products of, responses to and shapers of their cultural reality.1 These writers all 
came from very similar middle-class backgrounds and all had parents who, from an 
early age, instilled the habit of diligent work in them. Nonetheless, these 
commonalities did not produce uniformity of behaviour and ideology; on the contrary, 
the diaries under consideration reflect the personal reality of literary production and 
reveal how each of these writers positioned him- or herself within his or her cultural 
context, giving access to the subjective consciousness that informed his or her artistic 
output. In tune with the Victorian culture of self-improvement, these “professional” 
diaries are extroverted, rather than introverted, and reflect the diarists’ efforts to both 
conform to and reform their culture’s enthusiasm for self-improvement and self-
discipline.  
The diaries show strong similarities between the self-reported behaviour of the 
Victorian sages, such as Eliot and Ruskin, and the dissenters, such as Gissing and 
Hopkins, who, although they purposefully dissociated themselves ideologically from 
the pressures of Victorian communitarianism and the Protestant work ethic, 
                                                 
1
 These literary diaries, perhaps more so than domestic or professional diaries, translate the Victorian 
“spirit of the age” through the increased receptivity of the artist to his or her culture. Albert Gräser has 
argued that “[t]he artist perceives the tension between the ‘I’ and the ‘you,’ between the individual and 
the community, as well as between the person and the environment, much more acutely than the 
ordinary human being.” Although literary diaries do not reflect a more comprehensive picture of an era, 
they exemplify the effects of contemporary philosophy, as well as science, economy and politics, on 
the mind of an individual who deliberately exposes him- or herself to the intellectual and artistic 
productions of his or her culture and reproduces them for an audience. Albert Gräser, Das Literarische 
Tagebuch: Studien über Elemente des Tagebuchs als Kunstform (Saarbrücken: West-Ost-Verlag 
Gmbh., 1955), p. 99 (My translation).  
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nonetheless advocated a regime of strict self-discipline by which they sought to 
compensate for their unrespectable otherness. The texts that this thesis examines 
cannot be seen to represent examples of “archetypal” Victorian diary writing, as no 
such thing exists. Although the diary is a cultural product that always reflects the 
material circumstances of its creation, the variety of uses that it was put to by 
individuals is so wide-ranging that no specific Victorian type can be identified. This 
study concentrates on the ways in which the selected Victorian writers used the 
diary’s self-regulatory mechanisms in order to achieve maximal productivity and 
shows that the diary formed an integral component of the reality of authorship. These 
writers equated their value as individuals with the value of their literary production 
and their private records reveal an almost total identification with their professional 
occupation—to the point that these documents can be categorised as “professional” 
diaries. This new historicist investigation seeks to demonstrate that, beyond its 
function as a tool for time management and the observation of the external world, the 
diary can also further “self-education” and constitute a forum for self-cultivation that 
allows the diarist to craft and reinforce a persona specifically adapted to his or her 
professional needs, while simultaneously catering to the cultural codes of 
respectability which are perpetuated through his or her work.2  
This thesis represents a unique contribution to both Victorian studies and life 
writing criticism as none of the existing collections and bibliographies dealing with 
the diary genre focus on the Victorian age at large.3 Typically, scholarly articles on 
                                                 
2
 Term coined by Joseph Marie de Gerardo, Self-Education, or the Means and Art of Moral Progress, 
Elizabeth  Palmer Peabody, trans. (Boston: Carter and Hendee, 1830) 
3
 A remarkable collection is Trev Lynn Broughton, ed., Autobiography: Critical Concepts in Literary 
and Cultural Studies, vol. IV (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). Anthologies, beside 
Christopher Sampson Handley’s, include Arthur Ponsonby, English Diaries: A Review of English 
Diaries from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century (London: Methuen & Co., 1923) and More English 
Diaries: Further Reviews of Diaries from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century (London Methuen & 
Co., 1927); Philipp Dunaway and Melvin Evans, A Treasury of the World’s Greatest Diaries 
(Doubleday, 1957). 
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selected diarists can be found in volumes on autobiographical practices in general, but 
Robert A. Fothergill’s Private Chronicles (1974) still seems to remain the only 
monograph that addresses the diary genre specifically.4  Doll and Munns, in their 
collection of essays on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century diaries, deplore the 
scattered state of diary criticism, when they rightly remark: “Most discussion must be 
sought in introductions to and reviews of published diaries [with] the overwhelming 
subjects in such works [being] biographical or historical.” 5  In seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century studies, “the practice of publishing diaries and journals, excluding 
travel journals […] has always lagged far behind other canonical and noncanonical 
texts,” as Doll and Munns claim.  
Whereas the relative sparsity of published journals of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries may be the reason for the meagre body of diary criticism in this 
field, the same is not true for nineteenth-century studies. Diaries were published and 
read widely during, as well as beyond, the Victorian era. Politicians, public figures 
and writers habitually kept a diary and many of them were published, either 
posthumously, or even during the diarist’s life time. Given that the publication of 
diaristic records was an ongoing practice, diarists knew, or at least suspected or hoped, 
that their diaries might be printed after their death. In addition, the style and content 
of already issued diaries surely affected the narrative choices of a diarist, a fact which 
challenges the idea of the diary as unplanned writing. Spontaneity and emotional 
candour are often seen as the fundamental characteristics of the genre, emphasising its 
contrast to formal autobiography. However, the brief list of diaries that were read 
and/or published in the nineteenth century I shall offer will demonstrate the enormous 
                                                 
4
 Robert A. Fothergill, Private Chronicles: A Study of English Diaries (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974). 
5
 Dan Doll and Jessica Munns, Recording and Reordering: Essays on the Seventeenth-century and 
Eighteenth-Century Diary and Journal (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006), p. 9.  
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variety among diaristic texts and the multiplicity of interpretations of the generic 
characteristics. Despite a general tendency to monitor the intensity of emotions 
displayed in the diary, the extent of self-disclosure and self-scrutiny that diarists 
exhibit varies according to their perceptions of what constitutes privacy. Efforts to 
safeguard privacy took different shapes: whereas some diarists left out the self in 
order to protect it from public judgment, others used their diaristic records to 
construct and promote a public persona that acted as a flashy shield for privacy. 
Frequently, but not always, professional diaries tend to be reticent in revealing 
personal information and are rather defensive, while the more socially oriented diaries 
have a propensity to be forthcoming about their author’s experiences in the public 
domain. We can also detect differences in emotional attachment to the diary as an 
object: where some diarists cherished their diaries’ material presence, others felt 
compelled to destroy their private accounts.  
For diarists such as Samuel Pepys (1658-1703), Frances Burney (1776-1828) 
and Frances Kemble, the diary was a carefully crafted text, which was designed to 
frame a deliberately constructed persona. Many Victorian writers would have been 
familiar with the diary that Pepys kept from 1660-1669. Although it displays a 
consistent preoccupation with dailiness and chronology, many of its entries were in 
fact pre-conceived, re-written and based on notes. As such, the diary came close to an 
autobiography representing Pepys’s social and professional life. It was first published 
(and heavily edited) by Lord Braybrooke in 1825, who then issued an extended 
version of five volumes in 1848-1849 (reprinted in 1851). 6  Rev. Mynors Bright 
published Pepys’s diary in six volumes in 1875-79, but his edition comprised but few 
                                                 
6
 Richard Lord Braybrooke, ed., Memoirs of Samuel Pepys, Esq., Comprising His Diary from 1659 to 
1669, 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn, 1825). 
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copies and was not re-issued.7 Henry B. Wheatley extended the published diary to ten 
volumes in 1893-99.8 The most complete version (eleven volumes) was provided by 
Robert Latham and William Matthews in 1970-1983.9 The fact that several editions 
were printed in the nineteenth century points to a growing interest in the veracious 
representation of historical characters.  
Much like Pepys’s famous and influential diary, Frances Burney’s private 
writings (diaries and letters) frequently took the shape of commendatory 
advertisements for their author. With the exception of her early diaries, which are 
written for the eye of “Nobody,” the style in which Burney’s diaries and letters are 
composed is strikingly similar—both clearly address a wide audience and seem to 
have been written with the objective to portray the writer as a socialising marvel to 
her audience. Burney’s great niece Charlotte Barrett first published her subject’s diary 
in conjunction with her letters and extracts from the journals of her sisters Susan and 
Charlotte Burney.10 Barrett’s biographical project, which started in 1840, took her 
many years to complete but she ultimately succeeded in covering the duration of 
Burney’s life. Annie Raine Ellis republished Burney’s diaries in a similar format in 
1889 and 1907.11 This collage technique was also adopted by Thomas Sadler, the 
editor of Henry Crabb Robinson’s diary and Charles Eastlake Smith, Elizabeth 
                                                 
7
 Mynors Bright, ed., Diary and Correspondence of Samuel Pepys, Esq., F. R. S.: From His Ms. 
Cypher in the Pepysian Library, with a Life and Notes by Richard Lord Braybrooke ; Deciphered, with 
Additional Notes, by Rev. Mynors Bright (London: Bickers & Son, 1879).  
8
 Henry B. Wheatley, ed., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, M.A., F.R.S., Clerk of the Acts and Secretary to 
the Admirality, 10 vols. (London: Bell, 1893-99).  
9
 Robert Latham and William Matthews, eds., The Diary of Samuel Pepys, 11 vols. (London: G. Bell & 
Sons, 1970-83).  
10
 Charlotte Barrett, ed., Diary and Letters of Madame D'Arblay: 1797 to 1840, 4 vols. (London: 
Bickers and Son, 1840). 
11
 Annie Raine Ellis, ed., The Early Diary of Frances Burney, 1768-1778: With a Selection From Her 
Correspondence and From the Journals of her Sisters Susan and Charlotte Burney (G. Bell, 1907).  
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Eastlake’s nephew and editor of her life writings.12 The objective of this editorial 
practice seems to have been to represent the essence of the subject’s life in a way that 
would captivate the audience’s attention. In fact, however, although this method 
allows for a vivid account of the subject’s social life, it skews the reader’s 
appreciation of the diarist/letter writer’s unique expression of his or her subjectivity. 
However, Burney seems to have been so conscious of the audience she sought to 
manipulate that she assumed the role of the editor herself. 
 The diaries of the famous actress and writer Fanny Kemble not only 
consistently challenged the defining characteristics of the diary genre, but effectively 
overcame the boundaries between the public and the private when they were 
published. The style and content of the diaries mark them as texts were designed to 
impress and educate actual readers, as can be seen in the 1832-33 diary, which 
recounts Kemble’s travels to America and describes her emotional reactions to 
unfamiliar circumstances in a very unapologetic fashion. 13  Among the many 
autobiographical writings that she published is her Journal in two volumes, which she 
released herself in 1835 in what seems to be an attempt to sensitise her reader’s visual 
perceptiveness.14 It was republished in 1999 by Monica Gough.15 Kemble’s Journal 
of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation 1838-39, which she originally kept for 
Elizabeth Dwight Sedgwick, was published in 1863 to support the cause of 
abolitionism. For several months in 1838-39, Kemble lived on a plantation in Georgia, 
which her husband had inherited, and she was revolted by the treatment of the 
hundreds of slaves that the family exploited for their own gain. This journal was re-
                                                 
12
 Thomas, Sadler, ed., Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson, 3 vols. 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1869); Charles Eastlake Smith, ed., Journals and Correspondence of 
Lady Eastlake, (London: John Murray, 1895). 
13
 Frances Anne Kemble, Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation 1838-1839 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1863).  
14
 Frances Anne Butler, Journal, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1835).   
15
 Monica Gough, ed., Journal of a Young Actress (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).  
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published by J.A. Scott in 1961 and has attracted an enormous amount of attention in 
recent years from different academic disciplines, such as the social sciences, history 
and literary studies, which has led to and was triggered by new editions in 2006, 2007, 
2008 and 2009.16 Kemble’s famous autobiography Records of a Girlhood, which she 
issued in 1878 and which was republished in 2007 and 2009, can be seen as another 
conscious effort to manipulate public judgment: “I have thought that my gossip about 
myself may be as acceptable [as] gossip about me written by another.”17 Kemble is 
one of few Victorian authors who self-confidently published several diaries and an 
autobiography, hence elevating her own life to a matter of importance and using her 
public position to further the cause of underprivileged human beings.  
 Although the diary of the famous Romantic Lord Byron (1788-1824), can, 
compared to Kemble’s, be distinguished by a similarly unapologetic attitude to his 
own emotions, less importance is attributed to a potential or actual reader. In his diary, 
Byron reviews his past and present emotions with impressive frankness and clearly 
takes pleasure in engaging with himself, his contemporaries and his physical 
environment through writing. It was first published in two volumes by Thomas Moore 
in 1830 and substantially extended by Rowland E. Prothero to six volumes in 1898-
1901.18 As with Pepys’s diary, it was not until 1973-1994 that Leslie A. Marchand 
published a complete edition in thirteen volumes.19  
Whereas some diarists prioritise their social and emotional lives, others give 
special attention to their professional selves. The diary of the famous Romantic writer 
Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), for instance, displays much less emotional exaltation 
                                                 
16
 John Anthony Scott, ed., Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation 1838-1839 (New York: 
Knopf, 1961).  
17
 Frances Anne Kemble, Records of a Girlhood (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2009), p. 9.  
18
 Thomas Moore, ed., Letters and Journals of Lord Byron: with Notices of His Life, 2 vols. (London, 
1830); Rowland E. Prothero, ed., The Works of Lord Byron, A New Revised and Enlarged Edition: 
Letters and Journals, 6 vols. (London, 1898-1901).  
19
 Leslie A. Marchand, ed., Byron’s Letters and Journals, 13 vols. (London: John Murray, 1973-1994).  
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than Byron’s and, much like George Gissing’s, can be characterised by its accounts of 
relentless work. Leaving out the emotional self, Scott’s diary foregrounds his 
professional self and is, as Christopher Sampson Hadley claims, “entirely without 
self-pity.”20 The first printed version in two volumes was edited and published by 
David Douglas in 1890 and it was followed by J.G. Tait’s three volumes in 1939, 
1941 and 1946 and W.E.K. Anderson’s 1972 edition. 21  This publication history 
demonstrates a continuous desire on the side of critics to get the story right and an 
increasing willingness to let the diarist speak for him- or herself.  
Dorothy Wordsworth (1771-1855) almost categorically left out the self from 
her diary and principally used it as a poetic record of the tours she undertook with her 
brother William. The diary, which Dorothy kept with many long interruptions from 
1789-1828, contains very few instances in which she asserts herself as an individual. 
It differs from other “professional” diaries in that its lengthy entries are composed 
with utmost care and lovingly depict natural scenes. Although Ruskin (Chapter Three) 
similarly used his diary as a recipient for visual experience, his emotional reactions 
form an integral part of his records and in this way greatly differs from Dorothy 
Wordsworth’s. Because of its brilliance, Dorothy’s diaristic writing consistently 
served as a source of inspiration to William and has been much praised for its poetic 
genius by literary critics. It was first published by William Knight in 1897 in two 
volumes but extracts had already appeared in Edmund Lee’s 1886 Story of A Sister’s 
Love.22 E. de Selincourt republished the diary in 1941 and 1952.23 A lot of attention 
                                                 
20
 Christopher Sampson Hadley, An Annotated Bibliography of Diaries Published in English 
(Christopher Handley, 2002).  
21
 David Douglas, ed., The Journal of Sir Walter Scott: from the Original at Abbotsford (Edinburgh, 
1890); J.G. Gait, ed., The Journal of Walter Scott (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1939); W.E.K. Anderson, 
ed., The Journal of Sir Walter Scott (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).  
22
 William Knight, ed., The Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, 2 vols. (London, 1897); Edmund Lee, 
Story of a Sister’s Love (J. Clarke & co., 1886).  
23
 E. de Selincourt, ed., Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1941), reprinted 
1952.  
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has been paid to the Grasmere journals, which Helen Darbishire first published in 
1958 and Mary Moorman edited in 1971.24 Mary Ellen Bellanca has recently (2007) 
read Dorothy’s diaristic achievement as the work of a natural historian.25 It is thus 
thanks to the diary that Dorothy Wordsworth is remembered as a talented poet and 
writer in her own right.  
Some diaries, such as William Allingham’s (1820-1889), avoid the self as a 
topic to write about and instead constitute a “tribute” to other writers.26 Allingham 
was a close friend of Alfred Lord Tennyson’s (1809-1892), who described his 
interactions with the poet and his entourage in elaborate detail. He generally 
foregrounded his social persona, offering little information regarding his inner life. 
His diary, which he kept from 1847-1889, was first published by H. Allingham and D. 
Radford in 1907 and since 1967 has been published in regular intervals: 1985, 1990 
and 2000.  
Although the diary of Edith Simcox (1844-1901) has been read as a “tribute”-
diary to George Eliot, such an attitude disregards her extensive engagement with her 
own emotional and professional aspirations and doubts. Significantly, Simcox had 
named her diary Autobiography of a Shirtmaker in order to stress her professional 
vocation, but her editors, Constance M. Fulmer and Margaret E. Barfield, when 
publishing the diary in 1998, changed the title to A Monument of the Memory of 
George Eliot. This editorial move dissociates Simcox from her own work and renders 
her position as George Eliot’s biggest admirer permanent. Simcox did indeed call her 
                                                 
24
 Helen Darbishire, ed., The Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth: The Alfoxden Journal, 1789: The 
Grasmere Journals: 1800-1803 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Mary Moorman, ed., 
Journals of Dorothy Wordsworth (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).  
25
 Bellanca, Mary Ellen, Daybooks of Discovery: Nature Diaries in Britain, 1770-1870 (Charlottesville 
and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007). 
26
 Allingham, H. and Radford, D., William Allingham’s Diary: 1847-1889 (London: Centaur Press, 
2000); Constance Marie Fulmer and Margaret E. Barfield, eds., A Monument to the Memory of George 
Eliot: Edith J. Simcox’s Autobiography of a Shirtmaker (Taylor & Francis,  
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diary “acta diurnal amoris,” and mentioned George Eliot in almost every entry until 
many years after her hero’s death, but, nonetheless, the diary also constituted an 
important forum in which she reviewed and stored her daily experiences and 
encounters with politicians and public figures of the day. Moreover, her diary bears 
witness to her reflections about the morals, philosophy, love, religion and her own 
emotions, which she reveals with astounding candour.  
The desire to guarantee the privacy of the diarist culminates in the destruction 
of the diary. Many Victorian writers, such as Thomas Hardy (1840-1928), who made 
extensive use of diaries, commonplace books, notebooks and related memoranda, 
destroyed the majority of their private records and refused to be remembered as 
diarists. Charles Dickens’s (1812-1870) only extant diary, which stretches from 1838 
to 1841, was only preserved coincidentally, as he burnt all his other diaristic writings. 
This tendency to cancel out personal existence reveals these writers’ awareness that 
diaries could be published posthumously and had the power to incriminate their 
defenceless author beyond redemption. For those who destroyed their diaries, the 
desire to preserve their privacy and integrity overpowered the wish to impress future 
generations of potential, sometimes imagined, readers. 
Although this list is but a fragmentary sketch, it accentuates the countless 
shapes diaristic writing took in the nineteenth century (and before). Some diarists, as 
Patricia Meyer Spacks has argued, “itemize nothing but the inconsequential,” whereas 
others “breach [their] privacy in rather dramatic fashion.”27 There is indeed a vast 
difference between a confessional diary, such as Arthur Munby’s and a hermetically 
sealed account of professional activity, such as George Gissing’s.28 Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
27
 Patricia Meyer Spacks, Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth-Century Self (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 168, 169.  
28
 Derek Hudson, Munby: Man of Two Worlds: The Life and Diaries of Arthur J. Munby 1828-1910 
(Boston: Gambit, 1972).  
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degree of emotional revelation displayed in a diary does not define its status as a 
private, or intimate, document. Spacks makes a crucial point when asserting that 
“people zealously protect also the privacy of their lives’ monotony and the privacy of 
their obsessive concern with the events or nonevents defining that monotony.”29 
Every diary, whether its tendency is confessional or professional, must thus be seen as 
the materialisation of the diarist’s private concerns; whether these are sexual 
relationships or the number of pages read or written each day is irrelevant. What is 
essential is that the diary embodies its author’s decision to elevate the “trivial into the 
significant” and thus affirms the importance of his or her existence.30 
The diaries under consideration tend to rigorously disregard the authors’ 
‘private’ lives and habitually omit painful experiences and exclude intimate emotions. 
However, as Wendy J. Wiener and George C. Rosenwald maintain, diary scholars 
should not ask “what life experiences have survived repression,” but “study what the 
subject has selected for preservation. For the act of remembrance is a choosing, a 
highlighting, a shaping, an enshrinement.”31 Accordingly, in order to let the diarist 
speak for him- or herself, and to respectfully “decode the meaning of those texts 
within their context,” as Philippe Lejeune proposes, I have identified the most 
pressing concerns, such as the management of the emotions, work, time and 
observation, and have read them in light of the writers’ biographies, correspondence 
and literary work, considering the demands of a culture in which conservative and 
progressive beliefs coexisted.32 Again, the personal or historical value of the diary 
                                                 
29
 Spacks, Privacy, p. 14.  
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Wiener and Rosenwald, “A Moment’s Monument,” p. 30.  
32
 Philippe Lejeune, “The ‘Journal de jeune fille in Nineteenth-Century France,” Martine Breillac, 
trans., Suzanne L. Bunkers and Cynthia A. Huff, eds., Inscribing the Daily: Critical Essays on 
Women’s Diaries (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), p. 112; John Gardiner, The 
Victorians: An Age in Retrospect (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2002), p. 17.  
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does not depend on the degree of self-disclosure, as each one is an expression of an 
individual consciousness moulded by culture. The analysis of the diarist’s responses 
to culture can shed light on both his or her self-perception and self-positioning within 
the social, political, economic ontological parameters in which he or she functions and 
can give us an idea of the contemporary cultural hierarchy of values.  
 
Diary and Genre 
The reader, editor, biographer and critic of diaries face similar difficulties in 
interpreting the narrative choices that determined the composition of a diary. 
Although all four can be perfectly aware of the fact that generically the diary can be 
considered “a confession to the self with only the self as an auditor and without the 
public authority,” as Felicity Nussbaum has noted, they will inevitably discover that it 
provides but a “superficial illusion of transparency,” to use Spacks’s words.33 As the 
brief list of published diaries has shown, editors have struggled to do justice to the 
respective diarist. With manuscripts frequently comprising thousands of heavily 
repetitive pages, selection seems imperative but assuredly compromises the 
authenticity of the diaristic record. Editorial framing, in its endeavour to accentuate 
the diary’s literary or historical merit, is liable to misrepresent the subject, as we shall 
see in the cases of Crabb Robinson and Eastlake (Chapter One). Although both the 
diary critic and the biographer take an interest in the truthful representation of the 
diarist, the fundamental difference in their approach consists of the former’s focus on 
the text and the investigation of the ways in which the diarist uses its material and 
conceptual form to ground him- or herself in the world. The latter would tend to use 
the information shared in the diary to construct the author’s life narrative, 
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disregarding the importance of the contextual forum in which it was uttered. The 
boundaries between the work of the diary critic and that of the biographer can blur, 
particularly in the case of diarists such as Gissing, whose accounts are primarily 
concerned with establishing inventories of work done or money made.  
As much critical work has shown, the diary genre is characterised by its hybrid 
nature. The diaristic gesture is clearly a self-objectifying autobiographical attempt to 
give value to subjective experience by creating an anthologised record of daily life. 
Langford and West have eloquently summed up the particularities of this “uncertain 
genre” which belongs to several genres and is therefore excluded from all, as it is 
“uneasily balanced between literary and historical writing, between the spontaneity of 
reportage and the reflectiveness of the crafted text, between selfhood and events, 
between subjectivity and objectivity [and] between the private and the public.”34 The 
diary’s generic features can indeed be manipulated to reflect and contain the delights 
and pressures of individual lives, as well as cultural norms and literary styles and 
tastes. The extremely individualised form and content of a diary entry, which may 
take the shape of a single word, an extensive list, an elaborate travel account, or an 
analysis of the diarist’s psychological state, complicate the categorisation and 
definition of the diaristic record. Individual entries (or sequences), if dated, tend to be 
characterised by temporal immediacy, but frequently document experience 
retrospectively and must thus be situated at the generic threshold between formal 
autobiography and diaristic writing. 
Questions regarding authorship and audience cause further difficulties. Due to 
its intrinsic desire to share experience, be it with the self, or an actual/imagined reader, 
the diary, through “auto-destination,” mimics the conventions of letter writing: the 
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person who writes the entry also receives it, as it were, frequently establishing links 
between entries, “catching up,” apologising, confessing, justifying, and, particularly 
in the case of Eliot, hoping for an absolving response.35 Intratextual and intertextual 
references are, according to Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen, integral to the practices of letter 
writing, establishing a “dialogue of correspondence.”36 Similarly, self-referencing and 
direct allusions to previous entries are a common characteristic of diary writing, 
through which diarists tend to establish a continuity of text and persona. Chapter Two 
will highlight such ‘interactions between selves,’ focusing on the diary of George 
Eliot. As the writer and reader are identical, the diary functions as a formalised 
discourse between the two. 
Arguably, the fundamental motivation behind all autobiographical writing is 
the desire to remember and be remembered, which coexists with the need for 
confession and absolution. Rather than silently contemplating his or her thoughts, the 
diarist chooses to give them a material shape, thus inviting communication between 
writing and reading selves, as well as between him- or herself and a confidante, 
stranger, or wider audience. This reaching out for a response from the self and/or the 
other can be seen as the unifying quality of autobiographical writing, as Carolyn 
Barros has convincingly argued: “a diary, a set of letters, an oral account, a collection 
of photographs, or a hymn [;] someone is telling someone else that something is 
happening to me.” 37  Life-writing genres, such as spiritual autobiography, formal 
autobiography, memoirs, letter writing and diary writing, systematically overlap as 
they are products of individual consciousnesses perceiving themselves from a similar 
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“operational vantage point,” to use the words of Sidonie Smith, aiming to ensure the 
veracious and respectful treatment and remembrance of their lives.38 
Despite their similar generic objectives, the conception of reality 
communicated by retrospective autobiographical accounts differs fundamentally from 
the perspective that diaristic writing must necessarily adopt. Whereas the 
autobiographer “considers his or her destiny as a whole” and endeavours to create a 
unified version of the past, as Alain Girard has observed, the diarist does not have the 
advantage of retrospectively re-imagining his or her self, but “seeks to give to his or 
her present life a reality which ceaselessly escapes from his or her grasp.”39 The diary 
thus captures the process of self-signification in which the diarist negotiates his own 
value within his or her cultural context. Autobiography can be seen as an effort to 
manipulate the judgment of the past by future generations. The diary, in contrast, 
seeks to fashion a self that is considered respectable in the present and the future. The 
fact that this self-construct is usually invisible at first glance does not mean the 
diarist’s motivations are any less predetermined than the autobiographer’s.  
Diarists tend to use several life-writing genres for different purposes, as can be 
seen in the case of John Ruskin (Chapter Three). Ruskin did not use the diary as a 
forum for internal self-contemplation and only communicated truly personal issues 
via written correspondence that was explicitly addressed to a recipient. Considering 
the consistent silencing of the self that he practices in the diary, it is ironic that in Fors 
Clavigera (1871-1878 and 1880-1884), a collection of letters that takes the stylistic 
form of a diary and the material form of a pamphlet/magazine, Ruskin demonstrates 
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“reckless and absolute candour,” as John D. Rosenberg has observed. 40  In “The 
Convents of St. Quentin,” written in Brantwood on February 8th 1880, he admits that:  
Fors contains much trivial and desultory talk […] Scattered up and down in it 
[…] there is much casual expression of my own personal feelings and faith, 
together with bits of autobiography, which were allowed place, not without 
some notion of their being useful, but yet imprudently, and even incontinently, 
because I could not at the moment hold my tongue about what vexed or 
interested me, or returned soothingly to my memory.41 
 
Whereas in the diaries, Ruskin prudently limits the content of his entries to 
professionally useful observations, in Fors, this rather dignified reticence breaks 
down and gives way to “incontinent,” ebullient and self-revealing writing. The diary 
portrays Ruskin as the photographic intermediary between the world and the reader, 
but Fors shows a Ruskin longing for an “us of the old race” (“The Advent Collect”), 
solidarity and human understanding.42 He now seems unresponsive to nature, which 
constitutes a fundamental change from the attitude manifested in the diaries: “For me, 
the birds do not sing, nor ever will,” but he still aspires to make others see: “but they 
would, for you, if you cared to have it so.”43  
The maxim “Verba Volant—scripta manent” (“Words fly away, what is 
written stays put”), can be seen as the primary motive of the diary genre.44 This 
applies to all forms of writing, but in the case of the diary, the writer’s desire to fix his 
or her personal (temporal, spatial and emotional) reality transcends writing as a 
technology that aids intellectual reasoning.45 The diary embodies an attempt to grasp 
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and collect different facets of an ever-changing self through, to use the words of 
Robyn Sarah, its “contemplative nature, [its] engaged literacy, [its] respect for the 
past, and an examined life.” 46  The diaristic gesture is possessive, analytic and 
introspective, but always concerned with cultural rules for behaviour and conduct. 
The diary self-consciously articulates the diarist’s subjective experience of the world 
within the parameters of the culturally acceptable and hence its act of self-assertion is 
always already coupled with self-effacement. Regenia Gagnier has defined 
autobiographical records as “rhetorical projects embedded in concrete material 
situations,” and similarly, this thesis insists on their direct reflection of and indirect 
contribution to cultural circumstances.47 
 
Critical approaches and methodology 
Despite the abundance of published diaries, Victorian and other, Felicity A. 
Nussbaum’s 1988 assessment that “a theory of diary has not yet evolved,” is still true 
in the realm of English-speaking diary scholarship.48 Perhaps this is for good reason, 
as the definition of generic boundaries implies the constant danger of over-theorising 
the particular and brushing over instances of dissidence, thus misrepresenting the 
individual diarist. Despite the strongly subjective meaning that each diary has for its 
author, we can detect commonalities between diaries. Rather than to obtrude a generic 
frame onto the diaries I have considered, I have identified each text’s most urgent 
concerns and, taking a new historicist approach, read them in light of the author’s 
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work, letters and memoranda, as well as journalism, philosophy and psychology of 
the day. After individual study and contexualisation of the diaries in question, the 
themes of professional zeal and emotional regulation transpired and surpassed topics 
prevalent in other Victorian diaries, such as social life, politics and sexuality. 
Although I distinguish selective repression as an integral factor in the 
professionalisation of the self, I by no means intend to take up and perpetuate the idea 
that the Victorians were fundamentally repressed, which was spread by critical work 
of the 1960s and 1970s. I use the Foucauldian model not to stress the dissemination of 
repression throughout the Victorian culture in general, but rather to indicate specific 
ways in which the diarist functions as the product and shaper of his or her culture by 
showing a variety of responses to the cult of self-improvement as well as individual 
interpretations of the diary’s generic characteristics.  
 My endeavour to explore Victorian perceptions of the desirability and 
respectability of feeling bears resemblance to Gesa Stedman’s impetus for her study 
on the Victorian discourses on the emotions. 49  Although Stedman is similarly 
interested in the influence of “the individual body and the feelings” on the “body 
politic of the nineteenth century,” our studies diverge on a methodological level.50 
Whereas Stedman’s focus on nineteenth-century novels and both Victorian and 
contemporary criticism provides an important survey of the language of the emotions 
in their cultural context, my thesis exhibits the “dialectic of the expression of the 
emotions and the necessity to control them” in the Victorian diary and shows that the 
compulsion to exert self-censorship that can be detected in public utterances also 
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intruded into the supposedly free and private realm of the diaristic record.51 The study 
of these well-known writers’ diaries can thus shed a new light on their perception of 
their function in the world. Whereas the examination of their published work reveals 
their impact on Victorian culture, the diaries uncover the extent to which they 
themselves were concretely influenced by the ideologies of the day, such as the 
necessity to control the emotions (Chapter One).  
 In order to form a critical understanding of the diary genre, as well as to 
develop methods of interpreting non-confessional diaries, I have frequently turned to 
French diary criticism, which has produced several large-scale monographs that 
successfully explore the effects of socio-political, historical and philosophical 
developments on the interiority of the diarist from multiple perspectives, such as 
psychoanalysis and sociology. The seminal French diary studies written by Philippe 
Lejeune, Beatrice Didier and Alain Girard include both genders and discuss the 
importance of class and historical moment, as well as generic affinities. 52  Their 
comprehensive and in-depth surveys, more so than the disunited and rather 
fragmented body of English diary criticism, lucidly present the diary as a tool for 
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gaining self-possession, obliterating the need for a possibly disappointing human 
other and maximally taking advantage of the time available to the individual.53  
In contrast, English analyses tend to focus on the particular and refrain from 
establishing all-encompassing generalisations. Nonetheless, they frequently portray 
the diary as a specifically feminine form and aim to give a voice to the silenced.54 In 
order to situate a diary among other autobiographical texts, while still respecting its 
unique articulation of authorial subjectivity, it was imperative to consult theoretical 
attempts at defining the genre, as well as case-specific information, such as 
biographical references and other forms of life writing, and historical evidence of 
Victorian discourse.  
The approach of cultural historians to the diary was of little help when it came to 
the analysis of individual texts.55 Research carried out by nineteenth-century critic 
Jakob Burkhardt and twentieth-century scholars Karl Joachim Weintraub and Georges 
Gusdorf, among others, has read the desire to communicate noteworthy information 
relating to the self as the product of “certain metaphysical preconditions,” to use 
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Gusdorf’s words.56  For instance, according to Weintraub, in ancient Greece, self-
searching was extremely limited because the conditions of the day did not encourage 
self-centred activity, as “individuals were embedded in the social mass of given blood 
relations. These earlier lines are enmeshed in and derive their meaning from basic 
social and kinship relations.” 57  The Middle Ages, Weintraub argues, present a 
similarly low number of autobiographical writings because the medieval societal 
structure differed from the social order of ancient Greece to a minimal degree: the 
Church took the place of the “polis.” While this thesis takes into account the “macro-
phenomena” of the historical context in which the Victorian diaries under 
consideration were conceived, such as social and industrial change, it devotes 
substantial attention to the individual writer’s private utterances. Rather than to 
impose a determinative framework, Chapter One’s discussion of selective repression 
acts as an explanatory, contextualising basis for my examination of the chosen 
diarists’ tendency to prioritise discussions of their work over expressions of personal 
emotion in their diaries.  
Returning to my previous point, there is obviously reason to doubt the 
possibility of a total immersion of the individual in his or her culture, as Marcel 
Mauss’s sociological investigations have revealed: “there has never been a human 
being without the sense not only of his body but, but also of his simultaneously 
mental and physical individuality.”58  It does indeed seem obvious that intelligent 
beings, aware of their inner and outer particularities, would form a concept of self, 
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even if the term “self” is not in common usage. However, for autobiographical writing 
to occur, “belief in the inward self as a responsible agent” needs to be encouraged, as, 
according to Roger Smith, “the Protestant sensibility” did.59 Factors such as political 
restructuring, technological advancement, religious reformation and scientific 
progress all have an impact on the individual and his or her material environment.  
Peter Burke has warned that a lack of autobiographical records must not be 
equated with a lack of self-consciousness: 
It is obviously dangerous to argue from the rarity of ego-documents before 
1500 that self-consciousness was undeveloped, since modern Western links 
between writing and self-examination are not universal. The kinds of texts 
produced in a given culture are related not only to its central values, but also to 
local assumptions about the uses of literacy (and we must not forget that only 
a minority of the population of Renaissance Europe was able to write). 60 
 
Indeed, when considering the material reality in which autobiographical records are 
produced, we must take into account the practical aspects of culture. Victorian culture, 
with its immense output of literary, journalistic, scientific, educational, recreational 
and promotional publications, insisted on the supremacy of the written word. 61 
Literacy equated the ability to disseminate one’s knowledge and celebrities, such as 
Ruskin, published almost everything they wrote. Literacy also meant that writing 
could become a professional, bread-winning activity, which kept Gissing from the 
much-dreaded workhouse. The economic importance of writing and the general 
eagerness to publish written work can arguably be seen as a crucial factor that 
determined the shape (content and form) of Victorian life writing. As we have seen, 
even though diaries were not always designed for publication, it is very likely that 
many of them were written with publication in mind, or defensively anticipated 
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external judgment. The cultural association of writing and economic value could be 
seen to have stimulated diarists’ desire to use their temporal and emotional resources 
wisely and to appropriate their own lives, as Chapter Two discusses at length.  
From a political point of view, the liberalism that was in place in Victorian 
Britain was “a new type of social order related to a novel mode of production that was 
marked in contrast to either feudalism or the ancient republics,” as Richard Paul 
Bellamy has noted.62 In light of Weintraub’s metaphysical theories of autobiography, 
we might remark that liberal individuals did not adhere to a “unitary body of 
principles dubbed the capitalist ideology” but that still their society was not atomized, 
as they strove to maintain the communitarian spirit of past civilizations. 63  As 
evidenced by the diaries this thesis examines, the Victorians strove to establish a 
“meritocratic society of self-reliant and responsible citizens” who were united “in 
pursuit of individual, social, material and moral improvement,” which was not 
opposed to the community-based system that dominated the Greek “polis.” 64 
However, since Victorian individuals had both the right and the duty to maximise 
their own profit, they also assumed an undeniable, but not clearly defined, 
responsibility towards the community, which meant that their role in society was 
ambiguous. As a result, the diarists in this thesis constantly evaluated their behaviour 
in search for the appropriate conduct. Their diaries helped them ‘find a place for the 
self.’  
 
Themes: Time, Work and Extraverted Narrative 
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Rather than ruminate in isolation, the diarists under consideration used their diaries as 
a means to process the external world and to position themselves in relation to their 
cultural reality. The diaristic gesture’s primarily appropriative function consists of 
arresting and organising the temporal, which catered to the diarists’ need to use their 
limited time on earth as productively as possible. They were eager to ensure the self-
disciplined employment of time for the purposes of work, which ideally benefited the 
community. As the appropriation and possession of emotional experience was 
complicated due to Victorian culture’s condemnation of passion, sullenness and self-
complacency (Chapter One), a preoccupation with visual observations (Chapters 
Three and Four) and work schedules (Chapter Two) constituted a legitimised 
substitute for engaging with the self directly.  
Gradual secularisation, which denied the comforting belief in an afterlife, can 
be seen to have reinforced the pressures exerted by the Protestant work ethic and 
made productivity the standard for measuring human value. Martin Hewitt has thus 
viewed the extensive use and availability of (often preformatted) diaries after 1830 as 
the product of this capitalist lifestyle: 
The industrialization of time created wide demand for desk and pocket diaries 
to record meetings arranged and transactions conducted. The rise of 
bureaucracy brought the spread of the diary as a tool for management.65  
 
In this “meritocratic” culture, the treatment of time as a precious resource that was not 
to be wasted converged with the pressure to work tirelessly and encouraged the 
diarists this thesis discusses to take maximal advantage of their available time. By 
verbally rendering and inscribing the lived moment, they claimed ownership over 
their experience and sought to prove to themselves and to potential readers that they 
were/had been hard-working, useful members of society. Wastefulness of life and 
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misdirected energies were considered major sins and this awareness was progressively 
forged and reinforced by the diary, which, as Robert A. Fothergill has observed, 
shaped “a mental attitude [cultivating] systematic and discriminating observation. The 
journal is an instrument for seeing more clearly and remembering more profitably.”66 
Through re-reading, the diarists were able to (re-)establish connections to their past 
selves, which allowed them to take an educational short-cut: instead of having to re-
gain knowledge, they could learn from the inscribed events and relativise new 
experiences. Thus, in their attempt to use time and experience “profitably,” their 
whole lives became work. 
Besides consistently documenting their professional progress, the diarists 
under examination demonstrate a keen interest in observing their natural and urban 
environment, rather than reflecting on interhuman relationships. Eliot’s and Gissing’s 
fiction demonstrates very developed observational skills when it comes to human 
character, but their diaries, although less consistently than Ruskin’s and Hopkins’s, 
tend to privilege descriptions of the natural world (and artefacts) over human 
interactions. This tendency to foreground descriptions of natural scenery accentuates 
these diaries’ ‘professional’ nature and their role as equipment to the observer. The 
function of these texts, as Mary Ellen Bellanca has explained, was often more than 
that of “[repositories] of raw information,” as they provided diarists with 
a versatile instrument for investigating not only nature but also themselves as 
perceiving subjects—for responding to experience and reconstructing 
discovery as well as fashioning modes of expression that would later inform 
other writings, including published works in other forms.67 
  
The diary’s capacity to establish a self-objectifying distance between selves, allows 
the observer to watch him- or herself in the process of visually studying the world. In 
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this sense, for Ruskin and Hopkins in particular, the diary was a tool that allowed 
them to store and process visual experience and ‘train the eye,’ as well as to construct 
themselves purely as observers. We might argue that their diary’s strict focus on 
visual reality implies a conscious choice to block out undesirable emotions, such as 
sexual confusion. 
 
Chapters 
As I have announced, the selected ‘professional’ diaries can be characterised by their 
determination to improve the diarists’ productivity through an unwavering focus on 
work. The daily inventory of tasks accomplished, progress made and set-backs 
suffered establishes a competition between the writing selves (past, present and future) 
and encourages the identification of the diarist with his or her work. For the diarists in 
question, the diary was an essential instrument in the implementation of the self-
discipline necessary to maximise productivity and respectability. Although all the 
authors this thesis discusses are seminal Victorian writers whose work has received 
extensive critical attention, their diaries have largely been ignored. Even if these 
authors’ lives and publication histories are quite dissimilar, all of them display an 
eagerness to excel at their work and to avoid hostile social judgment by consistently 
monitoring the propriety of their utterances and actions. Their diaries can be seen as 
attempts to find the fragile balance between self-assertion and self-effacement.  
Chapter One aims to situate Eastlake’s, Crabb Robinson’s, Eliot’s, Gissing’s, 
Ruskin’s and Hopkins’s obsession with self-discipline within their culture’s passion 
for self-improvement. As professional motivation and the selective repression of 
emotion tend to be deeply intertwined in the texts under scrutiny, I shall analyse the 
instructions for emotional control as evidenced in the psychological discourse of the 
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nineteenth century and take Alexander Bain’s (1818-1809) psychology manual The 
Emotions and the Will of 1859 as a conceptual basis. Bain’s title has eponymous 
significance in that it accentuates the fundamentally bipolar organisation that he and 
many of his contemporaries and colleagues perceived to be the essence of a person. 
Before the strength of the will achieved dominance over the emotions, the human 
being was not considered a person, but rather an infant, madman/woman or criminal. 
Emotional control came to be seen as the mark of civilisation and respectability. 
 The first diarist discussed is art critic, artist and journalist, Lady Elizabeth 
Eastlake (1809-1893). She figures in this thesis because she was a woman in a male-
dominated world and wrote articles that defined the traits of character and behaviour 
that were desirable in a respectable female, as her famously scathing review of Jane 
Eyre shows.68 Although Eastlake never advocated total immunity from emotion, she 
insisted that work should always counteract emotional weakness and thus helped to 
reinforce her culture’s association of professional diligence with emotional control. 
Her diaries have mostly been ransacked for their biographical content and have not 
been read in their own right. Although they have been edited and reassembled with 
little sensitivity, they reveal a woman who not only cultivated a façade of moral and 
intellectual perfection, but who fervently strove to substantialise this persona by 
embodying and being an honourable and principled person. 
Eastlake’s heavily didactic cultural commentary supported Bain’s idea that the 
emotions needed to be managed and used for artistic creation, rather than self-
indulgent self-contemplation. Both Bain and Eastlake display a strong belief in the 
individual’s responsibility to control “passionate [emotional] outbursts” for the 
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benefit of the community. 69  Alongside this encouraged selective repression, both 
deemed enthusiastic emotion to be a crucial component of creativity. As Henry Crabb 
Robinson’s (1775-1867) diary shows, the Victorian artist was under considerable 
pressure to find this ideal emotional equilibrium. Crabb Robinson was a well-known 
Victorian lawyer, who was closely acquainted with the intellectual elite of the 
nineteenth century, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, as well as Goethe and Schiller. 
He used his diary primarily to document his interactions (verbal and written) with his 
famous friends, as well as to vent his opinions on contemporary philosophy. As with 
Eastlake, his diary has not been the object of scholarly investigation and is often used 
as a reference text to deliver ‘authentic’ Victorian ‘first-hand’ ‘facts,’ as well as 
background information on the members of the diarist’s social circle. His estimations 
of his personal value correlate with his regrets over his failed artistic career and 
accentuate the desire, or duty, to achieve professional success that we see in the other 
diaries of this thesis. His (heavily edited) records show that he was severely 
intimidated by the general cultural call for just enough emotion, which stifled his own 
creative energy. The disappointment, humiliation and shame that came from this 
‘poetic dryness’ (which is also evident in Hopkins’s career) demonstrate that, for 
Crabb Robinson, artistic prowess was the highest distinction of the human being, 
which he felt that, for him, was always out of reach. 
This chapter contrasts two types of cultural commentators: on the one hand, 
Lady Eastlake, who was confident in her professional authority and sought to 
influence others; on the other, Crabb Robinson, who, although he had a successful 
legal career, was not able to fulfil his professional vision and spent his life coming to 
terms with the compromises he had to make. I consider some of the cultural roots of 
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the habitual self-effacement, which all the diarists that this thesis examines seem to 
have exerted for the sake of foregrounding their work. It also presents the diary’s role 
as a self-monitoring tool that could help the diarist adhere to the culturally determined 
duty to tailor a self that protects, rather than challenges, the community. 
Chapter Two focuses on the diaries of the renowned Victorian realists George 
Eliot (1819-1890) and George Gissing (1857-1903). Eliot was a female sage who 
hoped to transform society through her fiction and, as her diaries show, attempted to 
craft a genuinely noble and selfless person. Although Gissing’s novels are often 
mentioned alongside Eliot’s, he was not motivated by the same determination to 
achieve social change through his fictional creations, but struggled for financial, 
rather than moral, survival. Reading the diaries of these realist novelists, whose works 
appear at different extremes of the spectrum of realism, reveals the ways in which 
material reality can inform and reinforce a writer’s moral philosophy (Comte’s 
positivism for Eliot and Schopenauerian pessimism in Gissing’s case). Despite the 
drastic difference in material wealth that separated these two authors, their diaries 
show that both treated work as a new form of religiosity that determined their value as 
individuals. Both constantly deplored their inability to produce fictional and essayistic 
writing. 
Eliot’s diary shows that her ideal of an uninterrupted, rigorous work-discipline 
exerted a significant strain on her and caused a constant personal struggle between 
self-abnegation and self-assertion. For Eliot, lack of work signified the neglect of her 
readers who depended on her for moral guidance. Failure to produce literature thus 
established her as a weak and selfish human being who had disappointed the 
community by not paying back the debt that came with her financial and romantic 
privileges and who had deserted her positivist ideals. Eliot’s diary reveals that her 
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didactic fiction, through which she sought to redeem her guilt towards her readers, 
was the product of endless crises of confidence, caused by her own, exceedingly high, 
literary standards. The diary offers a space for weakness and complaint, but, in tune 
with the cultural pressure to silence such emotions, Eliot refuses to wholly indulge in 
her lamentations and always reassures herself and her invisible reader that despite 
momentary discomfort she is extremely grateful for her blessings. Through frequently 
re-reading her diaries and consequently interacting with past selves, Eliot sought to 
cultivate a self-contained, balanced and productive persona who could “touch the 
hearts of [her] fellowmen” and accomplish social change.70 Significantly, Eliot did 
not employ her diary as a confessional vent, but instead used her letters and fictional 
works to utter and transcend emotional turmoil. 
 George Gissing’s (1857-1903) diary displays an even more obstinate 
compulsion to produce work and a more consistent equation of professional 
productivity with personal value. Gissing needed to produce literature at an 
astonishing speed in order to overcome the misery of poverty which he experienced as 
shameful and unrespectable. He used his diary as a tool to monitor his rate of literary 
output and to exert additional pressure on himself, and, usually only when he could 
report genuine happiness, did he inscribe experiences that were personal rather than 
professional. Gissing’s practice of diary keeping reflects the divided nature of his life: 
because material want and anxiety dominated his professional existence, he rarely 
shared anything beyond his progress with his diary. During his travels, however, 
when Gissing was in the pleasurable proximity of great art, his diary entries swelled 
in size and became more descriptive. It seems that in the idealised world of Italy and 
Greece, Gissing felt he was truly alive, which shows that work was the only 
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component of his comparatively dreary London life that deserved recording. He 
tended to reveal more personal information in his letters—for instance, among many 
other instances, the diary fails to disclose the romantic developments with Gabrielle 
Fleury, but his letters to her expose his obsessive love. 
Chapter Three examines the published diaries of art critic and philosopher 
John Ruskin (1819-1900), whose extraordinary body of publications is evidence for a 
life spent in the service of work. His diaristic writing was similarly extensive, as for 
Ruskin, undocumented experience was wasted. I shall treat Ruskin’s deliberate 
disregard of his personal life in his diaries and his autobiography as a prime example 
of the selective consciousness at work in many Victorian diaries. As Andrew Leng 
has pointed out, Ruskin, in his extensive “self-mythologization,” simply omitted his 
“disastrous marriage and the humiliating scandal surrounding its annulment on the 
grounds of non-consummation.” 71  Through foregrounding his professional self, 
Ruskin’s diary displays an unwavering focus on visual reality, which reveals a refusal 
to engage with the unrespectable aspects of his past and present life and is self-
assertive in its self-effacing censorship. The diary precedes Ruskin’s determination to 
“[pass] in total silence things which I have no pleasure in reviewing,” which he made 
explicit in Praeterita (1885-1889).72  
Whereas for Eliot and Gissing pleasure stood in direct opposition to work, for 
Ruskin, gratifying emotion was an integral part of the labour-intensive process of 
observation, as his diary shows. The other diarists only sporadically included 
extensive travel reports into their diaries, but Ruskin’s overflows with lengthy and 
very detailed visual descriptions of his external environment. Although Ruskin, like 
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Crabb Robinson, viewed emotion as the necessary spark that invested art with life and 
meaning, he employed it for the purposes of work and did not respect its natural 
dynamic of excitability and satiability, which was the cause of much frustration. 
Instead, he constantly forced himself to feel touched by landscapes and architecture 
when he was emotionally drained and incapable of connecting to the observed 
objects/events. Like Gissing’s, Ruskin’s diary strikes through its remarkably 
consistent silencing of private emotions, which stands in stark contrast to the desire 
for the total possession of visual scenes, which Ruskin expressed frequently.  
 Chapter Four scrutinises the diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889), the 
now famous Jesuit poet who existed at the periphery of the Victorian art world. None 
of Hopkins’s poems were published in his lifetime, for his religious and his poetic self 
were in a constant state of conflict. His diary primarily translates his poetic 
consciousness, rendering Hopkins’s wilful focus on the descriptions of visual objects. 
In some ways, the diary can be seen to embody Hopkins’s effort to distance himself 
from his subversive and unrespectable homosexual emotions, which was finalised by 
his decision to join the Jesuit order and devote his body and mind to God. His diary 
shows that, in order to divert from “dangerous” emotions, Hopkins developed his 
observational skills and, through inscribing his impressions into this record, 
strengthened his imagined connection to the natural world. Initially Hopkins used the 
diary form to monitor and quench his inappropriate homosexual interests and it later 
served as a forum in which to construct himself as a necessary observer of nature—a 
task that took the shape of a profession: in order to include and ground himself in 
God’s creation, Hopkins consistently animated non-human natural objects, imagining 
them to invite and return his gaze. Hopkins then received validation for his efforts to 
fulfil nature’s need to be perceived by a human consciousness, which, in the 
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terminology he developed in his diary, was called “inscape.” Presumably, Hopkins 
eventually gave up on his diary because his work as a priest was too demanding and 
completely swallowed his time, to the point that he could no longer cultivate his 
observational skills, which led to the despair of the “terrible” sonnets. 
 The Victorian diaries under examination can be seen as the diarists’ attempts 
to monitor the intensity and propriety of their emotions and employ them to increase 
their professional output. Eastlake, Crabb Robinson, Eliot, Gissing, Ruskin and 
Hopkins perceived self-scrutiny as a useful activity only when it could serve the 
perfection and maximisation of their intellectual endeavour, not when it encouraged 
self-indulgent rumination. Constantly aiming to inspirit themselves, these diarists 
preached the codes of silent discipline to themselves and, through their published 
work, to a wider audience.73 
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Chapter One 
 
Silencing the Self: Victorian Psychology and Social Life: Alexander Bain, 
Elizabeth  Eastlake and Henry Crabb Robinson. 
 
The diaries that this thesis examines are characterised by their reluctance to reveal 
intimate detail about their authors. These private records are distinguished by the 
diarists’ determination to maintain a disciplined work routine and to exert control over 
their emotions of anger, pride and passion. Invariably, the diarists portray self-control 
as a quality that is essential for maintaining a rigorous work ethic and thus an 
inestimably desirable trait of character. Emotionally indulgent behaviour, such as 
vanity, self-pity or lethargy, on the other hand, is regarded as a sign of personal 
weakness which has to be extirpated. This chapter will read the deliberate silencing of 
the self displayed in the diaries under investigation as a symptom of a more general 
societal pressure to hush the emotions, minimise references to the self and cultivate 
other-oriented behaviour, as evidenced in the psychological discourse of the period. It 
will consider the impact of Evangelical self-abnegation and political uncertainty on 
these diarists’ desire for a disciplined management of their emotions and show that 
repression did by no means target all emotions, but was employed in specific 
situations to achieve specific results.   
Alexander Bain’s (1818-1903) psychology textbook The Emotions and the 
Will (1859) investigates and disseminates the mechanisms inherent in emotional 
control and thus assumes a function similar to Victorian advice literature. 1  Bain 
believed that through will-power, the individual could control and train his or her 
emotions like limbs. I shall investigate the reoccurrence of similar instructions for 
repressing the emotions in favour of professional diligence in the diaries and critical 
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work of two extremely influential Victorian public figures: Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake 
(1809-1893), the art critic and writer who was a “central figure in the Victorian art 
scene” and the lawyer and linguist Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) who was “a 
significant cultural mediator and channel of communication between English and 
German letters.”2 Due to their high-ranking social circles—Eastlake’s was composed 
of celebrities such as Ruskin, Turner and Carlyle and Crabb Robinson was friends 
with Wordsworth, Coleridge and Goethe—their views would have influenced a large 
number of their contemporaries. At the same time, like Bain, they adopted 
behavioural guidelines that were pervading the culture, which were reflected in both 
their diaries and their work. 
The Victorian diarists that this thesis examines evidently come from a 
privileged background and the moral concerns they uttered in their private records 
reflect upper-middle-class ideas of respectability, rather than rendering a 
comprehensive picture of the Victorian cultural climate. All of them, George Eliot and 
George Gissing (Chapter Two) in particular, were “writers [who] spread the cult of 
self-awareness to the reading middle classes” and “professed a heartfelt interest in the 
secret needs and conflicting emotions concealed beneath civilized surfaces,” thus 
“[mapping] inner space,” to use the words of Peter Gay.3 Their diaries are dominated 
by a persistent struggle to tend to the various duties their cultural context demanded 
them to accomplish. Eliot and Gissing used the diary’s organisational structure to 
monitor daily accomplishments and failures. For Ruskin (Chapter Three), the diary 
represented a repository for his visual experience, which he felt compelled to preserve 
from oblivion. Gerard Manley Hopkins (Chapter Four) felt a similar duty to 
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appropriate his visual environment, insisting on his own presence as an observer in 
the tableaux he depicted.  
Eastlake, Crabb Robinson, Eliot, Gissing, Ruskin and Hopkins used their 
diaries as tools to enforce self-imposed as well as culturally determined duties and 
cannot be seen to fully conform to the functions—“expression” and “reflection”— 
that diary critic Philippe Lejeune views as the fundamental characteristics of the 
twentieth-century diary.4 I shall argue that, due to the cultural codes of propriety, the 
“[releasing and unloading of] the weight of emotions” inherent in diaristic expression 
often inspired the diarists with shame, which led them to give in to “the impulse to 
destroy.”5 Lejeune convincingly argues that through this final separation of the self 
and the emotion, diarists are able to “liberate” themselves from “the weight of the 
past.”6 Lady Eastlake destroyed some of the diaries she thought too revealing and 
Ruskin determined from the start to keep one diary for feelings and one for thoughts, 
thus weeding out the undesirable emotional overgrowth. The present diaries fit into 
Lejeune’s framework in that they can primarily be considered as instruments for 
“analysis” and “deliberation,” creating “archives from lived experience” in order to 
“freeze time” and “examine choices.”7 Significantly, Bain encouraged the use of a 
diary to separate thoughts from emotions in order to make rational decisions. The 
diarists I focus on similarly used their records to draw lessons from the past and 
strengthen their willpower rather than for venting emotional turmoil.  
An examination of the similarities between the portrayal of emotion in Bain’s 
psychological discourse and Eastlake and Crabb Robinson’s texts can give us an 
understanding of how cultural ideas of the emotional and physical constitution of  the 
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human being conditioned individual behaviour. In its effort to objectivise and 
catalogue the motions of the mental apparatus through scientific inquiry, psychology 
assumed an almost factual knowledge of the mind. Psychological textbooks thus 
propagated an image of the human being that claimed the unquestionable accuracy of 
anatomical analysis. Psychology manuals, such as the work of Alexander Bain, W.B. 
Carpenter (1813-1885) and T.S. Clouston (1840-1915), which possessed (some) 
scientific authority, tended to promulgate moral ideas under the cover of disinterested 
veracity. 8  They can therefore be viewed as prescriptive texts, in some ways 
comparable to the popular advice literature, such as Samuel Smiles’ Self-Help (1859), 
which I shall further discuss in Chapter Two.9 
The diary is an important tool in the analysis of Victorian thought because the 
diarist’s choice of material and language can shed light on the cultural consciousness 
of the nineteenth century.  However, due to the methodological difficulties that the 
editors of Eastlake’s and Crabb Robinson’s diaries have caused, this chapter will not 
be able to investigate the diaries’ role in the latter’s emotional self-monitoring, but 
will limit itself to an analysis of the attitudes they expressed in regard to emotional 
control. Despite the textual tailoring of the editors, we can discern Eastlake’s and 
Crabb Robinson’s efforts to fulfil socio-cultural requirements and assess the impact of 
culture on self-fashioning. Eastlake lived to witness the impact of Bain’s work and, as 
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I shall show, her 1868 study of grief entitled Fellowship: Letters to My Sister 
Mourners recalls Bain’s views that the suffering related to loss must initially be 
tolerated, if not embraced, before the individual must resume rigorous emotional self-
discipline.10 Because both Eastlake and Crabb Robinson, as much as the other diarists 
this thesis examines, discussed the necessity to repress emotion in their diaries, we 
can infer that they responded to the codes of conduct that their culture was suffused 
with. We may assume that Bain was himself influenced by cultural mores advocating 
repression which marked the moral didacticism of his studies. Neither of these authors 
can be considered a representative of the whole of Victorian society, but some of the 
conscious mechanisms at work in the regulation of their conduct can be seen to be 
characteristic of their historical and cultural context. 
Bain’s psychological studies, as much as the diaries and critical articles under 
consideration, depict emotional self-indulgence as a behaviour needing control, 
temperance and self-restraint. Section I argues that secularisation, religious self-
abnegation and political uncertainty intensified the culture’s focus on the self and 
heightened the individual’s responsibility towards the community. I will trace the 
motivation for emotional restraint to the self-negation advocated by Evangelical 
doctrines on the one hand, and the fear of revolution and social upheaval that 
pervaded Victorian culture on the other. I will show that psychologists and medical 
doctors of the nineteenth century, in accordance with the institutionalised enforcement 
of altruism, proposed techniques for a successful repressive adjustment of 
unrespectable emotions—particularly those relating to the self—to the social 
requirements. I will situate Alexander Bain’s work within the discourse of Victorian 
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psychology and discuss its relevance in light of the sociological scholarship of 
Norbert Elias and selected scholars of respectability, such as F.M.L. Thompson, and 
analyse the self-protective mechanisms at work within the individual that give rise to 
culturally conditioned behaviour. 11  Attempting to shed light on the practice of 
silencing the self that can be observed in the diaries under examination, I will 
investigate the conscious and unconscious processes inherent in the private ‘managing 
of feeling’ in the public persona’s moral appearance.12  
Section II will present my methodological choice to compensate the severe 
editorial distortion of the diarists’ original records by reading Eastlake’s diary in light 
of her published texts and Crabb Robinson’s in view of biographical factors. I will 
then discuss the feminisation of emotion in Victorian culture; presenting Eastlake’s 
and Crabb Robinson’s praise of both the nurturing, motherly qualities of feminine 
emotion and the connection that they draw between self-effacement and respectability 
as an example of more general cultural tendencies. Despite their encouragement of 
repression, they considered specific emotions as wholesome and necessary, such as 
the comforting and caring emotions that parents felt towards their children and artists’ 
emotional enthusiasm towards their creations. The juxtaposition of Eastlake’s attitude 
to the grieving process and the advice Crabb Robinson was given after the death of 
his mother demonstrates the delicate balance between indulgence and self-control that 
he felt he was expected to find. Whereas the emotions were seen as the mortar that 
solidified the family and infused art with its greatness, they had to be severely 
monitored in social interactions. In what ultimately can be seen as an effort to protect 
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the other and the community, the individual had to abstain from emotional 
impetuosity and selfishness, which explains the instances of apologetic self-
minimisation that are typical of the diaries under investigation.     
I Psychology and the Repression of Emotion 
In the past twenty years a considerable body of criticism has questioned the extent of 
Victorian repression and analysed its portrayal in nineteenth-century texts. Recent 
scholarship has interrogated and challenged the validity of accepted post-Victorian 
assessments of the period’s attitudes to ideas of propriety. Matthew Sweet, for 
instance, has observed that traditional views of Victorian sexuality have tended to 
focus on the “practices drawn from the cranky margins of Victorian medical culture,” 
tailoring a picture of the Victorians that is based on extremely shocking exceptions.13 
In reality, the Victorians were probably more lenient than Peter Cominos’ article on 
respectability and sexual behaviour can lead us to think. Cominos focused primarily 
on extreme anti-sexual attitudes, such as Dr. William Acton’s belief in “absolute 
continence” in the respectable gentleman, or Archbishop Ireland’s equation of “sexual 
passion” with “animalism.”14 Clitoridectomy, chastity belts, penis cages and veiled 
piano legs may have existed, but they certainly were not part of the standard 
household. However, selective repression of emotion, even in its most basic forms, 
was, and still is, an undeniable cultural necessity. Like critic Gowan Dawson, who has 
drawn attention to the censorship that Victorian naturalistic texts faced, I would like 
to expose some of the cultural imperatives that encouraged the chosen diarists to 
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customise his or her self into a well-behaved, self-contained, modest and tirelessly 
industrious human being.15  
The idealisation of self-possession, thrift and other-directed behaviour can 
partly be seen as an outcome of the Evangelical principles that were introduced in 
eighteenth-century Britain. Historian Lawrence Stone has noted that within the realm 
of Evangelical control, sexual repression was administered concurrently with a 
general discouragement of openly displayed emotion. 16 Max Weber (1864-1920), on 
whose study of the Protestant work ethic (1904-05) I shall elaborate in Chapter Two, 
attributes the Victorian obsession with proper conduct to the Puritan belief that “even 
though a man himself could not, others could know his state of grace by his 
conduct.”17 The Puritan not only anticipated and monitored his or her perception by 
others, but in order to do so, he or she had to believe whole-heartedly in the 
possibility of being one of the elect for whom salvation was assured. Not all 
Victorians were extreme Puritans, of course, but Evangelicalism had an impact on the 
culture’s perception of ardent emotion as undesirable.  
The fear of excessive emotion can also be traced to the political reality of 
nineteenth-century Europe. Britain witnessed the political turmoil of the French 
Revolution, and, eager to avoid such uproar within its own confines, created countless 
institutions that attempted to regularise conduct by establishing norms for individual 
behaviour.  These organisations, such as the Society for the Suppression of Vice of 
1803, the Association Securing a Better Observance of Sunday, the Society for the 
Prevention of Female Prostitution, the Religious Tract Society and the 1824 Vagrancy 
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Act, aimed to combat the forces that constituted a menace to the existing political and 
ideological system, such as revolutionary tendencies, decreasing religious zeal and the 
intrusion of science into the traditional value system. 18  This progressive 
institutionalisation of the Victorian state demonstrates that Henry Crabb Robinson, 
although born in the eighteenth century, was influenced by the increasingly restrictive 
culture of the nineteenth.  
Public and private fears of the disorderly fed into each other to form a culture 
of state control, which encouraged personal vigilance.  Walter J. Houghton, in his 
influential work The Victorian Frame of Mind (1957) has noted that the Victorians’ 
“excessive censorship [was] intended to protect and support the code of chastity, or to 
prevent the embarrassment of looking at what was felt to be shameful.” 19  This 
censorship manifested itself both on a private and on a state level. The necessity of 
controlling feeling sprang from a general fear of revolutionary chaos and cannot be 
reduced to mere prudish tastes. Gesa Stegman has emphasised the political aspect of 
uncontrolled emotion, which, for the Victorians, echoed the breakdown of the social 
system of 1789 France:   
The spectre of the body politic as a mass of powerful, passionate bodies 
overthrowing traditional values and institutions—Spencer’s ‘sanguinary chaos 
of the [French] Revolution’ still very much preyed on people’s minds—was 
another obsessive fear expressed by leading intellectuals, particularly during the 
first part of the century.20 
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This implied belief that human beings, when unleashed, could muster extraordinary 
force, capable of “overthrowing” the structures imposed by social control, 
demonstrates an acute fear of animalistic violence that defied all attempts of 
restraining discipline. In reaction, as social historian F.M.L. Thompson has explained, 
strict regulations became “[devised] mechanisms of social control which conditioned 
and manipulated the propertyless masses into accepting and operating the forms and 
functions of behaviour necessary to sustain the social order of an industrial society.”21 
Financially challenged groups such as the working-classes, prostitutes and Irish 
migrants, among others, were stigmatised as likely to “behave badly,” and thus 
represented a particular menace to an orderly society.22 
Since the introduction of a regularised police force in London in 1829, 
discussions about the nature of the criminal and of unlawful behaviour increased 
significantly and over the course of the nineteenth century led to the formation of “the 
policeman-state.”23 Such a state, according to Foucauldian critics Patrick Brantlinger 
and Donald Ulin, provoked “guilty consciences” in individuals, pushing them to 
behave in non-deviant, respectable ways. “The soul [being] the prison of the body,” as 
Foucault wrote in Discipline and Punish (1975), the self-monitoring individual 
became his or her own panopticon, as this “discipline [came to be] internalised in 
every well-behaved, ‘normal’ good citizen.”24 This approach implied that the human 
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being was seen as an unruly, wild and possibly riotous creature, who needed control 
and correction by a powerful, omnipresent authority.25  
Nineteenth-century psychological studies on the emotions can reveal cultural 
signifiers that reflect some of the concerns that preoccupied society and therefore 
represent valuable historical sources.  In her analysis of the emotions in nineteenth-
century psychological discourse, critic Gesa Stegman has attributed the increased 
focus on the emotions to a general decrease in religious devotion, which constituted 
“a threat to social cohesion and morality which had to be counteracted by desperate 
measures, all of which can be found in the discourse on the emotions.”26 However, it 
seems that religious zeal, as much as secularisation and the fears that accompanied 
this phenomenon, affected Victorian attitudes to the emotions with similar results. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb’s assertion that the “Victorian ethic” of moral reform was 
inspired by the Methodism which John Wesley had promoted, echoes Max Weber’s 
allegation that capitalism rose out of the disembodied behavioural framework of 
Protestantism: 
Even as religion became progressively more attenuated, as the public became 
more relaxed in its faith and the intellectuals more openly sceptical, the social 
ethic did not become correspondingly attenuated or relaxed. Indeed the ethic 
acquired some of the stigmata of old religion—the gloom and fierceness that 
Newman yearned for.27 
 
George Eliot’s diary, in particular, confirms Himmelfarb’s observation that the 
diminution of religious commitment was replaced by “an intensification of moral 
zeal,” and did not bring about a collapse of the value system.28 On the contrary, as 
Himmelfarb has argued, the focus shifted from religious concerns to social 
compassion, with the Victorians now “giving to mankind what they could no longer 
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give to God.”29 This turn towards altruism, I propose, can be associated with the 
general mockery and dismissal of vanity and of the preoccupation with the self which 
can be witnessed in the work of Bain, Eastlake and Crabb Robinson, as well as 
George Eliot, Ruskin and Hopkins (Gissing to a lesser extent).  
I shall now investigate the ways in which Alexander Bain’s psychology was 
other-directed and indicate its parallels to state control. For Bain, the function of 
education consisted in shaping the individual’s “half-organic and half-mental” will, to 
use Rick Rylance’s words, and in directing it towards respectable behaviour; namely 
selfless altruism: “the good of the community becomes the end and aim of our moral 
nature.”30 A very influential psychologist and academic, Bain epitomises the dualism 
“emotion” and “will,” which can be seen as the fundamental dynamic that 
characterises the diaries under examination as well as the diary as a genre. The self-
objectifying function of the diary facilitates the monitoring and the improvement of 
the written (past) self’s emotions through the writing (present) self’s will. The diary 
genre thus reflects the Victorian preoccupation with knowing and moulding the self.  
 
Alexander Bain (1818-1903) 
Alexander Bain was a psychologist and professor of Logic and English at the 
University of Aberdeen. His work, which elevated self-control to a moral level, brings 
to light the ways in which Victorian culture influenced the science of psychology and 
vice-versa. Rylance has argued that: “Bain was a man reacting to close historical 
events and tendencies [and] his conception of the will is not immune from some of the 
prevailing beliefs.” 31  Bain was not affiliated with any religious group and 
demonstrated a classical humanist belief in the malleability of human character and 
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the agency of the human being, as he was convinced that “men and women could 
become virtuous by their own effort of will.”32 The Emotions and the Will presents 
actual techniques by which the individual could condition the emotions by the power 
of the will and thus achieve professional productivity and respectability. Like Gesa 
Stedman, I believe that the “strict moral framework,” which Bain constructed to 
explain the emotions, was designed to “safeguard the individual as well as society 
from immoral behaviour and therefore from ill-health.”33 The will was seen to control 
the body’s “subversive potential,” and to prevent the individual from regressing, as 
my section on Bain’s stance on education will show.34 I would, however, like to go 
beyond Stedman’s argument, showing that Bain specifically encouraged the 
repression of emotions associated with the self, such as vanity and self-indulgence 
and encouraged the use of a diary to invalidate the misleading influence of the 
emotions.  
Bain, like Herbert Spencer, was a friend of George Eliot and George Henry 
Lewes and shared their admiration for the work of Auguste Comte. Because of their 
belief in the interdependence of mind and body, John Stuart Mill explicitly termed 
Bain and Spencer the “successors” of Comte, “who duly placed themselves at the 
twofold point between psychology and physiology.”35 Gustav Jahoda, in his book on 
social psychology, has acknowledged that although Bain was “not a central figure” in 
positivism, he, like Mill and Lewes, played an important role in introducing Comte’s 
ideas to Britain.36 Although, as Thomas Dixon has explained, Comte had not included 
psychology in his classification of the sciences, Bain approached the subject from a 
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scientific angle: “As Brown and other Scottish mental scientists had done before him, 
Bain turned to the physical sciences in his search for a preferable alternative to 
theological methodology.” 37  Using the “Natural History Method,” he viewed the 
emotions as bodily products which could be controlled by the rational command of 
volition.38 As Andrea A. Lunsford has explicated, “to Bain the emotive, cognitive, 
and volitional aspects are not ‘compartments’ of the mind; on the contrary, the mind 
is unified.”39 For him, mental states affected bodily functions and vice-versa—the 
body and the mind were inseparably intertwined as constituents of a unified human 
being and acted upon each other. 
Bain’s The Emotions and the Will starts out with an outline of the elements 
comprising the human mind: “Feeling, Volition and Intellect.”40 Although, as Rylance 
has noted, Bain “rejected the notion that personality and human agency [were] only 
reward stimulated,” he viewed “Pleasures” and “Pains” as essential tools for 
conditioning the emotions, which were termed “Feelings.” 41  Feelings were 
distinguished from Emotions, because they were “characterised simply as 
excitement.” 42  An “Emotion” was a complex phenomenon, which was activated 
through the energies generated by a combination of mental and physical factors:43 
Under the MUSCULAR FEELINGS and the SENSATIONS of the SENSES, 
[are] detailed all the susceptibilities of a primary character, due, on the one 
hand, to the putting forth of the muscular energy, and, on the other, to the 
operation of the outer world on the organs of sense. There remains a large 
department of secondary, derived, or complicated feelings, termed the 
EMOTIONS.44 
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The emotions were thus seen as complex derivatives of the body.45 The movements of 
the body could be refined and trained to perform high-precision skills through specific 
conditioning of the emotions. Similarly, in Bain’s view, intense emotions could be 
tamed, as it were, by the physical and mental control of the will. Through consistent 
efforts at habituation, the individual could achieve command over the shapeless mess 
that were the feelings and gear them towards the sophistication of the intellect. 
Like the diarists this thesis studies, Bain deemed an appropriate dosage of 
repression to be necessary for the individual to become a valuable contributor to 
society. In the fashion of classical humanism, Bain “reject[ed] the ethic of egoism in 
favour of altruism,” insisting that the individual was answerable to society and had to 
direct his or her actions towards the good of the social community.46 His scientific 
work thus reflects his personal moral ideals as well as a strong awareness of the 
expectations that society imposed on the individual. 
  I will not discuss the Victorian controversy relating to free will in this chapter, 
but I will attempt to highlight how, in Bain’s work, the will can be seen as socially 
constructed. Bain viewed the will as an emotion, which, once duly trained, could take 
the shape of what Freud later called the “superego”—a control mechanism 
maintaining the respectable conduct of the individual.47 William George Ward (1812-
1882), the Roman Catholic theologian, contested that Bain and his fellow 
“Determinists” believed in the existence of an “anti-impulsive effort,” by which to 
manage the emotions: “the whole Deterministic controversy […] turns on this one 
question: Do I, or do I not, at various times exercise self-restraint? Do I, or do I not, at 
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various times act in resistance to my strongest present desire?”48 Ward insisted that 
Bain had “omit[ted] all reference to that most important factor in the formation of a 
moral habit, the will’s repeated anti-impulsive efforts.” 49  Bain’s own partial 
confirmation of this accusation in his reply in the third edition of The Emotions and 
the Will is completely misleading, as his Chapter IX on “The Moral Habits,” for 
instance, comprises subchapters such as “Control of Sense and Appetite,” 
“Suppression of Instinctive Movements,” and “Repression of Desire.”50 Despite this 
incomprehensible denial of his belief in the power of will to control both the body and 
the mind, The Emotions and the Will portrays the will as the force that commands and 
corrects the individual’s thoughts and actions.   
Bain’s anti-theistic approach to the emotions represented a novel current 
among nineteenth-century psychologists. Evidently, secularisation was a phenomenon 
that advanced gradually, and within the discipline of psychology, like everywhere else, 
the secular coexisted with the traditionally religious. Thomas Dixon, in his study of 
religious, non-religious and anti-religious approaches to the emotions in the 
nineteenth century, has explained that the psychological term and category of 
“emotions” was introduced in Thomas Brown’s Lectures of 1820.  Because the term 
“emotion” belonged to a scientific terminology, as did words like “psychology, law, 
observation, evolution, organism, brain, nerves, expression, behaviour and viscera,” it 
represented a break with traditional religious typology from the start.51 The words 
formerly used were “passion” and “affection,” which were associated with a less 
rational approach to the mind: “soul, conscience, Fall, sin, grace, Spirit, Satan, will, 
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lower appetite and self love,” which are obviously suffused with religious morality.52 
Alexander Bain had looked at Brown’s Lectures in 1837, but “did not fully peruse” 
them.53 However, according to Dixon, Bain later acquainted himself with Brown’s 
work. Evidently, Bain adopted the secular term “emotion” which distinguished him 
from the group of conservative psychological writers who continued to use the 
religious designations “passions” and “affections.” Among them were the evangelical 
Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847) and the Anglican William Whewell (1794-1866).54  
According to the adepts of a “physiological psychology,” such as Bain, 
Spencer and the influential German Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), who insisted on a 
reciprocal correlation between mental and physical factors, the individual was to 
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attain respectability in the social sphere, rather than religious salvation, through the 
regulative function of the will.55 
 
Respectability and Self-Monitoring 
Although the codes of respectability varied greatly depending on the class context, 
this chapter will take the concept to designate the degree to which the individual was 
able to meet the social requirements of proper behaviour. The respectable individual 
closely monitored his or her emotions, always anticipating the judgment of an 
imagined other. Avoiding others’ contempt was difficult as respectability could take 
infinite shapes: for Henry Crabb Robinson and many of his contemporaries, for 
instance, respectability meant being well-to-do. Twentieth-century critical views 
extend from Walter Houghton’s association of the concept with Church attendance, to 
Peter Cominos, who has related it to the postponement of marriage and its 
gratifications for the gentleman, to Richard Dellamora, who stressed the Victorian 
distinction between the respectable gentleman and the homosexual male. 56 
Significantly, Cornhill Magazine of 1863 defined respectability in the following terms:  
The approval of mankind, its causes and its effects, are all summed up in the one 
word ‘Respectable.’ To be respectable, whether the object of the feeling is man 
or woman, is to fall under the protection of public opinion—to come up to that 
most real, though very indefinite standard of goodness, the attainment of which 
is exacted of every one as a condition of being allowed to associate upon terms 
of ostensible equality with the rest of the human race.57 
 
The unifying factor among the many faces of respectability seems to be the desire to 
be accepted by one’s peers; cradled in security through a comfortable integration in 
society. The absence of objectionable behaviour allowed the individual to reach “the 
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standard of goodness,” which included value, respect and authority. 58  Thus, the 
esteem of society not only “protected” the individual from social ostracism, but also 
gave weight to his or her existence, making him or her an important element of 
society.59  
Clearly, respectability came at a price, for it demanded the compliance to 
specific, sometimes unspoken, rules of conduct. F.M.L. Thompson explains in his 
study of nineteenth-century views on the subject: “Respectability [was] a creed and a 
code for the conduct of personal and family life.”60  This control was largely the 
product of “religious teaching and the conventions of acceptable behaviour of 
different social groups, not of the law itself.” 61  We can, however, object that 
legislations such as the Contagious Diseases Acts (1864, 1867 and 1869) reinforced 
the societal consensus that the respectable individual was not to veer from the norm. 
Progress was encouraged, but only in as far as it remained “helpful to mankind,” in 
Thomas Brown’s terms.62  The consistent efforts of this thesis’s diarists—Gissing 
functioning as an example of dissidence—to distance themselves from egotistical 
behaviour show that their authors perceived selfishness as a threat to the 
wholesomeness of society and therefore shunned it. 
This active avoidance of possibly objectionable behaviour is, according to the 
twentieth-century sociologist Norbert Elias (1897-1990), the product of “The 
Civilizing Process.”63 In this context, Bain’s writings on the emotions can partly be 
seen as active efforts to modify or facilitate the “psychological changes [inherent] in 
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the course of civilization.”64  Bain encouraged adherence to the dominant cultural 
codes by contributing to what Elias describes as a partially conscious indoctrination: 
The more complex and stable control of conduct is increasingly instilled in the 
individual from his or her earliest years as an automatism, a self-compulsion 
that he or she cannot resist even if he or she consciously wishes to. The web of 
actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave 
“correctly” within it becomes so great, that beside the individual’s conscious 
self-control an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is 
firmly established.65 
 
Because the individual is subjected to the cultural indoctrination of social values from 
the minute he or she is born, conforming to the cultural imperatives becomes an 
irresistible, an often unquestioned, compulsion. Like Michel Foucault, Elias attributes 
the necessity to regulate the emotions to the hegemonic apparatus, which both dictates 
and reflectes the subjective experience of the individual. Critic Martin A. Danahay, 
who has investigated the relationship of the Victorian individual to state power, has 
argued that: “it is through subjected autonomy that Victorian texts embody a model of 
the State’s role in the regulation of subjectivity.”66 Danahay contends that Victorian 
texts were dominated by the State’s “superego” which led them to encourage 
“[repression of] violent and anti-social tendencies.”67 Bain’s work, in its attempt to 
standardise respectable behaviour, can be seen to confirm this theory. 
For Bain, the function of education was to teach the individual how to exert 
self-control and to motivate him or her to adhere to the societal rules of behaviour. He 
developed techniques by which to civilise the newly born human being, which he saw 
as a bundle of inchoate feelings. In order to become a successful participant in 
cultural reality, “the infant has yet to be indoctrinated betimes into the suppression of 
at least violent emotion, and is fit to be disciplined to this when very few volitional 
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links are as yet established.” 68  Bain’s tone was detached and scientific when he 
described the educational process necessary to create a ‘proper’ human being; the 
infant seems to have been undeserving of respect due to the raw immediacy of his or 
her emotional responses. Bain repeatedly equated the human infant to an animal: “The 
treatment adapted for the young restive horse would apply to the beginnings of self-
control in the infant.”69 The impatient and instinct-driven infant was portrayed as a 
nuisance, necessitating harsh correction: “Pain is a surprising quickener of the 
intellectual process.”70 This approach clearly emphasises the similarities between the 
taming of animals, the “domestications of the animal tribe,” and the introduction of an 
infant to self-control.71  Pain was an appropriate motivational measure: “The first 
lessons in the control of passionate outbursts are unavoidably severe.”72 In order to 
produce a respectable human being, the individual’s emotional foundation needed to 
be established through uncompromising adjustment. 
Bain viewed obedience as unnatural, yet necessary; in the same way that 
strong emotion was natural but undesirable: “the habits of Obedience are created in 
opposition to self-will.”73 These habits were needed to protect the community from 
the fervour of uncontrolled emotions: “an artificial system of controlling the actions is 
contrived—the system of using pain to deter from particular sorts of conduct.”74 
Punishment was initially experienced directly and was then replaced by its threat. The 
fear of pain, penalty and ridicule motivated the individual to abide by the rules and 
respect the norms of the community, as Elias has argued. My aim is not to point out 
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the strictness of the pedagogical method, but to draw attention to Bain’s portrayal of 
intense, uncultivated and unrestrained emotion as impermissibly childish.  
Self-control, in Bain’s eyes, was the mechanism by which the force of habit 
achieved “control [over] the volitions and the appetites.”75  The unruly emotional 
features of the human being were cultivated through manners, for instance, which 
drilled the individual to behave “correctly,” to use Elias’s phrasing, as they were 
“directed against the primitive or instinctive movements of the body.”76 Thus, the 
actions of the body needed to be in line with socially accepted behaviour, already in 
the infant. Starting with bodily reactions, the human being had to learn to overcome 
emotional “difficulties,” such as “the power of the appetite itself, the inadequacy of 
the initiative” and “the want of any strong inclination in the mind towards the points 
to be gained by a complete control.”77 The failure to wield complete self-control was 
thus perceived as moral weakness. The individual was only in complete possession of 
his or her powers after having gained “superiority” over “flurry, excitement, needless 
fears, and extravagant ebullitions,” which constituted obstacles to the respectable 
person.78   
Bain’s work is enlightening in that it exposes some of the silently accepted 
and implicitly transferred conduct rules and portrays them as necessary 
implementations that help the community function. In his detailed analysis of the 
emotions, he, much like Elias, identified the process of civilisation as the obligatory 
“suppression of the more prominent manifestations of feeling,” and gave advice as to 
the successful management of emotional reactions according to social standards:79  
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The major part of every community adopt certain rules of conduct necessary 
for the common preservation, or ministering to the common well-being. They 
find it not merely their interest, but the very condition of their existence, to 
observe a number of maxims of individual restraint, and of respect to one 
another’s feelings in regard to person, property, and good name.80 
 
Bain clearly portrayed respectability as a motivation for engaging in this socialising 
process. As opposed to Elias, he believed this process of civilisation to be conscious, 
with the individual voluntarily renouncing some of his or her freedoms for the greater 
good. For Elias, this process of adaptation could not be equalled to a contract, because 
the “inculcation” necessary to instil social codes in the individual was only partly 
based on intention.  
Self-monitoring could be seen as a response to social scrutiny. As I have 
mentioned, the Victorian police-state can be seen as a giant metaphorical panopticon 
in which the individual both adopted the position of the guard monitoring and judging 
others’ behaviour from the control tower. The prisoner in the cell, always conscious 
of being surveilled, imagined and thus anticipated societal judgment and altered his or 
her behaviour in relation to this assumed criticism, as sociologist Charles Cooley 
(1864-1929) has held: “We always imagine and in imagining share, the judgments of 
the other mind.” 81  The other’s expected judgment became real because of the 
persistence of this anticipatory attitude. Reprimands for self-important behaviour were 
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likely to remain unspoken, but provoked the shrinking of the self that abided by the 
rules at the expense, perhaps, of personal development. As we shall see, Crabb 
Robinson renounced his literary career partly because the idea of social ridicule 
terrified him.  
 For Bain, the adult human being had to derive intimate self-knowledge from 
“self-examination,” which was a crucial premise of the acquisition and maintenance 
of complete self-control.82 Bain viewed the individual’s questioning of his or her 
“motives, merits, guilt, or innocence” as a fundamental constituent of personal rigour. 
Self-reflection, which Bain called “the most special occupation of the mind,” added a 
more complex dimension to merely impulsive behaviour and allowed the individual to 
double his or her consciousness and thus monitor his or her own conduct.83  By 
establishing a “study of his [or her] actions and motives,” the individual could 
“[compare] them with such and such examples, standards or rules.”84 To Bain, self-
monitoring contributed to emotional sophistication, because it raised the individual’s 
awareness of his or her position in the world and thus heightened the desire for 
respectability. 
 Significantly, Bain recommended the use of a diary as a vital tool in rational 
decision-making. Due to its objectifying capacity, which separates the writing self 
from the reading self, the diary constituted a well-suited medium for “self-
examination.”85 Bain essentially viewed the diaristic process as conducive to rational, 
self-protective behaviour. The lessons drawn from the experiences recorded in the 
diary could help the individual avoid painful mistakes:  
we need to recall past delights, according to their measure, with a view of 
securing them in full actuality, and to as great an extent as possible. We need 
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to recall previous suffering, in order that the reality, so much worse than the 
idea, may not be again be reproduced.86  
 
Although the individual could glean valuable insight from his or her experience, these 
lessons were not necessarily remembered, because, as the memory of the event and its 
circumstances vanished, the conclusions drawn from them weakened as well. The 
diary’s immediacy could physically compensate for memory’s ineptitude:  
the mind may be untrustworthy in recording the successive impressions, and 
may thus leave us at the mercy of those occurring last; it is to counteract such 
a danger that the method of recording and summing up the separate decisions 
is here recommended.87 
 
The latest impression was likely to be disproportionately strong and could mislead the 
individual into thinking that its impact was the greatest. Keeping a diary to document 
the decision-making process could give the individual a clearer grasp of the 
components that influenced the decision.  
Bain mostly recommended a diary to make educated decisions in times of 
crisis, in order to “record [every evening] the impression of the day, or put down the 
side which preponderates according to the balance of motives passing through the 
mind in the course of that day.”88 He approached the solving of the crisis like a 
scientific problem and was eager to avoid partiality caused by emotional investment. 
It seems that his technique was aimed at the separation of rational thought and 
emotional impulses. The “lapse of time” between entries, Bain hoped, “should reduce 
the casual or accidental biases to a general average.”89  At the end of the “period that 
the deliberation lasts,” the individual should “sum up the records of the days and see 
which side has the majority.”90 The purpose of weighing “all the states of mind that 
we pass through” against “the opposing questions” was to produce a logical 
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synthesis.91 Over the delineated duration of time, the diarist was to monitor his or her 
motives with attempted disinterestedness, trying to remove emotional inclinations that 
might spoil the superior decision reached by rational consideration. 
 We see that Bain viewed the diary as a logical consequence of the cultural 
imperative to monitor and improve the self. By adopting the gaze of the other, the 
diarist attempted to forestall external judgment and resolve the conflicts inherent in 
the civilising process without exposing him- or herself to potential ridicule or scorn. 
In this sense, keeping a diary can be seen as a self-protective activity of private 
socialisation which could help the diarist fashion a respectable persona for the public 
sphere. The following section illustrates both the pressure to observe and regulate 
possibly disruptive emotions, as exerted by cultural critic Lady Eastlake, and the 
demotivation and self-doubt that such demands inflicted on Crabb Robinson. 
 
II Self-control in the Edited Diary: Elizabeth Eastlake (1809-1893) and 
Henry Crabb Robinson (1775-1867) 
This section reads the diaries and work of Lady Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake, as well as 
Henry Crabb Robinson’s diary in light of Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the 
Will. Despite the differences in generic medium and historical moment, these texts 
reflect common attitudes towards the respectability of the emotions. Both diarists 
exerted a great influence on Victorian society through their publications, 
acquaintances and financial affluence. Eastlake’s response to society’s codes of 
respectability differed drastically from Crabb Robinson’s: whereas she was 
empowered by elitist politics, he failed to realise his full intellectual potential for fear 
of social ridicule.  Although Eastlake’s work exemplified the cultural need for the 
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repression of passionate emotion in social interactions, art, in her opinion, 
necessitated the enthusiasm and emotional receptiveness of both the artist and the 
critic. Crabb Robinson was less intent on maintaining or reinforcing codes of conduct 
but obsessively monitored his emotions. Generally, both Eastlake and Crabb 
Robinson believed that moral, family-oriented emotions were essential to a healthy 
society and that emotional enthusiasm was a necessary premise of the successful work 
of art. Whereas Eastlake and Bain tended to condemn pride, vanity and emotional 
excess as unrespectable behaviour, Crabb Robinson remained relatively silent on 
these subjects.  
The pressure to live up to social expectations and the societal judgment he 
imagined inhibited Crabb Robinson’s creative and critical output to the point that he 
renounced his literary ambitions. Although he enjoyed the respect of his famous 
friends and clients, Crabb Robinson suffered from low self-esteem which was caused 
by excessive self-monitoring. This necessity to anticipate judgment was integrated in 
Crabb Robinson’s consciousness through the definitions of respectability given by the 
media, literature and psychology, some of which I have illustrated in my previous 
section. Crabb Robinson’s self was constructed by the other; a notion which recalls 
Bentham’s Panopticon and the theories of M.M. Bakhtin, whose “attitudinizing” 
individual has incorporated the public gaze: “I am not alone when I look at myself in 
the mirror: I am possessed with someone else’s soul.” 92  Crabb Robinson had 
internalised social reprobation and adapted his behaviour to circumvent silent or 
explicit criticism from his peers. 
Both Eastlake’s and Crabb Robinson’s diaries were severely mutilated by their 
Victorian editors’ interference. By ripping selected extracts out of their context, 
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Charles Eastlake Smith and Dr. Thomas Sadler manipulated the text of their 
respective subject to a degree that prevents the reader from engaging with these 
diaries in a truly meaningful fashion.93 Crabb Robinson’s biographer Edith J. Morley 
was right when she wrote that Sadler had accomplished the immense task of “[sifting] 
and [condensing]” the thirty-five volumes of his subject’s diary, but she erred when 
stating that: “Sadler allowed Crabb Robinson to speak for himself.”94 That an editor 
would “select, re-word, and arrange” his or her material seems understandable, but 
Sadler’s practice to skip and re-phrase passages without indication “no scholarly 
editor or publisher today would countenance,” as Eugene Stelzig has rightly 
observed. 95  Sadler reduced Crabb Robinson to his friendships with Coleridge, 
Wordsworth and Carlyle, which may allow an interesting glimpse into the interactions 
between the thinkers of the nineteenth century, but the subject’s voice is ultimately 
portrayed inadequately. This editorial practice removes the immediacy and emotional 
spontaneity that is typical of the diary genre almost entirely. Instead, it creates the 
impression that Crabb Robinson is taking his reader through the text, stressing only 
the most memorable moments and name-dropping. Despite Sadler’s unfortunate 
editorial choices, we can still discern Crabb Robinson’s construction of self against 
the backdrop of societal judgment and emotional control. In order to fill in some of 
the gaps left by Sadler, I shall consult Crabb Robinson’s biographers Edith J. Morley 
and John Milton Baker, as well as more recent critics, such as Eugene Stelzig and 
Diana I. Behler.96  
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Eastlake’s diaries were heavily edited by her nephew Charles Eastlake Smith, 
who composed a text based on a patchwork of personal recollections, letters and 
diaries, rarely giving the full context of the entries. In fact, he tended to present 
Elizabeth’s manuscripts as a series of aphorisms, often accentuating her self-control. 
This fashioning of the text reflects Charles’s own appraisal of propriety, which led 
him to extend and perpetuate Elizabeth’s opinions, parading her as a model critic. 
Despite the maiming by her nephew’s editing, Elizabeth’s conflict between the 
desirability of emotion and its resolute repression can be retrieved in the diary. I shall 
attempt to complete and correct the distorted picture of Eastlake that her nephew 
created by reading the fragments of her diary entries in light of her critical work, such 
as her 1845 review article on travel literature written by women, her 1849 review of 
Jane Eyre, her 1856 review of Ruskin’s Modern Painters, and her 1868 Fellowship: 
Letters to My Sister Mourners. 
 
A Woman’s Role: Self-Effacement and Respectability 
Both Eastlake and Crabb Robinson strove to maintain a respectable image. Eastlake 
did so by upholding strict distinctions of gender and class which elevated her own 
status and shamed those who did not interpret and respond to the cultural rules of 
propriety in the same way that she did. Crabb Robinson sought to protect himself 
from the shame of unsuccessful attempts at literary creation by becoming a lawyer 
although he “hated the law,” because it was the only way of “[attaining] any social 
station.”97 Thus, his need to be respectable determined his entire life.  
Crabb Robinson struggled to overcome the painful “feeling of loss of not 
having attended [an English] university” all his life, as his biographer John Milton 
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Baker has explained. 98  Instead of savouring his feelings of inferiority, Crabb 
Robinson went to Germany for five years, during which he made the acquaintance of 
many of the prominent Romantic figures, such as Goethe, Schiller, Kotzebue, Herder 
and the Schlegel brothers, among many others. According to Diana I. Behler, Crabb 
Robinson was the “first foreigner to make a thorough investigation” of early German 
Romantic ideas, which he translated for and explained to his countrymen.99 Behler has 
observed that Crabb Robinson adjusted many of his translations to the English 
tradition of “common sense,” and “[toned] down” the revolutionary aspect of early-
nineteenth-century German thought.100 Significantly, Crabb Robinson discerned his 
culture’s fear of revolution and modified his work to fit the taste and needs of his 
fellow Englishmen.  
 Elizabeth Rigby Eastlake hardly represented the typical Victorian female. She 
was educated, well-travelled and had many literary contacts who published and 
celebrated her work. According to her biographer Marion Lochhead, Elizabeth’s 
marriage to the prominent art gallery director Charles Eastlake “meant the best of 
both worlds” as she could maintain her life as an “independent woman of letters, 
secure in her reputation [and as] a specialist and authority.” 101 Through her influential 
husband she permanently gained “the entrée to the inmost sanctuary of society.”102 
Although Eastlake herself did not adopt the traditional role of housewife and mother, 
she insisted on a strict separation of the male and female spheres and, through her 
work, reinforced cultural norms of propriety.  
Eastlake and Crabb Robinson tended to define respectable emotion as that 
which was altruistic, caring and beneficial for the community. Both gendered this 
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constructive, nourishing emotion as female. While Eastlake consistently stressed the 
virtues of domesticity, she also regarded excessive emotion as integral to the nature of 
femininity. As I shall show in my section on gendered grief, Eastlake’s contradictory 
attitudes to feminine behaviour reflect more general Victorian views on the 
subversive potential of women’s emotion and confirm what critic Ann Cvetkovich has 
identified as the simultaneous exemplification of “the domestic ideal [and] the threat 
of transgression.”103 Eastlake reproduced the cultural perception of female emotion as 
absolutely necessary for mothering future generations of intact family units. She 
viewed this emotional side—“affect”—as innate to the female sex, which, according 
to Cvetkovich, “meant that it might be uncontrollable.”104 This possibly uncontainable 
emotional energy, which could take the face of promiscuity, positioned the female, 
like the child and the criminal, outside of respectability and reason. Eastlake can be 
seen to establish her own superiority by setting the standards for her female 
contemporaries, whom she considered in need of her guidance to keep unrespectable 
emotions in check and develop their domestic skills.  Crabb Robinson’s idealisation 
of his mother’s moral education corresponded to Eastlake’s glorification of the ideal 
Englishwoman. 
Like many of her contemporaries, Eastlake despised women who gave in to 
their emotions, as can be seen in her commentary on German society of the 1830s; 
Some Biographies of German Ladies: “the German woman is feminine but nothing 
else; and herein lies the nullity of her influence.”105 German women, according to 
Eastlake, were indirectly responsible for the “[disgusting] social structure of morals 
and religion” she witnessed in Germany. Their “excess of devotion and self-
                                                 
103
 Ann Cvetkovich, Mixed Feelings, Feminism, Mass Culture and Victorian Sensationalism (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 6.  
104
 Ibid.  
105
 Quoted in Lochhead, Elizabeth  Rigby Eastlake, p. 7.  
 68 
abandonment,” for Eastlake, was natural and therefore somewhat acceptable, but she 
firmly condemned these women’s “unrestrained indulgence in these impulses.”106 
According to Eastlake, German women failed to counter their country’s moral laxity 
through their own intellectual and behavioural rigour and thus neglected their 
educational function in society.  
The Englishwoman, as portrayed in Eastlake’s 1845 article “Lady Travellers,” 
which appeared in the Quarterly Review, represented the opposite of the dramatic and 
ineffectual German woman. 107  Eastlake praised the Middle-class Englishwoman’s 
“four cardinal virtues,” namely “activity, punctuality, courage, and independence,” 
which made her a far superior traveller to the woman of any other country. Her 
principal quality consisted in the strict discipline with which she trained both body 
and mind. Unlike women of other nationalities, the Englishwoman was seen as a 
“well-read, solid thinking, –early rising—sketch-loving—light-footed—trim-
waisted—strawhatted specimen,” who combined the “refinement of the highest 
classes” with the “usefulness of the lowest.” 108  Significantly, the Englishwoman 
excelled at travelling because her domesticity had equipped her with the “habits of 
order and regularity” which furthered both her mental and physical agility.109 Her 
mind, hand and appearance were cultivated and geared towards useful actions rather 
than sensual excesses.  
This unreachable standard of respectability surely created a lot of pressure for 
Eastlake’s female readers. Her ideal woman was open to the world and diligently 
recorded the exotic sights she encountered on her journeys. Her role as wife and 
mother had taught her the “reserved” attitude which made her respectable, but her 
                                                 
106
 Ibid.  
107
 Elizabeth Eastlake, “Lady Travellers,” Quarterly Review, vol. 76 (June 1845), pp. 98-137 (p. 102). 
108
 Ibid.  
109
 Ibid.  
 69 
horizon was not limited to domestic affairs.110 Her personal reticence allowed the 
necessary space for an intense interest in the external world and the simultaneous 
inquisitiveness and receptiveness of her mind. Eastlake contrasted this virtuous expert 
at self-effacement with a different type of woman, who, despite the proximity of 
fascinating new sights, was unable to fix her mind on anything but her personal 
domestic circumstances and therefore was a tedious travel companion: 
[She] pauses every moment to tell you not only her own particular thoughts 
and feelings, but also those habits, particularities, preferences and antipathies, 
which one would have thought even she herself on such an occasion would 
have forgotten, we feel tied to one who at home would be rather tiresome, but 
abroad becomes insufferable—to one who never leaves self behind.111  
 
The self-obsessed woman was not responsive to external beauty because her need to 
share her private thoughts deprived her of the delights of both travelling and 
companionship. This woman’s constant preoccupation with the self and her narrow-
minded naivety were shameful because she disregarded the customs of both observant 
travelling and polite conversation. Her lack of self-monitoring made her unrespectable 
because she failed to redress her self-indulgent behaviour and neglected to actively 
please her companion. We see that Eastlake’s objective was to keep the behaviour of 
her fellow females under observation and, by elevating the ideal Englishwoman, to 
prescribe codes of propriety to which her readers could adhere. The “affect” that was 
natural in women had to be counteracted by a focus on the virtues of diligent order.  
Emotional control was thus an intrinsic characteristic of the respectable female.  
In his diary, Crabb Robinson praised the formative influence of his mother 
who, as his primary caregiver, had a major impact on his moral development. As we 
shall see, Crabb Robinson accused his father of neglecting his son’s moral, creative 
and spiritual life, which shows that he insisted on the parents’ responsibility to mould 
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their child’s character, maintaining the eighteenth-century view that it was the 
“primary duty” of “every educator [...] to gain mastery over a child’s emotions and 
shape them in a positive way,” as critics Anke te Heesen and Ann M. Hentschel have 
observed.112 Like Alexander Bain, who viewed the young child as an uncultivated 
animal, in need of emotional guidance, Crabb Robinson attributed his character to the 
formative influence of his parents. Bain believed that the child mirrored and 
internalised parental behaviour: “the child falls into the tones, movements, and 
peculiarities of action of the parent, through the circumstance of their being constantly 
presented to its imitation.”113 Deriving gratification from mimicking his or her parents, 
the child directed his or her will towards replicating their behaviour, which attributed 
an immense responsibility to the mother in particular. 
Crabb Robinson idealised his mother’s moral excellence which she 
successfully infused in her son: “in my childhood my mother was to me everything, 
and I have no hesitation in ascribing to her every good moral or religious feeling I had 
in my childhood or youth.”114  His mother was the key figure introducing him to 
proper, morally sound conduct; not through harsh discipline but through acting as an 
example of diligence: “I was an unruly boy and my mother had no strength to keep 
me in order.”115 Young and unsocialised, Crabb Robinson could not yet recognise the 
significance of “order” and only gradually learned to regulate his behaviour. His 
mother, through her moral guidelines, attempted to eradicate her son’s selfish 
behaviour by raising his concern for others. Robinson seems immensely grateful for 
her efforts, which can be seen in this remembrance: 
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I recollect a practice of hers, which had the best effect on my mind. She never 
would permit me (like all children, a glutton) to empty the dish at table if there 
was anything particularly nice, such as pudding or pie. “Henry, don’t take any 
more; do you not suppose the maids like to have some?”116 
 
Gluttony was natural, yet unacceptable behaviour for the young human being. Instead 
of letting her son selfishly indulge in the pleasures of the palate, Mrs Robinson shifted 
Henry’s perspective from the self to the other and heightened his awareness of 
egotistical transgression.  
Crabb Robinson, like Eastlake, cherished the moral rigour of the mother figure, 
who, through her own “reserve,” love of order and sense of propriety, taught her child 
the rules of respectability. 117  This ideal Englishwoman provided wholesome 
nourishment to her family because she was able to repress the passionate, selfish 
aspect of her emotions—“leave self behind”—and devote her emotional energies to 
care for the well-being of others.118 In the case of emotional shock, such as the death 
of a loved one, Eastlake and Bain allowed the individual to yield to the weakening 
blow temporarily but then encouraged him or her to regain strength and “reserve” 
through work and distraction. Because in this case, emotion was “natural,” it was 
acceptable, but interestingly, behavioural guidelines seemed necessary even for such 
legitimated emotion. Crabb Robinson does not explicitly discuss grieving behaviour, 
but the advice he received when his mother died reveals the pressure that his peers 
exerted on him; inviting him to extract lessons from the life-shattering event rather 
than to indulge in suffering.   
 
Gendered Grief 
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The discussions of proper grieving behaviour that this section considers tend to 
portray the female as particularly prone to emotional disintegration. As Laura Brown 
has argued, eighteenth-century consciousness was pervaded by theories such as 
philosopher Bernard Mandeville’s Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick 
Passions (1711) which viewed the female body as having a “peculiar relation to 
fluctuation, irregularity, excess, passion and imagination.”119 The female’s supposed 
inability to control the potentially overpowering impulses of the body and the mind 
set her on the same level as the child, who was unable to adopt a stance of posed 
serenity. These attitudes can still be observed in Catherine Buck’s legitimisation of 
Crabb Robinson’s grief as not that of “a silly girl,” as well as in Eastlake’s comments 
on strong emotion disabling the female mind. 
Eastlake insisted on the fundamental difference in rationality between the 
sexes. She felt that due to their unpredictable emotional nature, women had to cling to 
the structured sphere of the household, as this entry from her 1840-42 diary shows:   
Why do men invariably judge better than women? Simply because their 
feelings have less interference. With us, our feelings often make the worse 
appear the better cause. It is well our duties are more confined and prescribed 
than theirs, or, with such rash monitors within us, what should we do? Our 
feelings are like the element fire—most excellent servants but wretched 
mistresses.120    
 
Women were thus seen as always on the verge of being victimised by their emotional 
nature and therefore fundamentally incapable of making decisions based on a rational 
process of deliberation. Because women’s will power was not considered sufficiently 
strong to keep the foolish impulses of the female mind in check, their duty to create 
order in the domestic and social sphere had to serve as a clearly defined structure to 
contain the subversive potential of passionate emotion.   
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On a personal level, Eastlake admitted that even minor indulgences made her 
feel weak-willed and guilty of feminine, pleasure-seeking behaviour, as this entry of 
July 5th 1845 shows: “My pen has been too silent in every respect. The Siren Music 
has been the tempter […] with my strong love for music I have indulged myself far 
too much.” The language of seduction at work in this extract demonstrates that 
Eastlake felt that she had allowed her personal “indulgent” preferences to take over 
the time reserved for professional occupation. Her shame was caused by her neglect 
of the model behaviour of the restrained Englishwoman for the decadent German 
woman’s.  
 This association of femininity with excessive emotion can, as I have 
announced, be seen as an inheritance of the eighteenth century, which, according to 
Baker “believed in restraint and self-discipline, rather than in the free expression of 
[…] personality.”121 A letter by Crabb Robinson’s friend Catherine Buck of January 
8th 1793, written upon the news of his mother’s death, demonstrates her contempt for 
the overemotional female:  
I am not writing to a silly girl whose reason is under control of passion & 
whose passion having nothing of intellect in it is the object of pity without 
tenderness & of commiseration the result of our compassion for degraded 
humanity—you have indeed lost your best friend.122 
 
Buck legitimised Crabb Robinson’s grief by contrasting it with the improper 
emotional excess of the “silly girl,” unable to rationally tame her emotions and 
therefore less deserving of sympathy. In Buck’s eyes, Crabb Robinson was entitled to 
feel horrendous pain of loss and relinquish emotional control because he did not 
exaggerate and flaunt his grief over losing the most important person in his life.  
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 Unlike Eastlake, who believed that the widow was under the oppressive siege 
of grief and was, at least temporarily, powerless to alleviate her suffering, Buck 
advised Crabb Robinson to use his grief for self-improvement: “the hour of affliction 
is the hour of reflection—let us then not neglect to improve it.”123  Because the 
emotional shock caused by the death of a loved one could alter the individual’s 
outlook on life, Buck believed that he or she should take advantage of this temporary 
mental clarity. She viewed grief as a “test” of the individual’s resilience and 
discouraged Crabb Robinson from clouding the sharpness of his heightened 
intellectual vision by indulging in his agony: “shall we sacrifice to passion the 
precious moments which dedicated to reason produce the most salutary effects?”124 
Thus, even in this moment of utter despair, Crabb Robinson’s friend, instead of 
offering consolation, forced him to rationalise his grief and draw beneficial lessons 
from it. This would have put Crabb Robinson under considerable pressure to resist 
emotional expression and internalise his grief, lest he jeopardise his masculinity and 
give in to emotion like a “silly girl.”  
 However, emotional reactions to joyous and painful experiences marked the 
individual as human. Eastlake wrote Fellowship: Letters to My Sister Mourners to 
deal with the devastation she experienced after the death of her husband in 1865, 
when “the life of [her] life” left her, and her “own very identity […] departed with 
him [she] love[d].”125 In this address to her fellow widows, Eastlake portrayed grief as 
an illness and invited her readers to accept their own powerlessness and give in to 
their affliction: “the only reasonable view you can take of your own state is as of one 
smitten with a sore sickness,—the sorest the heart can suffer.”126 This surprisingly 
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mellow statement shows that Eastlake, in her unspeakable grief, had hit the limits of 
self-control. The will no longer had power over the diseased mind and any attempts to 
“repress the anguish—divert the spirits—change the scene,” which society 
recommended, were doomed. 127  Interestingly, Eastlake used a vocabulary of 
criminality and insanity to illustrate the complete incapacitation of the will, which 
recalls Victorian culture’s pathologisation of strong emotion, as exemplified in 
Section I: “the question […] is not how to arrest or cure the evil, for that is 
impossible.”128  She absolved the widow from the societal pressure to control her 
emotions: “let not the cant reproach of ‘indulging your grief’ disturb you—the very 
words are an imbecile contradiction in terms; can we turn our sorrow off and on as we 
please?” 129  Despite her apparent acceptance of emotional turmoil as inevitable, 
Eastlake still incriminated the emotion itself: “sorrow” was an “illness,” which, like a 
sentence, had to be served: “[prayer] is not meant to remove our pain—we are to 
suffer it.”130 The widow was seen as unable to thwart the emotional siege she was 
under and had to accept the acute pain of loss. 
The Letters explicitly evidence Eastlake’s perception of and reaction to the 
societal pressure to control the emotions. Although she appealed to her audience to 
“live in your sorrow; let the heart ache itself out,” she did not completely abandon her 
socially conditioned belief in the virtues of industrious behaviour, which I shall 
discuss in detail in Chapter Two. Eastlake ensured that her readers did not take her 
Letters as an invitation to become lazy: “it is mockery to accuse us of indulging in our 
agony, yet, on the other hand, we must meet it with remedies as strong as itself. Of 
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these, work is as indispensable as prayer.” 131  In a typically Protestant fashion, 
Eastlake identified the “remedies” as useless, yet, the very composition of the Letters 
can be seen as an effort to counteract her debilitating grief through intellectual activity: 
“work we must in some shape in self-defence; if we are idle, our sorrow is doubly 
busy.”132 Although work could not undo the pain of loss, activity could keep the 
individual from feeling at the mercy of strong emotion.  
Bain’s techniques for dealing with intense grief resembled Eastlake’s in that 
they stressed the importance of initially accepting the emotion and then consciously 
counteracting it by wilful industry. Eastlake’s suggestion to “let the heart ache itself 
out” was paralleled by Bain’s assertion that “under a shock of joy or grief, a burst of 
anger or fear, we are recommended to give way for a little to the torrent, as the safest 
way of making it subside.”133 Convinced of the necessity to restrain emotion, Bain 
admitted that “an emotion may be too strong to be resisted” and gave advice for its 
successful repression.134 After allowing a “free vent” to the emotions, the will could 
operate on the “voluntary muscles” and “[reach] the deep recesses of emotion.”135 
Physical control was thus echoed by the emotions, which could be manipulated by a 
“resolute determination.”136 
 The diaries this thesis examines tend to omit the process of grieving. For 
instance, the announcements of death in George Eliot’s diary (Chapter Two) are 
usually reduced to one sentence, such as her entry of March 15th 1859 shows: 
“Chrissey died this morning at quarter to 5.”137 Although Eliot was extremely fond of 
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her elder sister, whose children she had cared for and whose consumptive illness had 
worried her immensely, her diary does not provide evidence of the severe pain she 
must have felt.138 This silence in the face of emotional may be a consequence of the 
society’s pressure to accept what could not be changed instead of lamenting an 
irreplaceable loss. Peggy Fitzhugh Johnstone has argued that Eliot mourned her losses 
by fictionalising these traumatising events: “through a work of fiction, Eliot could, 
like the patient in a therapeutic transference, enter into a fantasy in which she could 
reenact repressed feelings towards prior attachments.” 139  Thus, Eliot, rather than 
directly and gratuitously expressing grief in the diary, used this emotional energy to 
benefit the community through the education she propagated in her novels. For her, 
emotional despair was thus to be borne internally; it was too private even for the diary 
and could only be verbalised through artistic sublimation. 
 
Emotion and Social Life 
For Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, intense emotions constituted a constant threat 
to the integrity and moral rigour of the individual, “affecting the judgement of true 
and false,” as Bain wrote.140 Recalling the medical associations between “excitement 
of the brain” and insanity, they insisted on respectable conduct, which was defined by 
temperate and rational other-oriented behaviour, disinterestedness and intellectual 
rigour.141 The self-controlled individual aimed to prevent a rekindling of suppressed 
appetites through the efforts of the will in order to dominate the natural impulses of 
the body and mind. “Like destroying Vandals,” Bain wrote, feelings “pervert our 
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convictions by smiting us with intellectual blindness, which we need not be under 
when committing great imprudence in action.”142 The irrational, uncontrollable nature 
of the feelings was seen to make the individual vulnerable to thoughtless conduct and 
moral lassitude, by not only exposing him or her to public ridicule, but also leading 
him or her to regress morally and give in to substance abuse and promiscuity. 
Although Crabb Robinson wished for a less apathetic temperament to fuel his 
creative output, in social interactions, he still felt uneasy and distressed when he 
experienced others’ boundless emotional outbursts. In 1805, Crabb Robinson harshly 
criticised the display of powerful emotion and although he admired it to a degree, was 
grateful that he was less prone to such unrespectable disintegration. His friend Major 
von Knebel was extremely upset when he heard the news of Schiller’s death, but, in 
Crabb Robinson’s eyes, went too far in the demonstration of his emotions: “it was 
ridiculous and pathetic. Dear Knebel’s passions were always an odd combination of 
fury and tenderness. He loved Schiller and gave his feelings immediate and 
unconsidered expression.” 143  For Crabb Robinson, the emotions were not to be 
exhibited carelessly and had to remain within the spectrum of acceptable gestures.  
Deeply uncomfortable with displays of emotion, Crabb Robinson resented the 
overly sentimental individual. In 1810, he explained his discomfort, asserting that he 
felt awkward when confronted with arduous emotion. Excitability became his criteria 
for the categorisation of human character; he associated himself with more rational, 
sensible human beings, as opposed to those individuals capable of open fervour: “we 
of colder temperament and sober minds feel ourselves oppressed by the stronger 
feelings of more passionate characters.”144 Others’ powerful emotion was unpleasant 
and unnerving to Crabb Robinson even if he did “fully recognize the dignity of 
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passion” and claimed to “admire what I have not and am not.”145  While strong 
emotion could be desirable for the creation of art, Crabb Robinson validated his own 
personality by comparing himself to fanatical or overly fragile fellow humans, as can 
be seen in this entry of July 6th 1816:  
Sometimes I regret a want of sensibility in my nature, but when such cases of 
perverted intensity of feeling are brought to my observation, I rejoice in my 
neutral apathetic character, as better than the more sanguine and choleric 
temperament, which is so dangerous at the same time that it is so popular and 
respectable.146 
 
Crabb Robinson’s disappointment over his inability to experience an increased depth 
of emotion was outbalanced by his disgust with “dangerous,” inferior emotion. The 
fact that he attached the term “respectable” to such a temperament is very surprising, 
but could be explained by the imaginativeness and inspiration that passion brings to 
the creative process—a dimension that Crabb Robinson felt utterly incapable of 
entering. He viewed his exclusion from the realm of emotionality as definite but 
gradually came to terms with it as this same entry shows: 
The older I grow, the more I am satisfied, on prudential grounds, with the 
constitution of my sensitive nature. I am persuaded that there are very few 
persons who suffer so little pain of all kinds as I do; and if the absence of vice 
be the beginning of virtue, so the absence of suffering is the beginning of 
enjoyment.147 
 
Crabb Robinson rejoiced over his relative insensitivity, which kept him from 
experiencing the peaks of excitement, but also spared him the experience and ridicule 
connected to intense mental pain. He convinced himself that his lack of excitability 
annulled the threat of dangerous emotion and established him as a harmless and 
therefore virtuous human being.  
When Eastlake insisted on personal reticence in social interactions, she aimed 
to establish a climate of mutual respect in which the individual was to refrain both 
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from exhibiting his or her emotions and from probing into other people’s private 
emotions. The politeness of “easy society,” which Eastlake mentioned in her 1848 
“Review of Vanity Fair and Jane Eyre,” was characterised by “awkwardness,” 
because it depended on the restraint of any emotion that could cause offence, 
embarrassment or boredom in the interlocutor.148  The social interactions Eastlake 
described were highly stylised and she advised her readers to observe the “tacit 
understanding” to “go so far and no further; to be as polite as we ought to be, and as 
intellectual as we can; but mutually and honourably to forbear lifting those veils 
which each spreads over his inner sentiments and sympathies.”149 Ultimately, such 
conventionalised behaviour was intended to protect all members of society from being 
overwhelmed by the other’s emotional burdens. 
In her personal life, Eastlake was very careful to maintain the façade of 
respectability by appearing humble and disciplined in her letters and even her diaries. 
Through this performance of the respectable correspondent, Eastlake consciously 
evaded the general association of vanity with low intellect, lack of refinement and 
taste. Eastlake’s conviction that emotional restraint was partly a response to societal 
expectations and partly a genuine concern for others can account for her apologetic 
attitude to her reader, which forced her to dutifully express regret whenever she 
provided information relating to the self, as this letter to Miss L. Browne shows:  
I find I have been writing in an egotistical strain, and am shocked to have to 
speak so much of myself; but while this insignificant person is made so much 
of, and while you are so kindly interested in hearing of what she does and sees, 
you must just take this as it comes.150 
 
Calling herself “insignificant” undid the act of self-importance she felt she was liable 
to. Eastlake was “shocked” by the necessity to communicate facts relating to her life; 
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implying that if it were possible, she would omit self-referencing altogether. She 
appealed to her reader’s kindness and understanding; making clear that she was aware 
that such behaviour was reproachable. 
 On March 20th 1846, Eastlake encounters the embodiment of  perfect conduct:  
Professor Wilson is the only person I ever heard who can speak of himself 
without being an egotist; but he talks of himself as the species man, not as the 
solitary individual; he talks of feelings and passions common to the race, and 
dissects himself to lay them bare to you. Whenever he talks as an individual, it is 
only drollery.151 
 
Through portraying himself as the object of study rather than a person to be admired 
or pitied, Wilson effaced himself while speaking of himself. His deliberations 
remained impersonal as he presented himself as an example of “the species man,” 
giving the impression of “disinterestedness.”152 Relying on conversational self-irony 
to talk about himself allowed him to evade accusations of self-indulgence and 
boastfulness. 
Eager to imitate such selfless conversation, Eastlake, like Crabb Robinson and 
the other diarists this thesis examines, conscientiously apologised for references to 
personal feelings in her letters and can be seen to consistently monitor the intensity of 
her emotional reactions generally. For instance, in a letter to Miss L. Browne of 
January 1843, Eastlake reported a scandalous emotional outburst: “He [Dean of 
Faculty, Mr Peter Robertson] made me laugh, till I was almost shocked to hear 
myself.” 153  The intensity of her laughter embarrassed Eastlake, because she had 
evidently lost control over her emotions. The language of his extract suggests a self-
objectifying, self-monitoring attitude in Eastlake—she listens to herself from the 
position of an external observer and judges herself accordingly.  
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Crabb Robinson similarly minimised himself in his correspondence, as his 
letter to Wordsworth of March 19th 1840 shows: “You ask me why I write so seldom. 
The answer is an obvious one, and you will give me credit for being quite sincere 
when I make it. It is but seldom that I dare to think that I have anything to say that is 
worth your reading.” 154  Crabb Robinson hoped to gain Wordsworth’s respect by 
stressing his inferiority, which reflects his preference of self-effacement over self-
aggrandisement.  It seems that the willingness to denigrate the self which was 
frequent in the nineteenth century can be traced to “the moral consecration of 
sentiment,” which, as Charles Taylor has explained “[became] strong and 
unmistakable in England and then France in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century.”155 In order to protect the family and friendships that now were cherished, 
but not felt, with increased fervour, the individual needed to fight the omnipresent 
currents of utilitarian thought that threatened the common good, the self necessarily 
needed to abstain from wanting, needing or being anything. This could explain why 
“self-explorations,” in which Romantic poets conducted “dialogues [not] with readers, 
but solipsistically with [their] own psyche,” became more self-conscious and 
restricted in the Victorian era and why Crabb Robinson felt increased pressure to 
assure that his utterances were worthy of drawing others’ attention to. 156   
For Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, vanity in social interactions, as well 
as art, was intolerable. They supported the idea that the creator of an object or the 
initiator of an action or event was not to be congratulated unless he or she was free of 
selfish motivations. Bain wrote that: “merit attaches itself only to something that is 
not our duty, that something being a valuable service rendered to other human beings. 
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Positive beneficence is a merit.”157 Human actions could only be virtuous if devoid of 
self-serving purposes. For Bain, the accomplishment of duty was a behaviour that 
society expected and failure to do so resulted in social despise. Thus, doing his or her 
duty benefited the individual; it was a “self-regarding action and therefore […] not an 
adequate foundation of morals.” 158  Bain fervently advocated behaviour that was 
geared towards the benefit of society: “the inculcation of unbounded Self-denial is to 
be regarded as an extreme statement of the happiness value of reciprocal good offices. 
It is found that, to reap the precious fruit, disinterestedness must sow the seed.”159 The 
individual was to renounce the self and work for the good of others, but, paradoxically, 
he or she should never claim any profit from his or her actions. “Inculcation” suggests 
the indoctrination of the individual by society, constantly rehearsing the rules of 
propriety, which seems to contradict the possibility of a truly “disinterested” 
attitude— notably because further on Bain spoke of a “disinterested impulse,” which 
connotes spontaneous emotion. 160  
 When Eastlake was confronted with others’ self-indulgence and boasting, she 
attempted to withhold judgment; stressing her moral superiority. In an entry of 1840, 
she wrote: “It is no hypocrisy to be courteous and kind even where we despise. 
Esteem or contempt is involuntary: judgment is controllable—and that is why the 
Scriptures, which prescribe nothing against the system of Nature, say ‘Judge not.’”161 
Eastlake thus attempted to be completely selfless—not only did she abstain from the 
temptations of despicable behaviour, but she did not even let herself indulge in the 
condemnation of such disgrace. In reality, however, Eastlake was an impetuous critic 
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and did not live up to her resolution to quietly tolerate others’ behaviour, assuming a 
position of superior, almost godlike, virtue. 
 In an attempt to examine the shame associated with referring to the self in 
conversation, Bain called attention to the thin line between description of the self and 
boasting, which violated the “virtue of Self-Sufficingness.”162 Ideal conduct should 
mirror that of Socrates, who represented the truly self-sufficient person “rendering a 
full share of help to others, and asking little in return.”163 Bain and Eastlake, in tune 
with their culture’s glorification of altruism, applauded those who stood “alone and 
unsupported,” always giving, never taking.164 Bain’s definition of virtuous behaviour 
emphasised the contemporary view of self-restraint as sophisticated mannerly conduct: 
Modern society has thrown a certain discredit on the enjoyment of self-
gratulatory pleasures, and hence a feeling of shame is apt to be engendered 
when a person is marked out as the subject of formal applause. For all these 
reasons, the transformation of the open into the more covert modes of paying 
honour has been thought a refinement. Vanity and Vain-glory signify that the 
individual is active in the cultivation of self-importance, canvassing as it were, 
for distinction. The open boaster, not satisfied with his own feelings of esteem, 
insists on the concurrence of others, and, if people do not choose their own 
accord to pay him regard, he detains them on every opportunity with the 
circumstantials of his own glorification.165 
 
“Self-importance” was obviously unacceptable behaviour. Any kind of “open” excess 
violated the codes of “refinement,” and was identified as moral weakness. The boaster 
was unable to abstain from insisting on his or her own value or to give value to 
himself in a Socratic fashion, and thus heavily relied on the other to bequeath 
meaning upon him or her. This dependency was the opposite of the virtue of “self-
sufficingness,” and thus constituted a behaviour that discredited the boaster. He or she 
was the object of ridicule and never of respect, as he or she blatantly performed 
respectability instead of embodying it. 
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Eastlake considered “selfishness” as the characteristic vice of the Victorian 
individual. She deemed modernisation, industrialisation and consumerism to be the 
dominant cultural forces feeding into the greedy and hectic lifestyle of modernity, as 
this diary entry of December 16th 1842 shows: “What will future ages be? For we are 
really living awfully fast. […] selfishness is like the daughters of the horse-leech, that 
cry ‘Give, give!’”166 Eastlake feared that individualism was taking over the culture’s 
sense of communality and that mass reproduction was spoiling art. The capitalist 
mode of production increased the number of commodities available for purchase, 
which arguably stimulated the individual’s desire to possess, “shifting,” as social 
historian Thomas Richards has noted, “the axis of perception toward an objective 
phenomenology of property.” 167  The early-Victorian religious moral codes that 
defined the “value of the individual,” were giving way, at least partly, to the fast-
paced culture of consumerism that Richards describes. 168  In Eastlake’s eyes, the 
measureless amassing of commodities and the loosening of moral values were 
paralleled by the individual who constantly drew attention to himself or herself, 
showing off personal merits, without any guise of humility. To both Eastlake and 
Bain, such individuals were disgusting. 
Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain believed that the artist especially was to 
control his or her vain cravings for recognition and produce art that benefited the 
viewer rather than the artist. According to the double standard by which the artist was 
judged, emotional energy constituted a vital part of the process of artistic creation, but 
vanity was an impermissible motivation. The ambiguous status that emotion occupied 
was the source of immense complication for many artists, as excess of emotion was 
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unrespectable, whereas lack of emotional enthusiasm made for a weak and boring 
work of art.  
Art and the Necessity of Emotion 
Eastlake and Crabb Robinson viewed artistic respectability from very different 
perspectives. Whereas Eastlake critically monitored others’ creative output, Crabb 
Robinson struggled to attain the status of respectability as an artist and critic. Both, 
however, believed that, in order to result in an artefact of lasting value, the creative 
process had to be fuelled by the artist’s emotional energies. This belief is reflected in 
Crabb Robinson’s frustration over his own lack of “sensibility” and in the disparaging 
comments on Ruskin’s “unfeeling heart” that Eastlake makes in her 1856 review of 
Modern Painters.169 While embracing emotional energy, Eastlake, Bain and Crabb 
Robinson were in tune with their culture’s condemnation of self-indulgence in the 
artist. Victorian critics, such as John Keble, gave advice in regard to the productive 
channelling of the emotions in order to avoid unrespectable effeminate sentimentality.  
Elizabeth Helsinger has argued that the major Victorian writers, such as 
Tennyson, Browning, Arnold and Ruskin, regarded the artist’s preoccupation with the 
self as immoral and hence deliberately omitted traces of personal involvement from 
their writings. By doing so, they hoped to evade accusations of excessive self-
contemplation that resounded Wordsworth’s “sublime egotism,” which was 
considered fruitless, and even “unhealthy:”170  
The strongest reason for the Victorian objection to self-revealing literature 
seems to be not that it fails to lead to identity and action, but that it is ‘the mere 
delirium of vanity,’ an act of selfish pride. Their objection is profoundly moral. 
It is an attitude which can be found throughout the literature of the period.171 
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Self-indulgence was thus considered a faux pas in both a literary and a social context. 
Pride was never to be shown publicly, and praise ideally should only be given to 
others—never the self. In response to this necessary self-effacement, many writers 
performed a “deliberate shift in focus from the self to mutuality;” an increased 
concern with community, friendship and marriage.172 
The influential Victorian literary critic John Keble (1792-1866) advocated a 
similar attitude of restraint in poets—the “law of modest reticence.”173  Poetry, in 
order to be considered of “primary quality,” had to “hint at very many things, rather 
than [be] at pains to describe and define them,” thus leaving the reader with “an 
appetite whetted but not satisfied.”174 This required reserve demanded that the poet’s 
self be left out; any deliberate, flashy, over-sentimentalised behaviour in poetry was 
considered a sign of low quality: “In short, they [primary poets] more willingly 
understate than exaggerate, while the common run of poets pride themselves most of 
all in outdoing their rivals in the production of what is novel, passionate and 
startling.” 175  Although Keble applauded enthusiasm, such as Homer’s, he sternly 
advised young poets to have “insight” and to realise that “a poet’s fine frenzy is 
subject to law or control.”176 Unconcealed, unsublimated emotion indicated the poet’s 
poor taste and connoted an immature lack of self-control, mistaking art for a means of 
self-glorification and confession. Significantly, “master-passion,” as in Virgil, could 
only be expressed through “significant ellipses.”177  
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 Women’s poetry in particular tended to be associated with the 
“uncontrollable” side of emotion and was often accused of effusive “affect,” as Isobel 
Armstrong and Virginia Blains have shown. 178 Victorian culture presupposed women 
to produce literature that was gushing with sentimentality and thus intellectually 
inferior to men’s. In critical reviews, both women’s work and taste were portrayed as 
deficient in moral and artistic rigour, which is why, according to Kristen Drotner, 
melodrama’s “excess of emotions and intensity of events” was seen as an 
“aesthetically and morally inferior ‘women’s genre.’”179  
The reactions of Victorian critics to poet Felicia Hemans’s work (1793-1835) 
exemplify the connection between femininity and over-sentimentalised art. Kevin 
Eubanks has observed that, even in her lifetime, Hemans was considered to be “the 
quintessential feminine poet” whose “themes of heart and home” dominated her 
domestic poetry. 180  Eubanks convincingly argues that Hemans chose her subject 
matter to cater to the cultural demands for women’s poetry: “Hemans[’s] persona 
arose, in part, out of the interaction of her texts and the contemporary critical 
texts.”181 She depended on critical approval for her income and thus was forced to 
work within the sphere of gender stereotypes. Elizabeth Barrett Browning, who 
actively attempted to overcome the “dissociation of [female] sensibility from the 
affairs of the world,” which Angela Leighton has identified as the “disabling 
inheritance” that women poets faced, set Hemans up as her “‘feminine’ female” 
counterpart in an effort to distance herself from “the superficial, emotional lyrics that 
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were considered women’s poetical sphere,” as Kay Moser has convincingly argued.182 
Eager to establish herself as a “‘masculine’ female” poet, Barrett Browning chose to 
write about philosophical, social and political issues. Hemans’s work, according to 
Barrett Browning, was characterised by its “conventional excess of delicacy [which] 
was the flaw in her fine genius.”183 Reacting against this sentimental tradition, Barrett 
Browning did not write “from, but against the heart,” because she wanted to be 
perceived as an “intelligent, human thinker.”184 She criticised the emotional overflow 
of female poets in order to impose her superiority on the producer of “second-rate” 
literature and to avoid the equation of her work with the popular genres such as the 
sensation novel and melodrama.185 This suggests that the connection between emotion 
and femininity that Victorian culture tended to draw had to be counteracted by the 
explicit dismissal of sensualism.  
When critiquing art, Eastlake was as adamant as Keble and Barrett Browning 
in her insistence on self-control as an indicator of quality. Flaunted, exaggerated 
emotion seemed vulgar to her, as her diary of 1840-42 shows: “There is no simplicity 
so simple as that which is refined, no sorrow so touching as that which is subdued, no 
art so beautiful as that which is concealed.”186 Art, in order to be praiseworthy, had to 
capture subtle nuances and was never to parade the overtly sentimental. Eastlake 
seemed to suggest that the more understated and hidden the artist’s intention, the more 
valuable and effective the work of art. Further on in her 1840-42 diary, she wrote: 
“there is more moral courage in refusing than in accepting, and more merit in 
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restricting genius than in indulging it.”187 Here, she denounced a blatantly visible 
desire to please on the side of the artist. How exactly genius can be restricted is not 
clear, due to Charles Eastlake Smith’s editing techniques, which omitted the context 
of many entries. We may speculate that the constraints set by altruism limited the 
artist’s freedom of expression and heightened the quality of his or her work.  
 Generally, Eastlake criticised art in which the self of the maker was not left 
out. When she met Turner at a dinner on March 4th 1844, she was greatly displeased 
with his self-indulgent behaviour, as can be seen in this diary entry: “Turner, the artist, 
a queer little being, very knowing about all the castles he has drawn—a cynical kind 
of body, who seems to love his art for no other reason than because it is his own.”188 
Clearly, in Eastlake’s eyes, a great artist had to abstain from displaying pride or 
affection in relation to his own work. This self-aggrandising performance of self 
catered to a taste for spectacle, and did not spring from a sincere concern for others. 
The other was forced to participate in this grandiose, absurd acclamation of the self.  
Bain attempted to explain self-centred behaviour from a psychological point of 
view, which reveals the strong cultural concern with the propriety of such conduct:  
There is a great pleasure in observing and contemplating our own excellence, 
power, grandeur, or other imposing characteristics. This is a very special mode 
of self-regarding emotion; the names used for it are Self-complacency, Self-
gratulation, Self-esteem, Self-conceit, Pride.189 
 
“Self-regarding emotion” was acceptable when it meant “self-monitoring,” but 
became objectionable when the contemplation of the self was a source of pleasure. 
Bain seemed sympathetic towards the “Desire of Fame or Glory” and “Love of 
Approbation” and identified them as common pleasures, shared by all humans.190 
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However, because these emotions led to egotistical and exploitative behaviour, he 
sided with Eastlake’s opinion that they had to be held in check. 
To Eastlake, the artist’s pride was immoral because she viewed art as the 
universal possession of all humankind; beyond any rewards to be hoped for him or her 
as a person. The self of the artist was never to be the object of the creative endeavour: 
“It is the business of the painter not to represent the individual, but the individuality—
not to copy a specimen, but to show forth a species.”191 Providing accurate depictions 
of selected subjects did not make a great artist. He or she was meant to render an 
atmosphere; a sensitivity, rather than to present a perfect demonstration of stylistic 
skills. A work of art should never consciously promote the artist but instead benefit 
the community. Eastlake’s general advocacy of self-effacement took on moral 
urgency when the artist was concerned, as her diary shows: “Self-forgetfulness and 
self-possession are the extremes which meet—they are essential to all excellence.”192 
Excellence was annulled by the desire to be excellent—true greatness was the product 
of rigour and self-control. Self-realisation, according to Eastlake, had no place in art. 
It is crucial to note that emotional restraint was, however, not a guarantee for 
artistic success. Eastlake, like Keble and Crabb Robinson, deemed controlled 
enthusiasm a primary factor in the creation of good art. As her review of Ruskin’s 
Modern Painters shows, Eastlake believed that “where a painter’s language has really 
given no delight to himself, it will as surely give no delight to the spectator.”193 
Emotional enthusiasm and personal involvement were thus necessary for the artist to 
be “borne up on the wings of willing power,” rather than to have his art “held down 
[…] to the grindstone of slavery.”194 Hence, Eastlake found the laws that Ruskin 
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considered essential to the proper appreciation of art to achieve the contrary—they 
limited artistic expression for the worse and stood in the way of a greater truth. 
In Eastlake’s eyes, Ruskin did not possess the enthusiasm that the successful 
artist needed, which is why she thought him a dreadful art critic. She disapproved of 
Ruskin’s work as having the “qualities of premature old age” from the first volume, 
lacking the passionate zest and vigour an art critic required. 195  His “overbearing 
spirit,” had “nothing of the self-excusing insolence of youth” and she despised the 
“coldness, callousness and contraction” of his critical stance.196 His opinions did not 
spring from a youthful emotional whim, but were completely rational. 197  The 
paradoxes in his way of thinking could therefore not be excused by the “perverse, but 
often charming, conflict between the arrogance and the timidity of a juvenile 
reasoner,” but established Ruskin’s judgments as unqualified. Ruskin’s lack of 
emotion made him incapable of appreciating art, because “art is a thing which […] 
appeals more to the heart, the seat of emotion, than to the head, the seat of thought, 
and is, therefore, more dreamt and raved about than reasoned about.”198 Art needed to 
be felt rather than thought and Eastlake condemned admiration or disapproval that 
was based on the rational critique of an “unfeeling heart” such as Ruskin’s.199 The 
restraint that the strict etiquette of polite society demanded was less desirable in the 
art critic. Eastlake loathed Ruskin’s “cold and hardened habit, in which no enthusiasm 
involuntarily leads astray” and thus established the emotions as a vital part of the 
appreciation of art.  
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Ruskin’s choice to “live only in [art], and (how generously!) only for it,” 
seemed selfish to Eastlake and led her to question his humanity.200 She condemned 
Ruskin’s unwavering focus on art and considered his complete disregard for human 
beings to be immoral:  
Mr. Ruskin may talk of love for trees, stones, and clouds, and profess an 
impious horror for those who do not represent them according to his ideas of 
truth, but where, throughout his writings, do we find one spark of that love for 
man, woman, or child which is foremost among all the precepts and the fruits 
of religion and morality?201 
 
In most of Eastlake’s writings, such as Fellowship: Letters to my Sister Mourners of 
1868, affection was seen as a woman’s “dearest duty.”202 In this case, she blamed 
Ruskin for neglecting the care for his fellow humans that she deemed fundamental to 
moral behaviour. She was convinced that morals could not be aestheticised but were 
grounded in virtuous human interactions, which necessarily had to be fed by 
affectionate emotions. 
Bain would have disapproved of Ruskin’s obsessive preoccupation with art 
because it negated the “vicarious and self-sacrificing impulse of our nature, in 
opposition to the self-seeking or self-regarding impulse.”203 Ruskin’s focus on art was 
reprehensible because it revealed a conscious decision to distance himself from his 
fellow humans, which made him guilty of the selfish behaviour he sought to avoid, as 
Chapter Three will show. Eastlake deemed Ruskin incapable of “admiration, love, and 
sympathy” which, for Bain, were the “powers that take us out of ourselves, and enable 
us to find pleasure in seeing, if not in adding to, the good that others possess.”204 We 
see that Ruskin’s refusal to engage with humanity and limit his scope to his own 
passions violated Victorian morality in two ways. Firstly, his lack, not excess, of 
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amorous and paternal emotions identified him as a heartless monster and positioned 
him outside Eastlake’s and Bain’s codes of acceptable behaviour. Secondly, his 
choice to focus his energies on the subject he felt most passionately about was seen as 
immoral because it represented an act of self-assertion that disregarded the well-being 
of the community. Notwithstanding Ruskin’s socially conscious writing, such as “The 
Nature of Gothic” in The Stones of Venice II (1853), Fors Clavigera (1871-1878 and 
1880-1884) and his unwavering desire to share his observations with his readers 
(Chapter Three), his association of morality with aesthetics instead of the family, as 
well as his “aged” narrative style, earned him Eastlake’s lifelong contempt.  
Hence, Henry Crabb Robinson’s lack of literary confidence could have 
stemmed from his fear of judgmental critics, who, like Eastlake, created and 
reinforced artistic and social standards of behaviour. He did not worry about over-
sentimentalising his creations, but feared that he did not possess the emotional energy 
to produce literature or criticism of lasting impact. His tendency to anticipate critical 
reprimands impeded him from pursuing his interest in literature and philosophy on a 
professional level and he never completely outgrew the dread of being annihilated by 
harsh criticism.  
In trying to isolate the factors responsible for his unemotional temperament, 
Crabb Robinson suspected that his father’s indifference might have played a role in 
the “want of sensibility in myself which I consider as a radical defect in my nature,” 
as his diary entry of April 23rd 1815 shows.205 By considering this neglect as his 
father’s “misfortune rather than his fault,” he pretended to absolve the latter for never 
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“excit[ing] in his children the best and most delightful emotions.”206 Nevertheless, he 
questioned the formative impact of parental emotional instruction:  
Oh, how difficult, not to say impossible, to assign the boundaries between 
natural and moral evil, between the defects of character which proceed from 
natural imbecility, which no man considers a reproach and those errors of the 
will, about which metaphysicians may dispute forever!207 
 
Crabb Robinson regretted his lack of “sensibility” immensely, which led him to 
investigate who was to blame for the gross moral negligence that deprived him from 
the necessary emotional resources. He tried to absolve both himself and his father 
through considering the attenuating circumstance of their respective incapacity to feel 
and to nurture being innate. Crabb Robinson was unsure whether he could hold his 
father responsible for not instilling a poetic temperament in his son because he could 
not assess the deliberateness of the latter’s indifference.  
Evidently, Crabb Robinson investigated the limits of his will power when he 
questioned his personal guilt in neglecting his literary talent: “on what does sensibility 
depend? On constitution, or habits, or what? I cannot tell. I only know I was not my 
own maker. I know also that I respect others more than I do myself.”208  Crabb 
Robinson attempted to weigh the predominance of external circumstances against 
internal factors in the formation of human character, but was unable to resolve this 
philosophical problem. Its solution would have determined whether Crabb Robinson 
was emotionally under-stimulated as a child, fundamentally lacking creative genius or 
whether he was too weak-willed to achieve literary greatness. The latter explanation 
presented him as responsible for the inferiority he felt in comparison to “those 
[individuals] I see around me [...] whom I believe of nobler and better nature than 
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myself.”209 However, Crabb Robinson felt powerless to actively change his character: 
“I sincerely wish I was other than I am.”210 This suggests a belief in his father’s 
failure to mould his son’s moral and mental qualities when this was still possible.  
 Throughout his life, Crabb Robinson’s conviction that he lacked emotional 
resourcefulness made him feel insecure about the quality of his literary and critical 
work; to the point that he composed less and less. Despite his studies at the University 
of Jena and the empowering encounters with prominent thinkers that he made during 
his stay in Germany (1800-5) and afterwards in England, Crabb Robinson maintained 
a sceptical attitude towards his talent as a critic and writer. Upon his arrival in 
Germany, he deplored his lack of both the emotional enthusiasm and technical skill 
that successful literary and pictorial composition required:  
I can neither reason nor paint… Could I only with elegance & effect describe 
what I feel and see (Which I call painting) I shod be contented but I am 
persuaded every day more confidently, that I want that sensibility of the 
beautiful in Language which is called Taste and in Composn. Style which 
alone without higher qualities enables a Man to become a respectable 
Author.211 
 
Crabb Robinson felt that both his perceptive and descriptive powers were incapable of 
producing sophisticated, “respectable” work. Because of these fundamental 
deficiencies, he was forced to clumsily represent his own experience, which made him 
vulnerable to attacks on the grounds of both self-indulgence and lack of talent. Crabb 
Robinson did not allow himself to fully develop his critical potential because he was 
intensely scared of public ridicule: “I believe I shall never expose myself by writing a 
very contemptible book, because if I did, I shod perhaps hang myself through shame at 
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being criticised.”212 Crabb Robinson stifled his own desire for literary and critical 
output by imagining destructive criticism for his potentially unworthy work.  
Constantly questioning his talent, Crabb Robinson gradually decided that it was 
more respectable to excel in his legal profession than to be an inadequate writer. Until 
1803, Crabb Robinson published several articles on German philosophy in the 
Monthly Register and the Monthly Magazine, but when he saw that his work 
“attracted no notice,” he stopped submitting it, as Behler has shown.213 Morley has 
convincingly argued that Crabb Robinson preferred the safety of obscurity to the 
threat of being ridiculed for his dishonouring mediocrity: “he gave up attempting to 
write because he was convinced that his powers were at best only second-rate.”214 By 
March 3rd 1811, Crabb Robinson had resolved to “not waste my faculties in 
attempting to acquire what is not within my reach, viz. pre-eminence as a 
metaphysical philosopher or critic.”215 Instead of consistently trying and failing to 
reach literary fame, Crabb Robinson determined to achieve respectability where it was 
possible. He recognised that his “moderately logical understanding” and his ability to 
“speak, when I know my subject, with some effect,” were “precisely the business 
talents of a lawyer and advocate.”216  Because the law could be mastered, Crabb 
Robinson was able to present a confident and competent persona to society, leaving 
little room for attack. 
Despite his function as a foreign editor, or war-correspondent, from August 
1808 until January 1809 during the Peninsular Wars (1807-1814), Crabb Robinson 
never acquired the confidence to confront a critical audience. Even thirty years later, 
when his editorial additions to Thomas Clarkson’s Strictures on a Life of William 
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Wilberforce were about to appear, Crabb Robinson expressed deep anxiety over the 
prospect of publishing his work in his letter to Wordsworth of August 10th 1838.  He 
alluded to the legend of a woman who stood on the street with the purpose of selling 
muffins but would only utter the faint cry: “muffins to sell, muffins to sell! Oh! I hope 
nobody hears me.”217 According to Sadler, Crabb Robinson was the epitome of the 
“shy author” who simultaneously desired and feared public recognition. Hence he 
identified with the saleswoman: 
This is just my feeling whenever I write anything. I think it a piece of capital 
luck when those whose opinion I most value never chance to hear of my writing. 
[…] I shall be out of the way when the book comes out. It is remarkable how 
differently I feel as to talk and writing. No one talks with more ease and 
confidence than I do; no one writes with more difficulty and distrust. I am aware, 
that whatever nonsense is spoken, it never can be brought against me; but 
writing, however concealed, like other sins, may any day rise up against one.218 
 
From a young age, Crabb Robinson had been a confident orator and in 1803, in the 
presence of Bonaparte, outdid his company with his eloquent forthcomingness: “I 
alone talked freely, and I could see that people envied me my power of saying what I 
liked.”219 The rules of polite society did not frighten Crabb Robinson, as he felt that 
the spoken word vanished after being pronounced, whereas publishing his work made 
him feel exposed and vulnerable because he could not control the reactions of his 
readers. His “distrust” stemmed from his anticipation of his audience’s destructive 
judgment. The cultural demand for self-effacement in the author may have affected 
his entry, as the pride that came with potential applause would have embarrassed a 
humble Crabb Robinson as much as the derision by his critics and friends. He was 
torn between the desire to be read and the need to be ignored. 
 In order to be respectable, the artist had to find the delicate balance between 
emotional self-investment and the insistence on his talents. Although Eastlake 
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asserted that Ruskin’s aesthetic laws detracted from the correct understanding of 
artistic creations, she implied that creative joy had to be limited to the process of 
creation and that once the work of art was finished; the artist had to distance himself 
from his work and assume a position of neutral modesty. Her rigid opinions of 
appropriate artistic behaviour were just as limiting to the creative spirit as the ideas 
she condemned in Ruskin. The Victorian art scene allowed little room for artistic 
experimentation as artists were either accused of too much or too little passion and 
Crabb Robinson consequently never had the courage to expose himself to this hostile 
audience.  
 This chapter has drawn attention to the strict parameters of acceptable 
behaviour within which the Victorian individual functioned. Respectability was as 
much determined by other-directedness as by the cultivation of personal talent and the 
diaries examined in the following chapters reflect this consistent tension between the 
individual and the community. As Chapter Two will show, George Eliot’s diary is 
characterised by her determination to improve the community through her literary 
production. The apologetic attitude that Eastlake and Crabb Robinson displayed 
towards their correspondents is manifested in Eliot’s diary and takes the shape of 
frequent expressions of gratitude and self-minimising guilt for being privileged. 
George Gissing’s diary is almost completely devoid of an authorial presence, but his 
letters and non-fiction reveal that his struggle for financial survival inspired him with 
a pessimistic egotistical outlook which thwarted other-directed behaviour and led him 
to despise the Religion of Humanity that George Eliot believed in. In accordance with 
the cultural pressure for self-improvement, Gissing monitored his professional output 
in his diary, which defined his sense of self-worth. His conviction that altruism was 
opposed to all forms of progress is unique among the diarists in this thesis, as George 
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Eliot, John Ruskin and Gerard Manley Hopkins displayed a strong concern for the 
educational and spiritual well-being of others. This chapter has aimed to clarify the 
specific societal circumstances that induced the pressure to channel the emotions 
away from contemptible indulgence, towards the disciplined accomplishment of duty 
which dominates the following chapters.  
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Chapter Two 
The Duty to Work: George Eliot and George Gissing 
This chapter investigates George Eliot’s and George Gissing’s responses to 
ontological void created by their secularising culture’s disbelief in an afterlife. In 
consequence, both viewed time as a substance that was to be turned into personal 
value by meeting the standards of respectability that Chapter One has described. For 
both Eliot and Gissing, the proper employment of time was their primary duty which 
defined their sense of self-worth. For both, material wealth was the welcome reward 
for assiduous work, but for Eliot money represented the source of the “guilt of the 
privileged” whereas for Gissing it was a means to purchase leisure time. This chapter 
will show that the prominence of the subjects of time and money in both novelists’ 
“professional” diaries is indicative of their wider philosophical outlook in that they 
encouraged Eliot’s pressure to be optimistic and animated Gissing’s pessimistic 
reluctance to value life, which marks him as morally dissident compared to the other 
examined diarists.  
Because Eliot filled the ontological void of agnosticism with her beliefs in the 
social responsibility of the individual, she felt immensely guilty for being well-off, as 
her diary shows. This fuelled the “economic of compensation” which dominated her 
work ethic and commanded her to pay off her debt to the community.1 In order to 
explain the consistent self-minimisation and the quasi-religious desire for self-
improvement that characterise Eliot’s diary, I shall draw on Max Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-1905).2 Although Eliot’s work ethic was 
heavily influenced by her Evangelical roots, she fought the Puritan orientation 
towards the self that inspired the capitalist system. Eliot, who was an enthusiastic 
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student of the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857), held the positivistic 
belief that concern with the self was sinful—the individual had to invest in others as 
the self on its own was meaningless. Thus, in the absence of God, the signifying 
power could not rest entirely in the individual, because personal meaning had to be 
evaluated in relation to an “other.” The analysis of Eliot’s diary reveals that she used 
her diary to create a self-conscious inventory of productivity by which to perfect 
herself as a reformer of social circumstances. 
In his 1980 review of Pierre Coustillas’s 1978 edition of Gissing’s diary, critic 
Robin Barrow disapproved of the “tedious” nature of the diary, which failed to 
“endear the author to us.”3 Barrow is right when he notes that the “diary gives a very 
restricted and limited view” of Gissing’s inner life.4 I shall, however, argue that this 
professional diary, which is indeed rarely confessional and “remarkably reticent,” 
speaks through its absences and does shed light on Gissing’s philosophical outlook.5 
Because Gissing’s diary is decidedly reluctant to reveal personal detail, I am reading 
it in conjunction with the letters and the Commonplace Book. 
Gissing’s life was dominated by the compulsion to make money in order to 
overcome poverty and re-acquire social respectability after the Manchester episode, 
which designates his imprisonment after stealing money to keep the prostitute Nell 
Harrison, whom he later married. Biographer Paul Delany has argued that Gissing’s 
personality and the “lower-middle-class instincts of frugality, order, self-discipline 
and constant work,” are at the root of the “exile” he “brought on himself.”6 Gissing’s 
diary is indeed distinguished by an unwavering focus on professional progress and 
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self-discipline, but there is also a clear sense that Gissing had to produce literature in 
order to buy time for himself. Only during his travels to Italy and Greece, did the 
proximity to great art inspire Gissing to develop as a diarist, but, unlike Eliot, 
“Gissing was not privileged enough” to adopt this ideal lifestyle permanently. 7 
Gissing’s pessimistic outlook can thus be traced to the limited space for personal 
development and enjoyment that his life afforded and explains his lack of other-
directed behaviour. Although Gissing’s work is primarily concerned with the social 
discontents of the nineteenth century, Delany has rightly noted that “his writing was a 
labour imposed from without rather than the expression of a creative self.”8 Gissing 
did not seek to improve society but treated his work as an indicator of his own value. 
Both Eliot and Gissing were acutely aware of the fragility of their lives. With 
no afterlife to hope for and no religious authority to pray to, life could change 
drastically any minute and the individual was powerless to prevent or explain disaster. 
Eliot confronted the assurance of eternal death by optimistically cherishing life as 
much as she could. Gissing’s life on the other hand, had no such idealistic framework; 
he defined himself entirely by his work, as Paul Delany has said: “there was always a 
sense in which his true partner was not another person, but his writing-desk.”9 Gissing 
found “immense satisfaction in a task accomplished,” as he wrote in a letter on 15th of 
August 1885, and enormous despair if this was impossible.10  
George Eliot and George Gissing are prominent figures of nineteenth-century 
literary realism. Eliot’s realism communicated her personal desire to educate her 
readers and was strongly other-directed, because art, for her, was “the nearest thing to 
life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow 
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men beyond the bounds of our personal lot.”11 For Gissing, on the other hand, writing 
was not a vehicle for social change, but a means to survive poverty and rise in 
respectability. Nor was writing a calling—Gissing had to resort to this type of work 
because his academic career had been terminated by the scandal of his imprisonment, 
and W. Van Maanen is right when he writes: “Gissing was not a ‘born’ writer: 
circumstances made him one. If they had been different, he might have been a 
professor of Greek in one of the major universities.” 12  Professionally, Gissing’s 
destitution set the theme for his novels, as, through his misery, he had “acquired [his] 
intense perception of the characteristics of poor life in London.” 13  Somewhat 
ironically, Gissing needed to be in proximity to London and the miseries he witnessed 
in order to find material for his short fiction and novels. As Delany has noted, Gissing 
“condemned the heartlessness of London,” which was seen as a “giant battlefield 
where, every day, thousands died in silence.”14Although Gissing’s work described 
these dreadful social conditions accurately, it was not intended to reform society, but 
rather for personal survival. In works such as The Unclassed (1884), Demos (1886) 
and Thyrza (1887), Gissing doubted the legitimacy of any reformer’s motives, 
because, as Daniel Born has suggested: “reform [could] be cast as activity carried out 
more for the psychological benefit of the reformers than for any positive outcome 
accruing to the supposed beneficiaries of such activism.” 15  In “The Hope of 
Pessimism” (1882) Gissing criticised the selfishness inherent in religious and 
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positivist doctrines and proposed, along with Schopenhauer, that only the pessimistic 
rejection of the will to live could bring about sincere sympathy.  
 In the absence of a religious system of signification, Eliot and Gissing had to 
signify themselves in relation to their social context. Their diaries clearly foreground 
their professional lives, displaying the struggle to possess and validate their own lives 
in the battle against time/death. After investigating the creation of personal value 
through work in both Eliot and Gissing, I will examine the meaning their diaries held 
in this process of signification. I will then present the impact of these biographical 
factors on their wider philosophies. 
 
Guilt and Gratitude in George Eliot 
Eliot’s “strenuous efforts to integrate individualistic and communal values and to 
transform religious ties into social ones,” were, according to Suzanne Graver, 
characteristic of many enforcers of communitarianism in the nineteenth century.16 
Eliot exhausted herself trying to fulfil her self-imposed duties which re-enacted the 
religious conventions of self-effacement, other-directedness and extreme diligence. 
Like Carolyn W. de la Oulton, I shall argue that Eliot’s “insistence on duty and 
responsibility is the one point of reference taken from her youthful Evangelicalism.”17 
Although Eliot had abandoned her Protestant roots, they had permanently shaped her 
mindset; a phenomenon which, according to Max Weber, had been carried over from 
pre-industrial time to capitalist culture: “the magical and religious forces, and the 
ethical ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most 
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important formative influences on conduct.”18 Eliot retained the insistence on dutiful 
self-restraint inherent in religious practices, but it was now mere gesture, devoid of 
religious significance. This emptiness was repulsive to Eliot and she was eager to re-
invest the concept with meaning through an increased focus on duty (towards others), 
which, in Scenes of Clerical Life (1858), she defined as “that recognition of 
something to be lived for beyond the mere satisfaction of self.”19 Without religious 
guidance, the individual was a “mere bundle of impressions, desires and impulses,” 
and duty, a concept that stemmed from religion, had to save the individual from 
nihilism.20 The individual could not subsist in isolation and had to live in relation to 
an authority, which forced him or her to “[rise] to a higher order of experience,” 
subjecting himself or herself to a “principle of subordination.” For Eliot, divine 
veneration had been replaced by a work ethic to which she was extremely dedicated.  
 Eliot’s work for, and behaviour towards, others justified her existence. She 
substituted divine criteria for virtuous behaviour by self-set standards, which were no 
less strict. Like the Puritan, whose fate was predetermined, but nonetheless had to be 
as virtuous as possible in order to count as one of the elect, Eliot felt that all her 
actions had to satisfy her duties towards others. In neither the Protestant, nor the 
capitalist work ethic did intentions suffice, as opposed to Catholicism where “the 
absolution of [the] Church was a compensation for [the subject’s] own imperfection. 
The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who 
held the key to eternal life in his hand.”21 Eternal life was questionable for the Puritan 
and unthinkable for Eliot. The absence of an absolving power handed over all 
responsibility to the individual, who was defined by his or her past behaviour and had 
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to bear the consequences of not meeting his or her standards in the form of shame and 
guilt.  
We must be careful, however, not to explain the necessity of self-control in the 
Victorian codes of respectability solely as a consequence of Protestantism. Trygve R. 
Tholfsen, as well as Niles M. Hansen among others, has pointed out that Weber 
merely identified the “‘elective affinities’ between evangelicalism and the liberal-
rationalist-utilitarian tradition.”22 Tholfson has insisted that secular forces, such as 
industrial progress, shaped mid-Victorian urban culture more than evangelicalism did. 
He does, however, like Gertrude Himmelfarb (see Chapter One), acknowledge the 
influence of the Protestant ethic as “the chief source of the moral intensity that 
pervaded the culture” which “[strengthened] the ethic of improvement,” by focussing 
on the actions of the individual.23 Moreover, evangelicalism “[softened] the astringent 
side of Enlightenment rationalism and radicalism” and “[elevated] the masses.”24 
Tholfson also explains that the ethic of improvement can be seen as the universal 
embracement of progress, settling, to some degree, the complicated class conflict 
between trade unions and middle-class employers. Workingmen “deradicalized” and 
joined the middle-classes to form a “cohesive culture given to a quasi-religious 
celebration of the activity of the community.”25 Thus, work became the ideological 
means to define and elevate the self through ambitious efforts at ever-greater 
productivity in all social strata.  
George Eliot’s diary and fiction are characterised by an intense feeling of 
responsibility—the self had to cultivate its strengths for the benefit of others. 
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Seemingly embarrassed to reap the worldly fruits of her labour, Eliot consistently 
pushed herself to “make greater efforts against indolency and the despondency that 
comes from too egoistic a dread of failure,” and thus attempted to eliminate any 
vanity from her drive towards success and fame.26 She did long for the validation of 
her efforts by others but desired to make a difference to humanity rather than to enrich 
herself: “life would ever be made precious to me by the consciousness that I lived to 
some good purpose!”27 Only when helping others did she consider her life worthwhile 
and only then could she fully enjoy her success. Despite Eliot’s evident agnosticism, 
these statements resemble religious pledges in their intensity and devotion.  
To Eliot, according to her friend F.W.H. Myers, literature represented “the 
means of self-expression by which she was best able to move mankind,” and changing 
her audience “for good” was her primary aim.28 He further asserted that her fame 
“ever presented itself […] unmixedly as responsibility,” which was confirmed by the 
moral urgency with which she reached out to her readership.29 When in the process of 
writing Daniel Deronda (1876), on January 13th 1875, Eliot felt pressured by time and  
she voiced her “fear lest I may not be able to complete it so as to make it a 
contribution to literature and not a mere addition to the heap of books.”30 Eliot strove 
to create a text of lasting value, employing her novels not only as “experiments in 
life” but as models for life.31 As Graver has observed, Eliot’s work enabled her to 
mould her readers’ minds by encouraging them to mimic: 
characters who experienced such changes as those as she would ideally have her 
readers undergo, or such failings as might bring her readers to a fuller 
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understanding of the human limitations and social conditions that inhibit the 
fellowship she wanted her readers to experience as a felt need.32  
 
Eliot measured her success in terms of the emotional and intellectual nourishment her 
work provided for its readers, which is why the public acclaim of Middlemarch 
(1871-72) was very satisfying to her, as her diary entry of January 1st 1873 
demonstrates: “No former book of mine has been received with more enthusiasm—
not even Adam Bede, and I have received many deeply affecting assurances of its 
influence for good on individual minds.” 33  The book was seen to cater to the 
audience’s need for the formative effects of wholesome fiction and Eliot hoped that 
her audience would internalise the virtuous behaviour she had depicted or learn to 
avoid the fictional errors of judgment in their lives. 
Reflecting the culture of zealous progressivity that Chapter One has described, 
George Eliot displayed an almost total identification with her work. She felt morally 
obligated to work and aimed to improve the whole of society through influencing the 
individual reader’s ethical choices. As Neil Hertz has observed, and this is obvious in 
her diary, Eliot portrayed her work as the “acquittal of a debt” she had to pay in order 
for her life to have “value” and meaning.34 This idea of work as a sacrifice that should 
be offered joyfully without the affirmation of the self by pecuniary reward implies the 
annihilation of the author and the foregrounding of the literary text.  
Eliot’s desire to provide moral sustenance to others can be seen to rise out of 
an “economics of compensation,” to use Hertz’s term, which implied that she thought 
she deserved personal validation only if she had invested in others. Moreover, her 
compulsion to dutifully acknowledge her “blessings” and to never indulge in 
complaint was an attempt to absolve the guilt related to her enjoyment of worldly 
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possessions in the face of the deprivation of others. Christopher Herbert, in his study 
of money in the Victorian age, has emphasised the religious aspects of this guilt of the 
privileged: “Christianity idealizes poverty and anathematizes money; it teaches 
Christians to recoil from the contaminating uncleanness of worldly riches.”35 In a 
similar fashion, Eliot strove to redeem her personal and material happiness through 
her literary output, along with her guilty expressions of gratitude, following the logic 
that Weber identified as specifically Wesleyan: “those who gain all they can and save 
all they can should also give all they can, so that they will grow in grace.”36 This 
imperative to aggrandise the other and minimise the self very clearly dominated 
Eliot’s mindset. 
Despite her agnosticism, Eliot had retained the orientation towards a higher 
being and seemed to look to an invisible authority to sanction her actions.  In her 
diary entry of December 30th 1868, Eliot relativised her favourable review of that year 
by alluding to her disadvantaged contemporaries and appealing to a superior power to 
grant her the tools to equalise this unfair distribution of resources: 
We have had no real trouble. I wish we were not in a minority of our 
fellowmen! I desire no added blessing for the coming year but these: that I 
may do some good, lasting work, and make both outward and inward habits 
less imperfect, that is, more directly tending to the best uses of life.37  
 
The certainty that the Leweses were uniquely privileged spoiled Eliot’s enjoyment of 
her peaceful existence and hence she wished for the “added blessing” of remarkable 
work by which to benefit others. Eliot obviously retained the religious gesture of 
prayer, when she looked to a superior power to concede the “blessing,” in other words 
the ability to more productively use the time available to her, instead of employing 
increased will-power to effect change.  
                                                 
35
 Christopher Herbert, “Filthy Lucre: Victorian Ideas of Money,” Victorian Studies, vol. 44, no. 2 
(Winter, 2002), pp. 185-213 (p. 190).  
36
 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p.176.  
37
 Harris and Johnston, eds., The Journals of George Eliot, p. 133.  
 111 
Eliot’s consistent de-emphasis of the monetary reward for her work was a 
crucial aspect of her tendency to self-minimise. Her attitudes can be seen to reflect the 
Victorian work ethic that was shaped by Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) and Samuel 
Smiles (1812-1904). Carlyle exclaimed in “Labour” that: “Blessed is he who has 
found his work; let him ask no other blessedness. He has a work, a life-purpose; he 
has found it, and will follow it!”38 Past and Present (1843) constitutes a eulogy of 
work in which Carlyle insisted that “there is a perennial nobleness, even sacredness, 
in Work.”39 Carlyle was the son of Calvinist parents and a passionate social activist 
who asserted, like Eliot, that the worker’s intention should not be personal gain, but 
that work was necessary to extract the “god-given Force” and the “sacred celestial 
Life-essence” out of his or her existence.40 Work was seen as an activity that ought to 
be fundamentally selfless; the “Reward” of professional effort being strictly non-
monetary: “The ‘wages’ of every noble Work do yet lie in Heaven or else Nowhere. 
Not in Bank-of-England bills [or] in Owen’s Labour-bank.”41 He associated work 
directly with religion and detached it from the worldly reality of financial necessity. 
Desirous to re-inspire England with energetic spiritualism, Carlyle uttered this deeply 
romantic declaration: “Thou wilt never sell thy Life, or any part of thy Life, in a 
satisfactory manner. Give it, like a royal heart; let the price be Nothing: thou hast then, 
in a certain sense, got All for it!”42 The individual had to invest his or her physical and 
intellectual powers in what critic John Ulrich has identified as “a sacrificial economy 
of energy,” in which the value of labour was equal to the value of life.43 In this 
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economy, God was maintained as the “guarantor of meaningful exchange,” the 
signifying “anchor,” attributing value to creation.44  
Samuel Smiles is probably the best known author of Victorian self-
improvement literature. His optimistic speeches and essays were delivered to crowds 
of workers to whom he sought to teach the moral value of consistent work, as this 
extract from Self-Help (1859) shows: “if a working man have high ambition and 
possess richness in spirit—a kind of wealth which far transcends all mere worldly 
possessions—he may not only help himself, but be a profitable helper of others in his 
path through life.”45 Intelligence and selflessness were the qualities of the virtuous, 
respectable individual. Money was an inadequate reward to get out of work—the 
individual should not invest time into work in the hope of material gain, but in order 
to improve him or herself. He too commented on the popular maxim that: 
Time is money; but it is more; the proper improvement of it is self-culture, self-
improvement, and growth of character. An hour wasted on daily trifles or in 
indolence would, if devoted to self-improvement, make an ignorant man wise in 
a few years, and employed in good works would make his life fruitful, and death 
a harvest of worthy deeds. Fifteen minutes a day devoted to self-improvement 
will be felt at the end of the year.46 
 
Time was clearly treated as a precious substance that was to be used properly. The 
employment of time defined the value of the individual, as “wasting” it was a sin and 
using it as an opportunity to enhance the self was a virtue.  
 Eliot greatly admired Carlyle and she both adopted and disseminated the 
principles he had designed to teach order and industry to the working classes.47 She 
shared Smiles’s progressive belief that the railway, and material progress generally, 
could benefit the community immensely as it constituted a “binding force” and a 
“much-needed communication net,” which had the “endless potential to do good,” as 
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Laura Otis has argued.48 All three thus believed in the necessary conjunction of thrift, 
self-abnegation and other-directedness in order to achieve social improvement. 
  Eliot’s self-abnegation was never complete, as she derived validation and 
satisfaction from the act of giving. The great responsibility towards the community 
that Eliot obtruded upon herself was, however, not a source of pleasure because she 
not only sought to redeem the guilt of her present self, but also to make up for the 
shameful neglect of her past self. In a letter of January 2nd 1858, having received 
much praise for her first novel, Scenes of Clerical Life (1858), Eliot wrote that: “[I am] 
hoping that my writing may succeed and so give value to my life [to] touch the hearts 
of my fellow men, and so sprinkle some precious grain as the result of the long years 
in which I have been inert and suffering.”49 Eliot’s episodic inability to produce work 
of a high standard made her feel like she had neglected her duty of providing others 
with moral nourishment. Because she had not worked for “long years,” she had been 
useless ballast hindering the community from progressing. Sowing the “precious 
grain” of wisdom in others allowed Eliot to justify her existence and receive 
absolution for her guilt.   
Eliot felt pressured to maximise her literary output because she was constantly 
aware that death would assuredly put an end to, or even annul, the lessons she was 
eager to teach. Having permanently distanced herself from Christianity, Eliot could 
not “believe in personal immortality,” as Bernard J. Paris has claimed and therefore 
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feared that her time was running out.50 Cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark 
Turner have explained that “our understanding of life and death is very much bound 
up with our understanding of time. This is because death is inevitable.”51 Within this 
limited time span, the individual (“User”) must employ the amount of the available 
“Resource” efficiently to achieve a “Purpose,” which will create “Value” to be gained 
by the “User.”52 The “Value” of the “Resource,” because exhausted, is lost in any 
case. The management of time is thus directly related to human agency, as human 
beings must hold themselves accountable for causing waste due to their 
disorganisation and inefficiency.  
This theory visualises that the prospect of death was terrifying to Eliot because 
it forever suspended her creative efforts and annulled the potential—“Resource”— 
from which to draw. She displayed an intense fear of mortality; a fear that Martin 
Heidegger attributed to death’s “character as a possibility […] which is certain and at 
the same time indefinite—that is to say, possible at any moment.” 53  The 
unpredictability and inevitability of death as the force that broke the bonds of human 
companionship and impeded capable human beings from becoming permanent 
carriers of wisdom unsettled Eliot. She wrote of her “perfect love” with George Henry 
Lewes: “our unspeakable joy in each other has no other alloy than the sense that it 
must one day end in parting.”54 When, on November 30th 1878, Lewes died, she 
bitterly regretted that his creative potential was not permitted to unfold completely; 
grief-stricken, she lamented “the beseechings of a mighty soul/ That left its work 
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unfinished.”55 During her lifetime, the thought of looming extinction was omnipresent 
and could not be repressed; to the point that it determined her outlook on life and her 
self-image. According to Heidegger, the individual commits a mistake by “expecting” 
[Erwarten] “possible” events. In the case of death, “Expecting is not just an 
occasional looking-away from the possible to its possible actualization, but is 
essentially a waiting for that actualization [ein Warten auf diese].”56 The definite 
assurance that death would strike turned life into a priceless commodity that was 
threatened; an invaluable “Resource” that had to be utilised with utmost care, which 
meant that experience had to be maximised during this waiting time that was 
existence.57 For Eliot too, the fear of death magnified the temporality of existence and 
created an oppressive obligation to maximise production. 
These cognitive linguistic mechanisms originated in the Protestant work ethic, 
as the model of “time is money” relates back to “the exact moment when the 
industrial revolution demanded a greater synchronization of labour,” as E.P. 
Thompson has shown. 58 Thompson has observed that the integral elements of 
“disciplined industrial capitalism,” such as the “time-sheet, the time-keeper, the 
informers and the fines,” were in place as early as 1700.59 He notes that the Puritan 
ethic did not introduce the concept of “industry” or “the moral critique of idleness,” 
but that it emphasised the moral character of laborious discipline.60  Even before 
pocket watches were in common usage, Puritan clergymen were inculcating “interior 
moral time-pieces” into their subjects. 61  For instance, Richard Baxter’s 1673 
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Christian Directory advised its readers to treat time as a valuable commodity, which 
was not to be wasted: “use every minute of [Time] as a most precious thing, and 
spend it wholly in the way of duty.”62 The reason the Christian individual needed to 
be so conscious of time lies in the Calvinist belief in predetermination, according to 
which “some men and angels” were given everlasting life, while others were wiped 
out by death.63 Max Weber explained that the knowledge of being one of the elect 
could be sustained by “intense worldly activity” in order to feel “self-confiden[t]” 
enough to “counteract religious anxiety.”64 Although the Calvinist did not technically 
have the power to “create his own salvation,” he or she could create “the conviction of 
it.” 65  Thus—and this is reflected in Eliot—the individual was responsible for 
constructing his or her self-image by establishing a certain set of standards to which 
he or she had to live up. Compared to Protestantism, Catholicism offered more 
guidance to the individual, who, as Henry Newman stated, had to “do God’s pleasure” 
in heaven and on earth, rather than to “choose and take his own pleasure.”66  In the 
absence of an absolving God, the individual faced the grave pressure of having to live 
correctly at all times.67 The diary, as Stuart Sherman has shown in his case study of 
Samuel Pepys (1633-1703), like the watch, provided “uses, pleasures and privileges 
as a medium of self-possession,” which exemplifies its early use as an aide-mémoire 
and tool for self-monitoring. 68 
Despite the decreasing importance of Judgment, Heaven and Hell in her 
secularising culture, Eliot was acutely alert to the irreversibility of time and constantly 
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attempted to ensure that the products of her actions avoided “loss” and achieved a 
“Purpose.” In tune with her culture, Eliot viewed existence through what Lakoff and 
Turner call the “life-as-a-possession-metaphor” which meant that individuals were 
answerable to themselves as well as to the community they lived in.69  
 
George Eliot’s Diary: Interactions Between Selves 
Eliot strove to “possess” life not only in terms of the proper employment of time but 
she also sought to materialise the lived moment in her diary. Like many diaries of the 
Victorian period, George Eliot’s diary was reluctant to unveil introspective detail. The 
scientifically inclined Eliot tended to “[make] herself the subject of study,” as diary 
critic Alain Girard would have it, rather than to employ her diary as an outlet for 
confessing her innermost thoughts. 70  
As we have seen, Eliot’s agnosticism and her positivist beliefs led her to 
consider life as a valuable resource and fuelled her desire to encapsulate the 
immediacy of the present moment. Her diary allowed her to appropriate the temporal 
in several ways: she was able to retain her momentary self in a verbal shape, to record 
and preserve visual and emotional reality and, through a unified consciousness, to 
synthesise the experience she had gained. Frequent re-readings of previous entries 
permitted a reconnection to former selves from whose sadness, love, failures and 
success Eliot drew lessons and comfort, which helped her to temporarily overcome 
the murderous linearity of time and to effectively use the past as a resource. Eliot’s 
immense respect for the limited time available to her reinforced the acute sense of 
responsibility with which she approached work.   
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The double-consciousness and temporal appropriation inherent in the diary 
genre were crucial factors in Eliot’s process of professional self-construction, because 
they   incited her to monitor and master her self and to diligently perform her duties. 
The personification of time at work in her diary suggests a strong unwillingness to 
lose her hold over the temporal resources available to her, which set the basis for her 
obstinate desire for uninterrupted diligence. Through her habit of re-reading her diary 
Eliot sought to improve her self by conducting what Mark Freeman has called the 
“hermeneutical project” of exploring and understanding the “narrative fabric of the 
self.”71 Although the diary strengthened Eliot’s sense of self, the sections following 
this one will show that her self-assertion was subject to the self-effacement both her 
culture and her positivistic beliefs demanded.  
Eliot’s tendency to personify and objectify durations can be seen as both an 
extreme act of self-assertion and a gesture of appropriation, by which she elevated her 
own experience to the level of serious history writing. According to Heidegger, 
time— in order to be graspable—had to be named or physically represented by “the 
clock [which made] the event explicit.”72 Historian Arnaldo Momigliano has similarly 
suggested that any historical evidence, “in order to be evidence, must somehow be 
dated.”73 The practice of dating events raised them from easily forgotten trivia to 
permanent elements integrated into a system of signification, which rendered their 
mastery less problematic.  
The diary, for Eliot, was thus an indispensable organisational and motivational 
tool that supported her mission to improve herself as well as others. It helped her to 
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unify and control her self as well as her past. Whenever she neglected her diary for 
more than a few days, she felt guilty; as if she had deserted a person in need of care. 
On June 22th 1857, she wrote apologetically: 
My mind has been too intensely agitated and occupied during the last three 
weeks, for me to have the energy left to make entries in my journal, though I 
have often been regretting that the days pass without registering the beauties 
we see on our walks.74 
 
We see that Eliot, like Ruskin, felt the duty to prevent the loss of time (and visual 
beauty) by recording her experience in her diary. When she failed to do so, she 
blamed herself for carelessly handing over “days” to oblivion, which, in Western 
thought, is considered to “devour” memory, snatching it to an “inaccessible location,” 
as linguists Lakoff and Turner have explained.75  For Eliot, the consistency of the 
diary habit was a calming and reassuring practice and frequently, after a period of not 
writing, Eliot felt the duty, as it were, to catch up and merge with her former self, as 
can be seen in this entry of January 13th 1875: “Here is a great gap since I last made a 
record! But the time has been filled full of happiness.”76 Thus dutifully informing 
herself in an epistolary fashion (Introduction), she clearly exhibited a desire to fashion 
a completely unified record of her life.  
Eliot manifested a deep emotional attachment to her diary; both to the material 
object and to the experiences it housed. This is evident in her habit of composing an 
evaluation of sickness, work achievements and family news at the end of each year 
with festive finality. She shared this custom with Alfred Lord Tennyson, whose poem 
“Death of the Old Year” of 1833 honoured the year that was taking leave and with 
George Gissing, whose father introduced him to this ritual by reciting Tennyson’s 
poem each year. Eliot sought closure by appraising the experienced pains and 
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pleasures; invariably expressing thankfulness for being privileged. In line with her 
efforts at self-improvement, she tended to acknowledge progress, as can be seen in 
this entry of December 26th 1857: “So goodbye, dear 1857! May I be able to look 
back on 1858 with an equal consciousness of advancement in work and in heart.”77 
Thus, through the chronological naming of time periods, “1857” and “1858” stand for 
the successes achieved during their duration. The tenderness with which Eliot spoke 
of certain years was derived from a conceptualisation of experience through 
metonymy: “The happy old year in which we have had constant enjoyment of life 
notwithstanding much bodily malaise, is gone from us forever” (January 1st, 1874).78 
Time, in the form of a year, was leaving as it were; “we” were staying and grieving 
over the “happy old year’s” departure. The flow of time, in the compact shape of a 
“year” was taking off like a train, having the “enjoyments” on board. The joys and 
accomplishments—“blessings”—were attributed to the year, which therefore had to 
be mourned. 
The diary as a physical object possessed inestimable value because it 
accommodated Eliot’s former selves and established a connection to past states of 
being through the daily practice of writing and re-reading entries: “Today I say a final 
farewell to this little book which is the only record I have made of my personal life 
for sixteen years and more.”79 The regular use of this “little book” had bestowed an 
aura of familiarity on the diary; it physically embodied the cathartic routine of 
recording. When the diary’s “Resource” of space had been depleted, it had to be bid 
“farewell” in its function as an effective “utensil,” retaining, however, its ineffable 
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“Value” as the lasting representation of subjectivity and a selectively constructed 
past.80 
Eliot’s diary represented a materialised act of self-assertion, as she insisted 
that her experience deserved to be recorded. Arguably, her diary helped her set the 
guidelines for the propagation of her ideals, as “this little book” embodied “human 
feeling,” which she considered to be “the proper source of social goals.”81 The diary 
established the self as its own signifier by obliterating God as the authority and 
catering to what Bernard J. Paris has called “man[‘s] powerful need for a response to 
his consciousness, for a humanized world.”82 According to Paris, for Eliot, “the world 
of things [was] humanized by the individual’s identification of himself with objects 
and places, by associations and long familiarity.”83 Through the long duration of its 
presence, the diary was among these objects that came to embody parts of the self, 
which could then defy death and outlive the mortal being.  
By the act of re-reading and by carrying the physical inscription of past states 
of mind, Eliot obliterated the other and sought to provide a response to her own 
subjectivity. The diary enforced Eliot’s work ethic by holding her to her duty to 
diligently provide intellectual sustenance for her readers. The diaristic gesture allowed 
Eliot to save time in the present through preserving the past and establishing a 
historical resource of experience, which, in Heidegger’s terms, represented “a way of 
viewing history arise in the present.”84 Heidegger further asserted that “The past—
experienced as authentic historicity—is anything but what is past. It is something to 
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which I can return again and again.”85 Through materialising experience, the diary 
was able to counteract time’s linearity and restore the past in a circular movement of 
return, which Bain considered to be conducive to mental health.  
Like the photograph, the diary is always in present tense, which is necessarily 
past at the moment of re-reading. The detachment produced by the act of writing and 
the subsequent passage of time have “eliminated the element of real time,” as Henri 
Bergson wrote, and leave historicised fact, thus creating a representation of a past 
moment. 86  Eliot’s earlier entries constituted invaluable touchstones and she was 
convinced that the diary was of great importance to her mental balance, as this entry 
of September 24th 1869 shows: “It is worthwhile to record my great depression of 
spirits, that I may remember one more resurrection from the pit of melancholy.”87 By 
registering her mental states, Eliot provided guidelines that her future self could 
follow and either avoid mistakes or handle crises better. Indeed, her entry of 
December 31st 1877 shows that her diary had permitted her to control her low moods 
and regain optimism by directing her attention to previous instances in which she had 
successfully tackled difficulty: 
I have often been helped by looking in [my diary] to compare former with actual 
states of despondency from a bad health or other apparent causes. In this way a 
past despondency has turned into present hopefulness. But of course as the years 
advance there is a new rational ground for the expectation that my life may 
become less fruitful.88 
 
This entry acknowledges the therapeutic value of re-reading and its fundamental 
importance in self-formation. Through revisiting past states of mind, Eliot relativised 
the present, knowing that she had overcome hardship before, which gave her hope and 
confidence.  
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However, Eliot did not always succeed in therapising herself, and occasionally 
failed to regain self-control through deliberating her problems in a scientific manner, 
as Bain had proposed (Chapter One). When the distance between selves became too 
great for identification, re-motivation could not occur:  
The last day of the month! This evening I have been reading to G some entries 
in my note-book of past times in which I recorded my malaise and despair. But 
it is impossible to me to believe that I have ever been in so unpromising and 
despairing a state as I now feel (January 31st 1862).89 
 
We see that despite her intense emotional turmoil, Eliot first situated herself within 
the year’s chronological sequence, as she often did in the beginning of an entry. She 
then actively tried to relate to a former self but could not retrieve a self that resembled 
her current one in her past. The agony of the present seemed unmatched. Seeking for 
similar states of being in the past was an effort at normalisation—an attempt to 
integrate the current self and its “malaise” into the realm of the knowable and hence 
remain in control: 
I have a distrust in myself, in my work, in others’ loving acceptance of it which 
robs my otherwise happy life of all joy. I ask myself, without being able to 
answer, whether I have ever before felt so chilled and oppressed (February 26th 
1862).90  
 
Re-reading a diary from the past could, thus, also enlarge the distance between the 
present self and the past ones and sharpen the contrast between them. Béatrice Didier 
has remarked that the diary can quadruple its author’s personality in the: “frequently 
arising situation in which the self who writes, the self-who-is-reading-the-journal-at-
present, the self-who-has written-the-journal and finally the self-who-was-the-object 
confront each other.”91 George Eliot experienced acute despair when she could not 
retrieve her present self in the past, as she felt lost without the guidance of the “self-
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who-has-written-the-journal.” This entry also displays her incessant need for 
validation by others; usually George Henry Lewes and her audience, as I shall show. 
 Eliot’s effort to “understand” the self can be seen to affirm the generic premise 
of the diary. Mark Freeman, in his discussion of fiction’s ability to restructure 
linear/historical time, has argued that “the project of self-understanding is to be 
regarded as a hermeneutical project.”92 By means of his or her personal records the 
diarist is able to interpret present events in light of past occurrences which can 
facilitate self-retrieval. Although Freeman does not specifically write on the diary, his 
argument on the function of narrative sheds light on the diary’s ontological 
mechanisms:  
In coming to terms with my past, I can only do so from the present, through 
the act of interpretation; I seek to ‘read’ the events of my life as episodes in an 
evolving narrative, the parts shaping the whole and the whole shaping the 
parts, in an undivided movement of the creation of meaning.93 
 
The recollection of isolated “parts,” such as the individual entries of the diary, can 
provide the re-reading self with the immediacy and precision necessary to bring about 
proximity to the past. The “whole” can be seen to represent the diary’s generic 
enterprise of writing the self; the effort of creating a written representation of a 
momentary self that arrests the passage of time. By connecting with her former selves, 
Eliot got the chance to imitate those selves, drawing upon them as models for 
desirable behaviour. In this sense, the diary supplied a shortcut that was conducive to 
learning—the experience undergone in the past did not have to be endured over again. 
As we shall see, Eliot’s attempts at self-sufficiency were only partly successful 
because she relied on Lewes, as well as her audience, to ultimately determine her 
value. 
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Self-Effacement and the Need for the Other 
The content, emotionally controlled self that Eliot aimed to construct in her diary was 
influenced by the criteria of respectability that Chapter One has presented in that it 
sought to silence emotions of vanity and pride to the point that Eliot became unable to 
evaluate the quality of her own work. Her behaviour can be seen to mimic the ideal 
Puritan that Max Weber described: 
[He] avoids ostentation and unnecessary expenditure, as well as conscious 
enjoyment of his power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social 
recognition which he receives. His manner of life is [often] distinguished by a 
certain ascetic tendency. […] He gets nothing out of his wealth for himself, 
except the irrational sense of having done his job well.94 
 
In an attempt at self-effacement, Eliot scolded herself when indulging in complaint or 
taking pleasure in her success. Her desire to be humble and altruistic compelled her to 
stress that she was profoundly grateful for her life’s “blessings;” namely, the financial 
security and intellectual stimulation she shared with her beloved mate. As a result of 
the economic culpability she felt due to her privileged status, Eliot guiltily added 
grateful pendants to most negative remarks:  
Read little this morning—my mind dwindling with much depression on the 
probability or improbability of my achieving the work I wish to do. […] I am 
much afflicted with hopelessness and melancholy just now: and yet I feel the 
value of my blessings.95 
 
Even when oppressed by depression, Eliot forced herself to keep a positive outlook, 
and tried to prevent herself from slipping into the abyss of self-deprecation and 
ingratitude through her will power. She clearly strove to maintain a balance between 
exhilarating happiness, physical frailty and an obsessive ambition that focused too 
much on the self. Thus, this balance was not just geared towards maintaining health 
but also aimed at sustaining moral faultlessness. 
                                                 
94
 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 71.  
95
 Harris and Johnston, eds., The Journals of George Eliot, pp. 98-99; 30th July 1861. My italics. 
 126 
 Although Eliot used her diary as a platform to learn from the interactions 
between her selves, it did not help her develop a stronger sense of self-esteem, 
because she heavily depended on Lewes to break the circle of constant self-
examination and dread of failure and to validate her work. Eliot needed Lewes to 
“assemble” herself “out of the other,” to draw on M.M. Bakhtin’s 1919 essay “Art 
and Answerability,” which argues that the self only exists in relation to the other.96 
Although Eliot strove both for control over her temporal reality and attempted to 
signify herself through her diary, these efforts at objectivity were doomed to fail, 
because she could only see herself through others’ responses to her being and her 
work. Bakhtin wrote that in order to gain self-knowledge,  
Something like a transparent screen has to be inserted between my inner self-
sensation (the function of my empty seeing) and my outwardly expressed image: 
the screen of the other’s possible emotional-volitional reaction to my outward 
manifestation—his possible enthusiasm, love, astonishment, or compassion for 
me. 97 
 
The other is thus necessary for self-realisation because although we can conceptualise 
the world we perceive and develop strategies to survive in it, we cannot form an idea 
of ourselves functioning in our material surroundings. We cannot watch ourselves live; 
only others can. It seems that Eliot did not manage to durably internalise the 
favourable appreciation of her work by those who admired her, such as Edith Simcox, 
George Henry Lewes and many of her readers. 
Eliot relied on the support, opinions and knowledge of her “second self” to 
comfort her persistent “distrust in myself, in my work, in others’ loving acceptance of 
it.” 98 Whenever she was unsure of the quality of her work, Lewes was usually able to 
confirm its value, which made her look at it more objectively and more proudly. He 
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functioned as her alter ego, who signified her as a person and as a writer. When Eliot 
was in the process of writing Romola (1863), she noted in her diary that she was 
“extremely spiritless—dead, and hopeless about my writing.” 99  Then however, 
Lewes’s appreciation of her writing helped her regain her spirits: “After this record, I 
read aloud what I had written of Part IX to George, and he to my surprise entirely 
approved it.”100 Similarly when working on her drama Brother Jacob (1864), she 
reported to her diary that:  
During the last week I have been worse than ever—with continual bilious 
headache. But yesterday and today I seem to be emerging from this swamp of 
miseries. I have written to the 16th page of the Third Act. The other day I read to 
George and he approved it highly.101 
 
We see that Eliot was incapable of properly judging herself and needed Lewes’s 
opinion to evaluate her work. Her first note of the year 1865 likewise demonstrates 
her reliance on Lewes’s appraisal of her experimentations in poetry: “for the first time 
in my serious authorship I have written verse and George declares it to be 
triumphantly successful.”102 Here, she neither stated what she thought of her poetic 
creations, nor the subject of her new line of work, but immediately substituted her 
own opinion for Lewes’s, which she deemed superior to her own.  
Eliot even went so far as to credit Lewes with her own virtuous self-control, 
attributing her own will power to him. It seems that Lewes acted as the super-ego who 
restored Eliot’s mental balance and self-esteem: “In each other, we are happier than 
ever: I am more grateful to my dear husband for his perfect love, which helps me in 
all good and checks me in all evil—more conscious that in him I have the greatest of 
blessings.”103 Again, when she felt “much depressed in the morning, feeling my work 
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worth nothing,” Lewes was able to help: “talking over my fourth act with George, I 
recovered some hope.” 104  By 1875 her reputation as a writer was all the more 
established after having published Middlemarch in 1872, but she nonetheless felt 
overwhelmed by the writer’s task: “the two first volumes of Daniel Deronda are in 
print and the first Book is to be published on February 1st,— I have thought very 
poorly of it myself throughout, but George and the Blackwoods are full of satisfaction 
in it.”105 This constant insecurity may have stemmed from the internalisation of the 
cultural beliefs in the inferiority of female writers, which I have discussed in Chapter 
One. Generally, Eliot can be seen to display both unorthodox and conventional gender 
politics. I agree with Shirley Foster, who has argued that Eliot’s open marriage and 
her acceptance as a woman within the masculine sphere of literary writers proved that 
she was a “rebel.”106 On the other hand, Foster confirms, Eliot’s success very much 
depended on Lewes’s motivational support: “She was positively assisted by her 
consort; she would probably never have written fiction at all without Lewes’s initial 
encouragement and consequent dedication to her success, over-protective though it 
may seem.”107 The diary shows that indeed, Lewes was the driving force that pushed 
Eliot towards progress and counteracted her ubiquitous lack of confidence.  
 In conclusion, we find that Eliot suffered enormously from her inability to 
reconcile the numerous responsibilities she heaped upon herself. She expected herself 
to be a social reformer while at the same time effacing her presence. Although she 
needed to adhere to the “Religion of Humanity” to compensate for her loss of 
religious faith, she did not have the energy or confidence of a resolute Carlyle or 
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Smiles. The fact that the medium through which she hoped to bring about social 
change was crafted fiction greatly added to her difficulties to live up to her own 
expectations of other-directed behaviour. The creation of literature was a necessarily 
solitary activity that encouraged a focus on the self, which meant that Eliot critically 
examined her own work and was unable to find it of a high enough quality to translate 
her moral idealism. Her guilt of being privileged as well as the awkwardness of being 
successful can thus be seen to have represented an ideological problem for the self-
effacing Eliot, which only Lewes could solve for her. Eliot, like Gissing, struggled 
because she wanted to achieve too much.  
 
Money is Time: Gissing and Work 
George Gissing did not “possess” his life because it was dominated by his financial 
struggle and the consequent excruciating loneliness. Opposed to the worshippers of 
work and self-improvement, such as Smiles and Carlyle, Gissing reversed the maxim 
of “time is money” into “money is time.” Although Gissing himself tended to portray 
work as simply a painful necessity, Paul Delany has convincingly argued that Gissing 
made work his source of personal value; a “project […] to be productive at all costs, 
to live under a daily discipline and have something to show for it.”108 Despite his 
personal tendency to “subordinate [his life] to self-discipline,” the self-declared 
pessimist seems like a grumpy dissenter in the context of Victorian culture’s 
glorification of work.109 Gissing can indeed be seen as “the Victorians’ antidote to 
Samuel Smiles,” as Philip J. Waller has claimed, because he refused to cherish work 
as a “blessing,” in the fashion of George Eliot.110 The unending anxiety about money 
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which dictated Gissing’s reality prevented him from extending his personal work 
ethic to a wider ideological construct. Although all his novels depict characters in 
desperate financial trouble, their struggle for survival represents merely the catalyst of 
the novels’ development and does not express the author’s desire for reform. Gissing 
lacked Eliot’s ideological vigour and took a stance of pessimistic determinism, and 
was, as Delany has convincingly argued, sure of his personal powerlessness in 
confrontation with social grievances:  
Gissing’s politics were rooted in his immediate personal situation; he cared little 
for political philosophies beyond what he himself had seen and suffered. He 
firmly believed that for the social question there could only be individual 
solutions; and he believed just as firmly that for most people there was not going 
to be any solution.111 
 
We see that Simon J. James’s claim that “the subject of money preoccupies Gissing 
more than any other novelist in English literature” is true for Gissing’s personal life as 
well. In many ways, Gissing’s work was his life because he wrote novels in order to 
survive and to fulfil the criteria that his personal standards of literary quality 
demanded. 112 
Gissing’s work ethic proposed that intellectual work of high standards could 
attribute value to the individual, but he felt that ‘work for work’s sake’ was a 
meaningless concept as the necessity to work subtracted time off life, instead of 
validating it. Neither in his diary, nor in his other autobiographical records did he deal 
with this subject, but his semi-autobiographical character Henry Ryecroft comments 
on the irrelevance of hard labour for moral growth, as advocated by Carlyle and 
Smiles: “Agriculture is one of the most exhausting forms of toil, and, in itself, by no 
means conducive to spiritual development; that it played a civilizing part in the 
history of the world is merely due to the fact that, by creating wealth, it freed a 
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portion of mankind.”113 Possibly in response to the culture of self-improvement, or 
Gissing’s shameful imprisonment, Ryecroft adopted a cynically materialistic attitude 
to hard labour, reducing it to a source of commercial profit and denying its spiritual 
nourishment. Gissing himself was as much afraid of a career as a clerk as he was of 
the prospect of ending up in a workhouse, which added enormous pressure to the 
literary process. 
The character Henry Ryecroft, who strongly reminds us of Gissing, tellingly 
comments on the harsh reality of the literary profession and openly derides the maxim 
of “time is money” by calling it “the vulgarest saw known to any age or people.”114 
According to Ryecroft, who as a young man did not feel in possession of his life, 
“money is time” would be more accurate, because all the time available to him had to 
be invested in work:  
Have I not lost many and many a day of my life for lack of the material 
comfort which was necessary to put my mind in tune? Money is time. With 
money I buy for cheerful use the hours which otherwise would not in any 
sense be mine; nay which would make me their bondsman. Money is time, and, 
heaven be thanked, there needs so little of it for this sort of purchase.115 
 
Ryecroft, like Gissing, finds himself in a circular economy: he must sacrifice all his 
time to work, in order to have the money necessary to afford leisure time, from which 
then to draw the inspiration that is essential to his profession. His life is kept captive 
by the ceaseless pressure for material gain, which is the only means by which he can 
recover control. Arlene Young has identified the same dynamic in Eve’s Ransom 
(1895), in which money purchases “freedom.” 116  Hilliard tells his friend Robert 
Narramore: “Here’s four hundred pounds. It shall mean four hundred pounds’-worth 
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of life. While this money lasts, I’ll feel that I’m a human being.”117 Money is thus 
seen as a humanising factor, allowing the individual not merely to survive, but to live 
in dignity.  
 As we shall see, for Gissing, the enjoyment of life consisted of reading, 
travelling and the contemplation of art. However, all of these depended on financial 
solvency. Annarita Del Nobile is right when she argues that “Gissing wrote in order to 
be able to travel […] and he travelled in order to write.”118 Gissing’s 1888 trip to Italy 
starts off in Paris, with an excited life-affirming attitude, which stems from financial 
security: “Rose in astonishing health and spirits. The knowledge that I am safe from 
penury for a year has helped me wonderfully” (October 7th 1888).119 Indeed, money 
bought him the agency to manage his time at will and enabled him to pursue his 
passions. 
 Money also determined the way he perceived the territories he visited. Museums 
tended to charge entrance fees, which had a detrimental effect on his research and the 
enjoyment of the art on display. When in Naples on November 7th 1888, he was only 
able to “glance at the Grotto of Sejanus, in passing,” because he “[could] not afford to 
pay every entrance fee.”120  This financial imperative to choose his destinations with 
respect to their cost caused him great inconvenience because the ubiquitous fees 
rendered a total immersion into the artistic patrimony of Italy impossible: “[I] must 
lose much that I should like to see.”121  Gissing felt that this commodification of art 
discriminated against those whose movements were limited by financial want. On 
December 31st in Florence, the museum’s charges all but ruined his experience: 
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“Went to the Uffizi, the Pitti, the Museo in the Bargello, and the Belle Arti. 
Something like despair is the result; it is cruel to have my opportunities of study 
curtailed by having to pay a lira each visit.”122 Gissing was greatly distressed to find 
himself in such close proximity to his “favourites,” but still to be separated from his 
ideal because of financial reasons.123 
Despite his financial struggles, Gissing maintained extremely high standards 
for both his novels and his short stories, which ultimately determined his self-worth. 
His letter of January 15th 1899 to Fleury condenses his pride over his serious work 
ethic: “it has never been my habit to write flippantly, idly; I have never written only to 
gain money, to please the foolish. And my reward is that—however poor that I have 
done—I do not feel ignoble.”124 Gissing deemed the constant re-writing, mental work 
and self-discipline that he invested in his novels to be superior to the “debased 
hackwork,” which, according to Kevin Swafford, he criticises in Ryecroft.125 Swafford 
has convincingly argued that for Ryecroft, “the practice of art and authentic writing 
should be beyond the fray of the market because its subject is truth.”126  Artistic 
veracity elevated remarkable writing from commodified literature and “remove[d] the 
individual from the mass of humanity.” 127   In this case, Ryecroft functioned as 
Gissing’s ventriloquist, voicing the latter’s satisfaction of having maintained his 
standards for artistic creation. The highest distinction was the respect Gissing had for 
himself; he possessed the dignity of an individual who had prioritised artistic quality 
over financial prosperity.  
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Although Gissing thought himself lucky to be a writer instead of a clerk, he 
refused to romanticise the daily toil that characterised literary production. I agree with 
critic Simon J. James who has argued that: 
In contrast to the valorisation of labour’s redemptive quality by most Victorian 
fiction, for Gissing the debilitating effects of labour, ‘the curse of curses,’ are 
such that it is only undertaken resentfully in order to continue existence, even 
intellectual labour, as New Grub Street shows.128 
 
New Grub Street (1891) indeed paints a uniquely grim picture of the writer’s 
profession as it disregards the rewards that literary art can bring. Although it is 
tempting, we cannot read Reardon as a purely autobiographical character, because he 
embodies solely the dissatisfying aspects of literary production. His despair, however, 
is comparable to Gissing’s, when the former “dipped his pen for the hundredth time, 
bent forward in feverish determination to work. Useless; he scarcely knew what he 
wished to put into words, and his brain refused to construct the simplest sentence.”129 
This clearly recalls Gissing’s own obligation to be creative on command: “With what 
terrific reluctance I sit down to work every afternoon!”130 Writing is pleasurable if it 
gives expression to narrative currents that have been damming up in the mind, but 
Gissing was under the torturous pressure to squeeze out an average of 3000 words per 
day in order to survive. 
 Like Henry Crabb Robinson, Gissing struggled to (re)gain the status of 
respectability after the Manchester episode. His financial success and the critical 
approval he received proved that he had risen above the status of poverty, which filled 
him with the pride of having overcome material difficulties through his art. Liz 
Hedgecock has identified “contradictions or at least incongruities in Gissing’s practice 
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of his profession, and an ambivalence in his ideological position within it.”131 Despite 
the pressure to produce as abundantly and speedily as possible, Gissing insisted on the 
quality of his literary output, which is why he rejected many of his projects, even at an 
advanced stage. Hedgecock is indeed correct when she points out that Gissing 
combined “both ‘artist’ and ‘tradesman’ characteristics in labouring over his 
novels.”132 Money, for Gissing, did not suffice to distinguish a respectable author. He 
produced numerous short stories for “quick cash,” which is why, according to 
Emanuela Ettorre, they are generally considered to be “the inferior product[s] of an 
otherwise talented author.” 133  However, Gissing did not seem to make a major 
difference between the types of story he produced. On December 31st 1894, he 
congratulated himself on having “earned by literature in 1894 no less a sum than 
£453-12-5. Bravo! I see that my total expenses were £239-6-9.” 134  Gissing was 
immensely proud of making a profit off his literary work because it meant that he had 
overcome poverty and gained respectability without compromising his intellectual 
standards.  
Gissing’s refusal to glorify the work process denoted his support for thinkers 
such as the socialists John Ruskin (1819-1900) and William Morris (1834-1896), who 
were critical of Victorian culture’s glorification of work, as well as the wider 
capitalist system, and insisted that work was only valuable if its content was. In “The 
Nature of Gothic,” Ruskin condemned the mechanical and repetitive tasks that 
construction workers had to execute as dehumanising. He insisted that unless they 
were posed an intellectual challenge which allowed them to develop their creativity 
                                                 
131
 Liz Hedgecock, “Men at Work: Gender, Class and Ideology of Employment in In the Year of 
Jubilee,” in Bouwe Postmus, ed., A Garland for Gissing (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), pp. 91-105 (p. 
95).  
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Emanuela Ettorre, “‘The Salt of the Earth’ and the Ethics of Self-Denial,” Gissing Journal, vol. 31, 
no. 3 (July 1995), pp. 19-30 (p.19).  
134
 Coustillas, ed., The Diary of George Gissing, p. 358.  
 136 
and integrate their own ideas into the architectural product, they were likely to focus 
only on their work’s monetary reward. Unlike Adam Bede, they would “throw away 
their tools” as soon as they could, because “they [had] no pleasure in the work by 
which they [made] their bread, and therefore [looked] at wealth as the only means of 
pleasure.”135 The “thoughtful part” had to be cultivated, as the slavery of modern 
human machinery was a waste of human life.136 William Morris, in his essay “Useful 
Labour versus Useless Toil,” which was published by The Socialist Platform in 1885, 
similarly commented that “there is some labour which is so far from being a blessing 
that it is a curse.”137 “Repulsive” work would always be a “burden” to the human 
being and it was “manly” to “refuse” work that was mechanical and degraded human 
intelligence.138  
As his diary shows, Gissing’s work was, more often than not, utterly repulsive 
to him. However, he was resolved to live a strict “life of the mind” and excel at it, as 
Delany has argued, because, with the Manchester episode, he had “shut himself out of 
all the other learned professions.” 139  The ideal that Gissing envisaged resembled 
Eliot’s life: academic study, frequent travel and domestic bliss. His diary 
demonstrates a constant bitterness which was caused by the stark contrast between the 
life Gissing felt he deserved and the one he was forced to lead.  
 
Working for the Ideal: Gissing’s Diary 
As we have seen, the necessity, as well as the ability to work determined Gissing’s 
fitness and value as a writer. Any disruption of his work routine both led him to 
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question his intellectual superiority to a clerk, and posed a practical threat to his own 
existence and his family’s. Gissing’s high standards dictated that he had to produce 
remarkable literature with the promptitude of a machine, which complicated the 
creative process by introducing the binaries of success and failure as well as 
aspiration and satisfaction. Unlike Eliot, Gissing tended to blame external factors as 
the cause of his perceived failure, rather than himself, as his metaphorical appraisal of 
creativity, stress-related illness and the suffering induced by perpetual loneliness 
show. Gissing’s pessimism may have originated in his lack of freedom of movement. 
All his autobiographical writings show that Gissing longed for remote geographical 
places, especially Italy and Greece, and bygone centuries in which art flourished. He 
always underwent a change of mood when he managed to “escape” from “the wrong 
world” that was England into the “ideal world” in Italy, to use Del Nobile’s terms, 
and drew consolation from studying the classics and from decorating his domestic 
environment with portraits of his literary heroes. 140 
Gissing’s life was dominated by an escapist movement towards his ideal. 
When he was travelling, the despair that distinguishes his diary was greatly alleviated 
and he reported exhilarating happiness. Like his character Reardon in New Grub 
Street (1891), Gissing “loved the old writers with all his heart; they had been such a 
source of strength to him in days of misery.”141 Literature and art provided spiritual 
nourishment to Gissing and he thought of their creators as his intellectual company. 
As Delany has observed, travelling dramatically changed the dynamic of Gissing’s 
life, because it “became one of receiving impressions, rather than actively pursuing 
any of his desires.” 142  Indeed, Gissing’s professional life was characterised by 
observing society, adapting scenes for his novels and producing work that met his 
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standards; all of which involved active extraverted crafting. The “ideal world” that 
Gissing encountered on his journeys was there for him to internalise and possess. I 
shall first examine the portrayal of work and its obstacles in Gissing’s diary. I will 
then discuss the function of the ideal in Gissing’s mental life. 
 
Work and Hardship 
Gissing’s diary primarily presents work as the struggle to overcome the challenges of 
poverty and creative impotence and it constituted both the source of and the vent for 
intense frustration and despair. Gissing suffered intensely under the pressure to 
produce work of lasting quality under the constraints of time that his poverty imposed 
upon him. The combination of these factors can be seen to have caused Gissing’s 
writer’s block, which he perceived as a bodily dysfunction. He also tended to blame 
his loneliness and domestic troubles with Edith for his inability to work. Ultimately, 
however, his work did supply pride and self-affirmation.  
Although Roger Milbrandt has noted that only during the first years in London, 
Gissing was “starving,” effectively, his life was distinguished by recurring periods of 
extreme want, as in this entry of March 14th 1890: “do not really have enough to eat, 
but no help for it.” 143  Hunger was a highly disconcerting factor, which, in 
combination with publishers’ demands could be held accountable for “the familiar 
block of thought and fancy,” of which Gissing complained repeatedly; April 6th 1890 
being one of many entries.144  
The literary success of a completed novel was immediately undone by the 
necessity to produce more. Although within three weeks of the publication of The 
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Nether World on April 3rd 1889, Gissing had worked on several short stories and 
written poetry, this did not suffice, as can be seen in his entry of April 5th 1889: “Of 
course no work. By heaven, I must set to, to-morrow!”145 Such periods devoid of 
literary yield seemed to coincide with a state of general inoperativeness in the author. 
He reported that April 28th 1889 was: “a very unsatisfactory day. Nothing done, 
nothing really read. […] These long breaks in my writing suit me very ill. […] Dull 
day until evening; heaviness upon me. Never am I well when I break off my work.”146 
Work and a habitual work routine are here portrayed as the source of health; the 
absence of which resulted in an aggravation of the depressive episode.  
Although Gissing produced a surprising amount of work, a large part of it 
remained unfinished because it did not meet his standards, as his entry of April 7th 
1889 shows: “I shall have to abandon all I have written, and begin a new story. Am 
dissatisfied with the subject I have undertaken. And had finished 31 pp.! Always the 
same, each new book.—A vile day. Did nothing but rack my brains.”147 The process 
of creating literature was thus characterised by a constant movement of conception 
and termination. Gissing’s aspirations to excellence, which did not allow him to 
publish work he thought inadequate, significantly increased his frustration. As a 
consequence, Gissing at times felt “stupid,” when composition proved to be difficult, 
as the entry for June 24th 1889 shows: “Have no confidence in this novel of mine, but 
must finish it, because I am all but penniless.”148 Again, Gissing found himself in the 
“money is time”-circle where he had to invest the time he really needed to recover 
and gather his creative energies into new work that might buy him time.  
                                                 
145
 Ibid., p. 146.  
146
 Ibid., p. 149.  
147
 Ibid., p. 213.  
148
 Ibid., p. 220.  
 140 
Gissing tended to relate his professional success or lack thereof directly to his 
personal life. Only a week before meeting Edith Underwood, on September 16th 1890, 
Gissing prophesised gloomily: “I know I shall never do any more good work until I 
am married!”149 The hasty marriage to Edith was the result (and the cause) of years of 
unhappiness and loneliness, which led Gissing to ignore the signs that Edith might not 
be a suitable partner in the first place. Pierre Coustillas has claimed that “a certain 
masochism” and a desire to avoid “sexual frustration” were at the root of Gissing’s 
decision, but he also viewed Edith as a project, as Paul Delany has argued.150 The 
union ended in disaster, as Edith, eager to get attention from hard-working Gissing, 
fought with her husband constantly.  
The episodes of debilitating loneliness that motivated this romantic choice 
always coincided with professional unproductiveness. In a letter to Gabrielle Fleury of 
September 11th 1898, looking back on his life, he explicitly stated that “I was made 
solitary by hard circumstances and the necessity of ceaseless work.”151 With poverty 
forcing him to work constantly, he had neither the time nor the means to associate 
with the people he felt were worthy of him, and this was partly because Edith 
belonged to the “low-class Londoners,” whom Gissing despised.152 By marrying Edith, 
Gissing increased rather than cured his loneliness, as his entry of April 21st 1891, 
composed two months after his marriage, shows: “Wrote to Mrs. Harrison, telling her 
of my marriage, and that henceforth I am shut off from educated people.”153 The 
discontent triggered by Edith’s intellectual inequality, as well as her temper tantrums, 
frequently made work impossible. The “wrangling and uproar down in the kitchen,” 
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which Gissing described on October 4th 1892, obliged him to separate the spheres of 
home and work: “Things going so badly in the house that I had to go and engage a 
sitting-room, at 7 Eaton Place, Heavitree Road, to use daily as a study.”154 In order to 
concentrate, Gissing had to invest money in renting an office to buy his own time, 
repeating the circular economic of “money is time.” 
Gissing believed that the years of “ceaseless quarrel and wretchedness” with 
Edith permanently transformed his health.155 In 1899, in a letter to Gabrielle Fleury of 
February 25th, Gissing displayed extreme relief when he discovered that he had 
rightly blamed his health troubles, which had continuously interfered with his 
productivity throughout his life, on his emotional despair: “I am so glad you have 
learned that emphysema can be produced by mental suffering. One reason why I think 
of my past life so bitterly, is because I know that my health was destroyed by the 
moral torments I underwent.” 156  This can perhaps be seen as the reason and 
consequence for the environmental determinism that Gissing displays in his novels, 
which, according to Stephen D. Arata, “repeatedly show how, over time, social 
injustice becomes immutable physical fact.”157 More specifically, Ian J. Deary has 
argued, Gissing’s perpetual financial insecurity and the pressure to use his time 
beneficently can account for the “somatopsychic distress,” which is Deary’s term for 
the “self-limiting factors,” such as the “bouts of anxiety” and “minor [medical] 
ailments,” that Gissing frequently identified as the obstacles to literary emanation.158 
For instance, Deary counts forty-one diary entries in which Gissing complained of 
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headache, which is abnormally high in comparison to the “lifetime prevalence in the 
general population” of twenty-five.159  
Gissing metaphorised his powerlessness to be creative on demand by 
conceiving of contaminants located within his body that impeded coherent thoughts 
from forming. After his return from Italy and Greece in 1889, for instance, Gissing 
felt that his creativity was blocked. Despite his rigid work routine, he was unable to 
counteract the perceived limitations to his expressiveness. He wrote on July 24th: 
“Worked 9 to 1 and 4.30 to 8.30, doing 4 pp. Had to rewrite last ½ p. of yesterday. 
Working with that miserable sense of clog on the brain which comes now and then; 
seems to be a physical obstruction to thought,—and no doubt is.”160 Like Carlyle, 
Gissing viewed creativity as an illumination that could not wilfully be retained or 
regained even by the most zealous effort. The “clog” in the brain extinguished the 
inspirational spark, as it were, depriving Gissing of all control. Gissing reported a 
“slight relief” at “about 12 o’clock,” when he was surprised by “a sudden flow of 
composition for a few lines,” which then “[stopped] again.”161 This “flow” of ideas 
represented the creative energy that managed to circumvent the barricade of the 
“clog.”  
When confronted with the immense undertaking of creating a new literary 
work, Gissing did not blame the enormity of the task at hand for his lack of ideas, but 
rather held his neurological constitution responsible, as this entry of August 23rd 1890 
shows: “made a beginning of a new novel […]. Wrote 3 pp., but in the evening saw 
that they are no good.—Am on the verge of despair and suffering more than ever in 
my whole life. My brain seems powerless, dried up.”162 He thus portrayed creativity 
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as an essence the individual could produce by sheer effort of will, which means that 
he considered his brain as too feeble to exert itself sufficiently to generate creative 
output; it had used up its resources and there were none left to draw from. In New 
Grub Street, Reardon, who can be seen to reflect the unpleasant aspects of being a 
writer, reports a similar grievance: “I am at the mercy of my brain; it is dry and 
powerless. How I envy those clerks who go by to their offices in the morning!”163 The 
unpredictability of the creative spark and the lack of control the writer possessed over 
the “trivial accidents” that might impede him from working, made writing for money 
an “insane thing.”164 Both for Gissing and Reardon, it was impossible to be inventive 
on command, yet they both depended on forced creativity to make a living.              
However, work was not merely the tedious and worrisome activity of “fiction-
grinding”—it also determined Gissing’s prominence as an intellectual and thus 
confirmed his status as an artist.165 The comparatively few entries in which Gissing 
rejoiced over his intellectual and financial achievements appear in the later stages of 
his career. The Commonplace Book presents an aphorism on the dynamic between 
self-doubt and pride that characterises writing: “The pains of lit. composition. How 
easy any other task is in comparison. Forcing of mind in a certain current, the 
temptation of indolence with a book. Yet, the reward, when effort once made.”166 
Gissing recorded several instances of praise in his diary that filled him with pride as 
others’ approval established him as a great writer. The entry of August 21st 1893 
contains the most flattering praise that Gissing could have wished for: “letter […] of 
acknowledgment from P. Bergson who says that he takes my books with him 
everywhere, and that they continue the qualities of Shakespeare, Marlowe and 
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Euripides!”167 Gissing’s aspiration to be equal to his literary heroes was affirmed by 
his direct association with their genius. He finally belonged amongst those he admired 
the most.   
 
Ideal and Escapism 
Ultimately, and in this I agree with Delany, the main source of Gissing’s perpetual 
discontent was his conviction that his miserable situation was undeserved, which was 
particularly accentuated when he taught his upper-middle-class students: “[Gissing’s] 
sense of poverty came from his relative position and what he considered due to a man 
of his education and talents.”168 Gissing tended to escape from the frustrations of his 
reality by studying the classics and imagining himself among the great thinkers of the 
past. He underwent a healing change of identity whenever he delved into a world 
saturated with artistic and historical monuments and was able to leave his life in 
England, which was dominated by work and financial pressure, behind. The diary 
displays a marked change in mood, attitude and openness to the world during 
Gissing’s travels.  
 Gissing’s diary conveys the sense of personal limitedness that he experienced 
in England, whereas he was able to adopt his ‘real’ or ‘ideal’ self abroad. Upon 
commencing his 1888 trip to Italy, on October 19th, for instance, Gissing told his diary 
that he had switched identity and had laid off the role of the novelist who struggled to 
make a living: “on crossing the Channel, I have become a poet pure and simple, or 
perhaps it would be better to say an idealist student of art.”169 Travelling was an act of 
self-assertion as time abroad could be used at leisure and Gissing went “abroad for 
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[his own] pleasure and profit.”170 His letter to Edward Bertz (1887-1903) of 1890 
clearly shows the necessity to leave England and enter the geographical place that 
could host his ‘true’ self: “I work only in the hope of getting away very soon […] I 
am in the wrong world […] I am so much more myself when abroad.”171 In the 
proximity to great art and architecture, Gissing felt at ease and inspired—the person 
he could have been if he had not been constantly preoccupied with professional 
matters. His entry of December 14th 1888 proves that once the load of work was lifted, 
Gissing’s depression faded as well. 
Woke early this morning and enjoyed a wonderful happiness of mind. It 
occurs to me—is not this partly due to the fact that I spend my days solely in 
consideration of beautiful things, wholly undisturbed by base necessities and 
considerations? In any case this experience is just remarkable.172  
 
Gissing was finally able to break the exhausting cycle that perpetuated his depression, 
which David Grylls has identified as a product of the former’s simultaneous belief in 
determinism and determination: “he toiled on to counteract his dark depression, but 
excessive toil only made him more depressed.”173 In the absence of the pressure to 
fight demotivation by increased will power, Gissing could invest all his energies into 
the contemplation of art, such as his “favourites” at the Capitoline Museum, or 
“[lounging] with delight in my favourite Sala Rotonda.”174 
 Gissing’s inner world changed drastically with the variation of scenery. 
Confronted with amazing artefacts, he was able to retrieve the passionate interest in 
art he had had as a child, when the future was not yet threatening. Whereas in England, 
he recurrently reported “frequent waking in the night with fears of the future,” in Italy, 
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his sleep was untroubled and he was able to connect with a truly inspired former 
self:175 “I have had moments of strange peace lately. If I awake in the night, I lie 
thinking of only the pleasantest things, and experience a strange revival of the feelings 
of my boyhood—the peculiar love of art, etc.”176 Incidentally, Gissing was able to 
reconnect to the enthusiasm for art that his father had instilled in him. When he went 
to the Loggia in Rome, the “Bible pictures” he saw filled him “with keenest joy,” 
because “they [brought] back the earliest longings of the days when I copied several 
of them from outline engravings that father possessed.”177 In Italy, Gissing was able 
to contemplate the originals of works of art that had been in his consciousness since 
his childhood. So far, they had existed purely in the realm of the mind and the actual 
encounter provided deep reassurance.  
 The locations that Gissing visited during his travels to Italy and Greece had 
been sanctified by their occurrence in the study of the classics and had come to 
embody the associations with the extraordinary art they accommodated or the 
unforgettable historic events that happened within their confines. Gissing was thrilled 
to visit such sacred spots. In the Vatican, on December 10th 1888, Gissing was awed 
by the tremendous significance of the place: “impossible to look at anything […] with 
the excitement of being on such ground.” 178  The aura of the Vatican suffused 
Gissing’s entire being, overwhelming him with feeling, which made objective study 
impossible. Similarly, when in Athens, a place which his studies had rendered 
familiar to him, he was filled with profound respect when he actually experienced its 
monuments: “went onto the Acropolis. So in truth I have trodden this sacred soil!”179 
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The mental images of these spots that Gissing had been forming for years were now 
exchanged for tangible reality.  
 For Gissing, these places possessed a deeply subjective meaning as they 
embodied the literature in which they figured, which had offered Gissing emotional 
refuge in times of acute despair, as is apparent in his letter to Fleury of August 26th 
1898: “but for Greek and Latin poets, I should perhaps have been brutalized in the 
long years of poverty. How many a time I have read Homer when I was living in a 
wretched garret, and had scarcely enough to eat!”180 Classical literature seemed like 
the guarantor of civilisation, reminding Gissing that the human being was capable of 
creating sublime art, which constituted a source of pleasurable distraction for him.  
The physical proximity to the greatness of Rome and Athens, among other 
cities, enabled Gissing to realise his ideal. The complementation of mental images 
with physical reality bequeathed Gissing with a deep satisfaction and a sense of 
arrival. The Commonplace Book presents an entry in which Gissing described the 
perfection experienced in Rome as the high point of his life: 
Perhaps the supreme moment of my life was that when I woke one night in 
Rome, & lay with a sense of profound & peaceful possession of what for so 
many years I had desired. Before going to bed I had read Horace. Never have I 
been so free of temporal cares (in soul, that is to say) & so clearly face to face 
with the ideal of intellectual life.181 
 
This entry exemplifies the deep fulfilment Gissing drew from the unification of 
imagination and reality, which enabled him to finally “possess” his experience. 
Reading a classical Roman author in the very city in which he wrote gave Gissing a 
sense of presence, and he “possessed” the reassurance that this place was not a mere 
fabrication but that ancient Rome lived on through its literature and its monuments. 
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Gissing’s ideal had become real and he accomplished the appropriation of the lived 
moment by writing down his experience.  
 When exploring Rome and Athens, Gissing tended to identify with the 
imagined consciousness of the historical figures that inhabited these structures. He 
stepped out of his self and attempted to see the place with the eyes of personalities 
long dead. When on December 17th, he contemplates Rome from a distant hill, he 
combines his knowledge of history and the sights in front of him to form a hypothesis 
of past conditions: “what a delightful view of the city there must have been from 
Tusculum, which was up by Frascati!”182  Gissing tries to mentally inhabit a past 
moment by adopting the perspective of now fictionalised humans. In Athens, on 
November 24th 1889, Gissing feels connected to Socrates because of the shared 
location; the banks of the river Ilissus. He tries to imagine the conditions of 400 B.C., 
assuming Socrates’s viewpoint: “When Socrates sat on this spot, under the plane-tree, 
and discoursed the ‘Phoedrus,’ the conditions must have been very different. It was 
then, of course, outside the city.”183 Again, his academic knowledge and the present 
place serve as a basis to imagine the past and Socrates’s reality.  
This section has exemplified the striking contrast between Gissing’s and 
Eliot’s ideas of community. Eliot wrote in search of a response, but Gissing, at least 
until he met Fleury, orbited indefinitely in a life of the mind. As Graver has shown, by 
the time The Mill on the Floss (1860) was published, “[Eliot’s] audience had become 
extraordinarily responsive to her compassionate realism. It seemed that she was 
indeed having the effect she hoped to have.”184 Both imagine an other, but whereas 
Eliot sought to extend her own “blessings” to the community, Gissing struggled to 
possess his own life. In his attempts to escape the pressures of writing for money, he 
                                                 
182
 Coustillas, ed., The Diary of George Gissing, p. 100.  
183
 Ibid., p. 179.  
184
 Graver, George Eliot and Community, p. 253.  
 149 
delved even deeper into the realm of the mind, which can perhaps account for an 
increased need for the diary as a signifying other to validate experience. 
 
Pessimism versus Optimism: Gissing and Eliot 
Despite the abundance of critical readings that analyse the depiction of Gissing’s 
political stance in his novels, such as Workers in the Dawn (1880) and The Nether 
World (1889), Gissing’s writing was not motivated by the spirit of reform. In order to 
explain the ontological differences between Eliot’s and Gissing’s social consciousness, 
which resulted in fiction of a very distinct realism, I shall recall Eliot’s personal 
motivations for turning to positivism and contrast them to Gissing’s refusal to believe 
in the individual’s responsibility towards the community. Whereas Eliot’s self-
effacement was intended to increase her openness to others, Gissing’s pessimism 
demanded the paradoxical union between egotism and self-effacement.  
As I have mentioned, Eliot envisaged a fundamentally ascetic self, who 
believed in the “interconnectedness” of all human beings and felt morally obliged to 
work towards the improvement of society “in [her] day-to-day relationships,” as Tim 
Dolin has stressed in his recent biography.185  Obliged to obey her “economic of 
compensation,” Eliot minimised her self in order to empower her reader, which is 
evident in her compulsive desire to express her gratitude for her “blessings.”186 Her 
altruistic utopia forbade her to indulge in pleasure as well as pain without redeeming 
artistic production. She was thus unwilling to accept physical and mental illness and 
forced herself to actively rebel against such weakness, with a vehemence that recalls 
Bain and Eastlake, as can be seen in the following entry of November 28th 1860:  
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I am getting better now by the help of tonics, and I should be better still if I 
could gather more bravery, resignation and simplicity of striving. In the 
meantime my cup is full of blessings: my home is bright and warm with love 
and tenderness, and in more material vulgar matters we are very fortunate. I 
have invested £2000 in West Indies Stock.187  
 
Eliot urges herself to convalesce by exerting optimistic self-control. Although Eliot 
ultimately feels unable to gather the mental strength to improve her health, it is 
evident that she expects herself to do so. After complaining about her health and 
admitting this flaw in her willpower, Eliot feels obliged to restore her positive outlook 
by assuring herself of her gratitude over the affection and affluence in her life.  
Optimism, for Eliot, was a quality of character she had to actively cultivate by 
consciously diverting her attention towards those factors of her life that gave her 
satisfaction and blocking out those that could give rise to complaint, as this entry of 
December 30th 1868 demonstrates: “I enjoy a more and more even cheerfulness, and 
continually encreasing [sic] power of dwelling on the good that is given me, and 
dismissing the thought of small evils.”188 She invariably relativised her own condition 
in relation to that of the under-privileged other when she reassured herself that she 
had not lost sight of her unique beatitude. In the reverse situation, she diminished her 
own happiness through expressing regret that her advantages were not universal, as 
can be seen in this entry of December 30th 1870:  “Here is the last day of 1870. […] In 
my private lot I am unspeakably happy, loving and beloved. But I am doing little for 
others.” 189  As George Levine has observed, Comte’s philosophy had obviously 
shaped Eliot’s self-image, so that to her “every act, no matter how trivial, has a vast 
number of consequences, not all of them traceable [and she] felt that it [behoved] 
every human being to exercise the greatest care in his actions to avoid causing misery 
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to others.”190 The individual thus had to exert strict self-control, as Chapter One has 
shown, in order to guarantee the sanctity of the common good. Levine confirms my 
point that “the mark of strong will, according to George Eliot, is the ability to avoid 
being influenced by merely selfish causes.”191 Self-effacement and unbending other-
directedness were thus the necessary attitudes of the respectable individual. Eliot’s 
diary shows that her social aspirations had a direct impact on her personal life, which 
caused her “struggle between the legitimate claims of individualism and the 
imperative need for a ‘coherent social faith and order,’” which Dolin has accurately 
identified as the core of her fiction.192 Gissing experienced no such moral struggle as 
he both lived and wrote for his personal benefit. He drew the material for his novels 
from his own experience, which returned to him in a circular economy as monetary 
value. As we have seen, the money he made from his literary production allowed him 
to cultivate his self through travel and the purchase of books. Openly egotistical, 
Gissing evidently abstained from supporting any political causes. 
After a brief flirtation with positivism, Gissing disapproved of its organised 
idealism and concluded that only disinterested sincerity, divorced from religious or 
ideological codes, could achieve true sympathy—an endeavour which strictly other-
directed behaviour was incapable of achieving. The deterministic message of his 
novels and his ambitions to be an acclaimed author—“I can’t endure to be nobody”—
demonstrate an egotistical desire for personal gratification that he maintained 
throughout his life.193 He retained the conviction that life in itself was meaningless 
and that the individual’s responsibility did not extend beyond the assurance of his or 
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her own survival, which in itself was not desirable—Gissing’s pessimism went as far 
as to question the legitimacy of human reproduction.  
Although Gissing’s oft-quoted essay “The Hope of Pessimism” (1882) was 
certainly the product of an extremely defiant mood and can by no means be 
considered a manifesto of Gissing’s outlook on life, his personal despair led him to 
devalue human life consistently. He shared with Schopenhauer, as well as some of his 
literary heroes, the conviction that life was a sequence of unnecessary pain, toil and 
disappointment. Life began in misery and ended with the sorrow of others: “we enter 
the gates of life with wailing, and anguish to the womb which brings us forth; we pass 
again into the outer darkness through the valley of ghastly terrors, and leave cold 
misery upon the lips of those that mourn us.” 194  Reproduction was selfish and 
unnecessary, because it could only lead to work, worry and mourning.  
 “The Hope of Pessimism” can be seen as an extreme expression of Gissing’s 
life-long, relentlessly deterministic doubt that led him to question the individual’s 
ability to rise socially. The essay’s advocacy of the complete “suppression of the 
Will” denotes the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer’s (1788-1860) philosophy on 
Gissing’s ontological outlook.195 Indeed, Gissing’s essay resembles Schopenhauer’s 
chapter “On the Vanity and Suffering of Life” (1819) to an astonishing degree.196 
Pierre Coustillas has advised caution as to Schopenhauer’s influence on Gissing, and 
has warned that “these ideas were not common knowledge at the time” because the 
first English translation of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung did not appear until 
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1883.197 Gissing did know German, so the possibility of influence cannot be ruled out. 
To me, the two essays present commonalities that seem too striking to be parallel 
developments.  
In these texts, Schopenhauer and Gissing contemptuously reject both 
positivism and religion and condemn the validation of life by the fear of death that 
characterises these creeds as the foundation for “envy, hatred, malice and all 
uncharitableness.”198 Gissing criticised the adepts of both Christianity and positivism, 
who stressed the blessedness of humanity and encouraged altruism, for their 
willingness to deceive and be deceived. Their optimistic determination to cherish life 
necessarily included the intense fear of death, which was seen as “the one dread foe,” 
who “puts an end to our joyful labours.” 199  Gissing strongly agreed with 
Schopenhauer’s view that optimism assumed the human being at the centre of the 
universe because it “[presented] life to us as a desirable condition and the happiness 
of man as the end of it.”200 The reality, however, was bleak and had but desolation in 
store: “work, deprivation, misery and suffering,” which could only be alleviated by 
death.201  
In this essay, Gissing mocked the naïveté of the positivist who attempted, as 
Eliot did, to signify an essentially empty universe and refused to recognise the futility 
of their endeavour. He derided the Religion of Humanity as a “creed” in which, 
the unconscious optimism of the average man [was] embraced as a 
philosophical sufficiency, the scientific doctrine of evolution [was] made to 
yield a principle of beatitude, and the very agonies of existence [were] turned 
to the service of an all-hoping, all-enduring faith.202 
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Disregarding the “eternal truth that the world is synonymous with evil,” positivism, in 
its insistence on the brevity of life and the necessity to maximise altruistic work, was 
seen to “strengthen the natural forces of egotism.”203 Precisely by basing the value of 
life in mortality, the optimistic doctrines of positivism and Protestantism imbued the 
individual “with [the] desperate determination to win what he [deemed] his just share 
in the enjoyments of life.”204 The constant awareness that time was running out and 
that every moment was unique in its irreversibility was the source of malevolent 
selfishness, inevitably resulting in the opposite of Eliot’s aspirations. Altruism, for 
Gissing, was opposed to progress, because it deprived the individual of personal 
agency. He ridiculed the positivistic “renunciative instinct,” which maintained that “it 
is more blessed to give than to receive” and attacked its “joys of self-forgetfulness” 
and its “worship of Humanity.” 205  Disparaging these “beautiful ideas,” Gissing 
commended “the competitive system,” for its absolute sincerity and realistic 
practicality, deeming it “the grandest outcome of civilisation,” which put him at odds 
with Ruskin and Morris.206  
In the absence of the mollycoddling inherent in the Religion of Humanity, the 
pessimist was solely responsible for his or her own life. He or she was “robust and 
self-reliant,” and “[expected] no mercy in the battle, and accordingly [gave] no 
quarter.” 207  The pessimist’s acceptance of life as a miserable journey and the 
unashamed self-centeredness with which he or she endured life until death came, 
constituted “the final triumph of mind, the highest reach of human morality, the only 
hope for the destruction of egotism.”208 Optimistic selfishness, which was the product 
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of the desire to take full advantage of the human being’s allotted time, was contrasted 
with the pessimistic refusal to attribute value to life. Because the pessimist expected 
and wanted nothing from life, he or she was personally detached from the will to live 
through the anticipation of death.   
Pessimism was not only a theoretical idea that Gissing developed in his youth, 
but his passionate outcry against the will to live, which was summed up in his cruel 
conviction that: “our existence is something which should not be; the vehement desire 
of its continuance is sin,” durably determined his reluctant attitude to reproduction. 209  
Gissing’s relationship to children was heavily influenced by his worry that their lives 
might be long and unhappy. In his Commonplace Book, he describes an (undated) 
instance in which he witnesses a playing puppy and “laughed with delight.”210 He 
then ponders that “most people, I believe, derive the same pleasure from watching a 
child.” 211  Gissing cannot find the sight of a baby endearing as he “cannot take 
pleasure in its oddities & prettinesses because [he is] oppressed by the thought of 
anxiety it is costing in the present, & of the miseries that inevitably lies before it.”212 
For Gissing, life is deplorable and the world “evil” and hence he sees no purpose in 
creating another human being.  
This pessimistic reluctance to embrace life became obvious when his son 
Walter was born. In his diary, he reports the birth in a very detached and matter-of-
factly manner as the entry of December 10th 1891 demonstrates: “5.15. Went to the 
study door and heard the cry of the child. Nurse, speedily coming down, tells me it is 
a boy. Wind howling savagely. So, the poor girl’s misery is over, and she has what 
                                                 
209
 Ibid., p. 95.  
210
 Korg, ed., Gissing’s Commonplace Book, p. 22.  
211
 Ibid. 
212
 Ibid.  
 156 
she so earnestly desired.” 213  Gissing, unlike most Victorian fathers, according to 
historian K. Theodore Hoppen, does not assist the birthing process.214  Occupying 
himself downstairs, Gissing puts himself deliberately at a distance and learns of the 
birth through the “study door” and through the excited nurse’s alert. The desire to 
have a child seems to have come from Edith, which, in combination with Gissing’s 
pessimism, explains his joyless entry, as well as his reluctance to associate with the 
child which lasted for several months.215  
Yet, Gissing’s cynicism did allow for human sympathy and mutual care. 
However, unlike Eliot’s overbearing concern for others’ happiness, which forced her 
to sacrifice and belittle her own interests, Gissing believed that human companionship 
was possible because the despair over the human condition, devoid of an afterlife, 
affected all human beings equally. If humans delved into the “immense self-pity 
[which] took possession of the imprisoned soul,” when contemplating their dreadful 
fate, then they could connect to their fellow humans who shared the same lot.216 For 
Gissing, self-pity was not selfish, as Bain and Eastlake claimed, but this earnest 
capacity to feel sorry for oneself was the source of human kindness: “the compassion 
which each man first feels for himself, let him extend to his fellow-sufferers.”217 In 
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order to care about others and establish meaningful connections to them, Gissing 
believed, the individual had to tap into his or her emotions instead of silencing them.  
In what might be seen as a response to the gradual secularisation of 
nineteenth-century culture, Eliot combined the remnants of her religious heritage with 
her positivistic frame of mind, which inspired her with the duty to create literature 
that could accomplish social change. Gissing, on the other hand, resisted his culture’s 
push towards self-improvement and altruism and believed that material circumstances 
shaped the individual, which fiction alone was powerless to alter. Despite this 
fundamental difference in outlook, for both writers, success and discipline in work 
were the principal factors that determined their sense of self-worth and defined the 
“value of the individual.” The differences in the perception of duty were informed by 
social status, which had a direct impact on the meaning that work had for both. Eliot 
felt the guilt of the privileged and used her work to redeem herself by giving to the 
other, whereas for Gissing literary success depended on his being given approval and 
subsistence. To both, however, the self and its allotted time became a project whose 
standards of quality and productivity were incredibly high.  
In conclusion I would like to emphasise that, both for Eliot and Gissing, the 
pressure caused by the unending, self-imposed, duty to work restricted the ripening of 
creative thought. Work became its own obstacle. The following chapter will show that 
for John Ruskin, the duty to observe his visual environment and to translate it for his 
readers constituted a similar source of frustration and guilt. Gissing had to be 
imaginative on command and likewise Ruskin expected himself to emotionally react 
to the visual splendour he encountered during his explorations of nature and art. When 
he was unable to feel amazed awe at the beauty that presented itself to him, he blamed 
himself for wasting precious time and experience. Like Eliot, he felt culpable of 
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neglecting his readers, who, in his eyes, depended on his guidance in the proper 
appreciation of art. Not only did Ruskin torture himself in order to produce critical 
observations with unfailing regularity like Gissing; but moreover he required himself 
to invest genuine emotion into his critical labour. Ruskin’s diary demonstrates that he 
worked compulsively in order use the time available to him as productively as 
possible and to educate his reader. We see that Lady Eastlake (Chapter One) erred 
when she accused him of making his life a self-obsessed refuge into art because in 
fact, Ruskin was consistently other-oriented and felt a very strong responsibility 
towards the moral health of his audience. Gerard Manley Hopkins, as we shall in 
Chapter Four, completely abnegated his private life and intended to devote his entire 
existence to the fulfilment of his divine duties when he joined the Jesuit order. 
Despite his willingness to obliterate the self completely, which is obvious in the act of 
destroying all his poetry, his dutiful self-effacement was punctured by recurring 
instances of self-assertion, as the re-uptake of poetic composition and the act of 
keeping a diary demonstrate. Thus, all the diaries that this thesis examines are 
distinguished by the tense conflict between self-effacement and self-assertion.  
 159 
Chapter Three 
 
Visual and Temporal Appropriation in John Ruskin’s Diaries. 
 
John Ruskin’s diary, which he kept throughout most of his long life, shows that he 
was obsessed with theorising the processes inherent in the perception and 
representation of visual experience. Despite the conflicting statements Ruskin made in 
regard to the photographic medium, he was governed by a photographic mindset, 
which drove him to obstinately peruse his environment for sights he desired to 
appropriate through artistic representation by drawing or writing. He did, however, try 
to redeem this self-assertive, self-centred and often entirely isolated condition of the 
observer by not only training his eye for the maximisation his own pleasure by 
publishing work that aimed at making the reader see. Pleasure was thus legitimised by 
a philanthropic concern for the intellectually less privileged other. Because enjoyment 
was a vital part of perceiving the world “properly,” Ruskin, like Eliot and Gissing, 
expected himself to switch on emotional receptivity at will, trying to control 
ungovernable aspects of the self and to make them function at maximal productivity. 
Ruskin’s diaries show that for him seeing and feeling were work, which can account 
for his frequent lamentations of personal inadequacy. While for George Eliot work 
and pleasure were mutually exclusive opposites, Ruskin was constantly trying to turn 
pleasure into a form of productive labour.   
This chapter focuses primarily on Ruskin’s hunger for visual and temporal 
possession in his diaries. Despite the unquestionably self-assertive nature of his 
appropriation of visual reality, Ruskin used his own experience as instructive material 
for his readers, thus effacing his right to privacy. He devoted his entire life to the 
study of his external environment and constructed himself as a prophet on whom his 
readers depended for aesthetic and moral education. Although Ruskin asserted his self 
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by resisting the pressures to comply with traditional domestic conventions and by 
cultivating his eye through ceaseless observation, he simultaneously effaced his self 
by making the community of his readers the recipients of his own artistic illumination. 
Ruskin’s diaries served as a medium which allowed him to focalise his visual 
experience and, through insertion of selected diary entries into his published works, 
communicated it to his readers. They show that, for him, perceiving and representing 
the external world correctly was an incontrovertible obligation, both on a personal and 
a social level.  
In Ruskin’s diaries, self-cultivation took the shape of constant attempts at a 
complete rendition of experience, conveying his strong desire to possess selected 
objects/events and to preserve all his impressions in well-indexed diaries and 
sketchbooks: “I shall put down here whatever is worth remembering of the casual 
knowledge that we gain so much of every day, in conversation, and generally lose 
every tomorrow. Much is thus lost that can never be recovered from books.”1 This 
entry of March 31st 1839 is indicative of Ruskin’s efforts to retain those elements of 
reality that would otherwise fall through the cracks of memory, thus imitating the 
comprehensiveness of a photographic record. In his endeavour to memorialise his 
personal experience, Ruskin was always eager to avoid accusations of practicing the 
“Pathetic Fallacy” and tried to leave his self out of the observations. In order to do so, 
he legitimised strong emotion and personal involvement in his work through by 
constantly addressing his reader. This attitude announces the simultaneously personal 
and communitarian concerns that motivated The Stones of Venice (1851-53), such as 
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his indefatigable eagerness to save great art from the vulgar modernisation of 
nineteenth-century restorers by appropriating its visual reproduction.2 
Significantly, emotion was an integral part of Ruskin’s observational work, 
because for him, an object was only really seen when the observer was deeply 
touched by its exquisite appearance, as The Stones of Venice III shows: “how is [art’s] 
truth to be ascertained and accumulated? Evidently, and only, by perception and 
feeling. Never either by reasoning or report.” 3  Throughout the diaries, Ruskin’s 
inability to feel such amazement on command caused him great frustration, as he 
considered this numbness a waste of resources and a neglectful treatment of God’s 
creations. Like Eliot, Ruskin felt an intense sense of responsibility towards those who 
were unable to properly perceive the world of nature and architecture, and it was them 
that he neglected when he felt that he was emotionally unable to connect to his 
environment. Ruskin understood that lack of feeling was the natural consequence of 
physical and mental fatigue, as well as visual oversaturation, as can be seen in the 
justifications of this undesirable phenomenon in Modern Painters (1843-1860) and 
The Stones of Venice.4 Nevertheless, Ruskin never allowed himself any rest and, like 
Eliot and Gissing, forced himself to work ceaselessly, to the point that, more so than 
for the latter, his life became his work. His private writings can be seen as evidence 
that he tirelessly attempted to live the theories on art he developed in Modern Painters 
and The Stones of Venice. Ultimately, however, his unwillingness to separate the 
abstract concepts that were the foundations of his work from the private, more direct, 
experience of the world was the source of deep dissatisfaction with his own abilities. 
 Despite Ruskin’s perpetual insistence on the emotional receptiveness of the 
observer, his theorisation and rationalisation of emotion only legitimised emotion that 
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was the product of exquisite natural beauty. The result of this selective repression of 
personal feelings was the dehumanising self-abnegation which led to overwork, 
isolation, despair and, perhaps, insanity. Ruskin’s attempts to silence the self 
consisted of a persistent focus on the visual and a continuous identification of himself 
as a professional observer. He was unable to uphold this utopian self-construct 
because of his human limitations of satiability, indifference and coldness.  
The desire for visual possession is present in Ruskin’s diaries from its earliest 
volume, the Cumberland Diary (1830).5 It is particularly elaborate in the 1835-1847 
diary, whereas the Brantwood Diary (1876-1883) seems characterised by complaints 
over a general lack of “worthy” emotion and a panicked desire to control and 
appropriate temporal reality.6 Jay Fellows is right when he argues that for Ruskin, the 
fear of loss was a strong motivational factor: 
Among other things, he would like to preserve the notion of ‘present 
possession.’ More specifically, he would hold onto the present tense, or at 
least memoranda of the present. Even in his early diaries, the fear of a lost 
present is apparent. To forget is to lose time.7  
 
Ruskin’s “autobiographical impulse,” to use Fellows’s term, is synonymous with his 
photographic mindset, which entailed the problematic mechanisation of pleasure 
manifesting itself most significantly in the Brantwood Diary. When first published, 
many reviewers of Evans and Whitehouse’s 1956 edition of the 1835-1847 diary 
deemed its study to be pointless, as it “merely [confirmed] facts already known,” as 
C.H. Salter wrote.8 T.S.R.B. wondered similarly “how much the diaries add to our 
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knowledge of Ruskin’s thought and personality.”9 I believe that the diaries do provide 
crucial insight into the ways in which Ruskin situated himself in the world, beyond 
simply “providing factual details,” as George P. Landow wrote about the Brantwood 
Diary, or Van Akin Burd’s insistence that the diary for 1842 was primarily an 
“objective study of beautiful forms.”10 Like diary critic Robert A. Fothergill, I believe 
that diaries should be “[treated] as books rather than people” and that the literary 
analysis of the themes as well as the style of diaries, rather than the inverse process, 
can shed light on the diarist’s subjective processing of reality.11  
The interpretation of Ruskin’s photographic desire can further our 
understanding of how his visual experience influenced the way he felt in the world. 
Martin Seddon has convincingly argued that Ruskin chose writing primarily for 
teaching others, whereas the pictorial media (drawing and photography) served a 
more personal desire to assure possession and avert loss.12 The very high standards 
that Ruskin set for both his written and pictorial work came near his expectations of 
the ideal artist. Although, and perhaps because, the emotions were vital constituents to 
Ruskin’s perceptive process, their unreliability and their tendency to become saturated, 
tired and uncontrollable made them tedious obstacles to his determination to 
permanently observe his environment. These revelations can improve our 
understanding of Ruskin’s subjective experience and are not merely rehearsals of 
established scholarship.  
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Interestingly, although Ruskin cultivated his love of natural and architectural 
beauty in his diaries, the latter did not represent an introspective mirror, as for 
instance, in the French “intimistes,” but astound through their tireless effort “to move 
the imaginative focus away from self-contemplation towards an autonomous subject,” 
as Hilary Fraser has noted.13 Although Ruskin deemed the emotions to be sensors of 
primary importance in the process of perception, he was eager to monitor and contain 
the intensity of his “emotional response” because it might disturb his observations.14 
In tune with some of the Victorian codes of conduct presented in Chapter One, Ruskin 
asserts in Modern Painters III that the selfish nature of “all violent feelings” tends to 
cause misrepresentation as “they produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of 
external things, which I would generally characterise as the ‘pathetic fallacy.’”15 
Ruskin despised the sentimentality of the Romantics, although he enjoyed 
Wordsworth, and was anxious to avoid a self-obsessed contemplative stance. As an 
observer, Fraser writes, “[Ruskin] sought a solution in the objectification of the 
emotions themselves,” which is confirmed by his insistence in Modern Painters IV 
that the ideal artist must “receive indeed all feelings to the full but, having a great 
centre of reflection and knowledge, he [must stand] serene and [watch] the feelings, 
as it were, from afar off.”16  Ruskin refrained from giving in to emotion, but he 
constantly struggled to maintain his objective stance, as can be seen in his diary entry 
of August 2nd 1847: “I, with every hope, every power, every right pleasure at 
command, have yet no inconsiderable difficulty in restraining myself from merely 
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sensual pleasures!”17 Like many of his contemporaries (Chapter One), he felt “great 
shame” at his own failure to withstand what he would later call the “victory of 
devil.”18 Despite Ruskin’s “vision of an objective, unchanging reality” his “profound 
subjectivism” indeed could not be suppressed and would frequently resurface.19 
Significantly, on March 31st 1840, Ruskin resolved to “keep one part of diary 
for intellect and another for feeling.”20 This decision suggests a clear wish to treat the 
emotions as an object of study, but the diary destined for feeling has disappeared. To 
me, there is reason to doubt whether it was ever written, because it seems that Ruskin 
generally did not separate between his professional and his private life, but rather 
adjusted the private to the professional, displaying a very strong personal involvement 
in observation, which was a full-time occupation he pursued with vigour.  
 Ruskin’s extreme need for self-enriching photographic possession is expressed 
in his perennial habit to collect sights, memories and objects. The written 
representations of visual reality that characterise Ruskin’s diaristic records can thus be 
seen to claim ownership over lived experience and denote a refusal to exert self-
abnegation. Through my theoretical exploration of the photographic gesture I aim to 
shed light on the possessive and retentive behaviour with which Ruskin governed his 
visual environment. Ruskin’s typical choice of non-human objects to contemplate and 
anthropomorphise represents an act of self-assertion in that it defied the Victorian 
idealisation of family and community (Chapter One), but the fact that he increasingly 
(especially in the 1870s) deplored his isolation indicates that he had renounced his 
need for human companionship by his consistent focus on inanimate objects. 
Although this chapter will primarily consider The Stones of Venice and Modern 
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Painters, Ruskin’s vast body of socially engaged work reveals a desire to put his 
perceptive skills and influence to good use. Whereas the Cumberland Diary 
exemplifies Ruskin’s beginning passion for didactic observation, the 1835-1847 diary 
demonstrates his struggle between his human needs, his aesthetic moralism and his 
ability to experience pleasure. The frequent recognitions of loneliness in the 
Brantwood Diary can be seen as the consequences of a life that was lived in an 
attempt to find pleasure purely in visual reality, disregarding other aspects of human 
existence.  
  
Possessive Genres: the Photographic and the Diaristic Gesture 
 
Initially, the photographic gesture in Ruskin’s diary can be seen as a self-assertive 
attempt to possess the intangible lived moment. The diary, in its ekphrastic endeavour, 
and the photograph stem from a similar desire to appropriate a fleeting reality through 
materialisation. Both transpose spatial and temporal reality into a manageable form 
that invites re-visitation by the means of technological reproduction.  
The concept of ekphrasis, also mentioned in my chapter on Gerard Manley 
Hopkins (Chapter Four), is of primary importance to an analysis of Ruskin’s gesture 
of visual appropriation. The term “ekphrasis” designates the principle of “ut pictura 
poesis” (as is the picture, so is the poem), which consists of the verbal representation 
of visual and temporal reality. Some critics, such as Pia Brinzeu have insisted that 
“the result of the ekphrastic transmutation should always be a literary production” and 
should focus on an “artistic object.” 21  Others, such as Murray Krieger, seek to 
“broaden the range of possible ekphrastic objects by re-connecting ekphrasis to all 
‘word-painting,’” tracing “the ekphrastic as it is seen occurring all along the spectrum 
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of spatial and visual emulation in words.”22 Ekphrasis can be seen as the artistic 
principle that dominates Ruskin’s diary because he constantly verbally appropriated 
landscapes, buildings and paintings. The visual, for Ruskin, was always already 
verbal, as he wrote in Modern Painters III, “to see clearly is poetry, prophecy and 
religion,—all in one,” but necessitated completion by the actual ekphrastic act of 
inscription. 23  George Landow has suggested that Ruskin was familiar with the 
ekphrastic tradition from reading the work of eighteenth-century critics and artists, 
such as Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792), Henri Fuseli (1741-1825) and James Barry 
(1741-1806), as well as Leonardo Da Vinci’s (1452-1519) Treatise on Painting.24 
The ekphrastic impulse is part of a larger desire to take possession of spatial and 
temporal reality, namely, the photographic gesture. Before the visual could be 
transmuted into the verbal, Ruskin needed to study the object/event in question in as 
much detail as possible. The fact that Ruskin composed such lavish diary entries 
denotes a sincere fascination with nature and architecture, as well as an inherently 
selfish desire to identify with and possess the observed object/event.  However, he 
also used these sumptuous descriptions of extraordinary beauty to cater to his intense 
feeling of responsibility towards his reader, for whose benefit his studies were 
supposedly conducted. An ontological comparison between the diary and the 
photograph can help us understand Ruskin’s unwillingness to be separated from his 
visual conquests, his desire to counteract loss of life through visual reproduction of 
selected objects/events and his unwavering need to ensure their symbolic presence. 
Both modes of representation were acts of self-assertion, which Ruskin, through his 
work, universalised by teaching others.  
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The French photography critic Philippe Dubois has visualised this selfish desire 
to retain the lived moment in his analysis of the interpersonal dynamics in the Scottish 
artist David Allan’s (1744-1796) 1775 work “The Origin of Painting,” which depicts 
Dibutates’s daughter drawing the shadow of her lover on the wall to retain a trace of 
his presence. 25  This possessive gesture, according to Dubois, expresses the 
anticipation and elimination of total loss, which are essential components of the diary 
genre: 
 
 
In order to call up the impending absence of her lover and preserve a physical 
trace of his presence, at this turning-point, tense with desire and fear, the young 
girl gets the idea to represent the other’s silhouette on the wall, using a stick of 
coal. The other is projected onto the wall in the last flamboyant moment, in 
order to kill time and fix the shadow that is still there but will soon be gone.26   
 
Anticipating the painful yearning for her absent lover, the woman creates a reassuring 
substitutive presence for herself that is a constant reminder of the happiness that has 
disappeared: “the shadow always affirms a ‘that is there.’ Whereas the drawing of the 
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shadow affirms a ‘that has been there.’”27 This effort to hold on to the beloved being 
in a symbolic form clearly evokes the act of taking a photograph as much as writing a 
diary entry; the latter being less immediate, yet trying to achieve a similar 
preservation of the escaping moment. The photograph represents a precious presence 
that was just about swallowed by oblivion, and similarly, the diary holds the inscribed 
embodiment of an avoided loss. Based on this painting, Dubois offers an engaging 
analysis of the mechanisms inherent in the photographic gesture in this lengthy 
passage: 
The shadow, which is the image that only existed in the moment, when drawn, 
inscribes itself into a duration and into a determined state once and for all. […] 
By this inscription, the shadow loses its place within its temporal index and 
sends its spatial indiciality to the past. This loss of indiciality, this gain of 
iconisation, this temporal autonomisation, which, while maintaining a real 
connection with the referent, presents it as anterior, like a past origin. This 
responds to a grand fantasy of every representation of an element of an index: 
to affirm the existence of the referent as an irrefutable proof of what has 
occurred, which is to eternalise it, to fix it beyond its absence; but also, 
similarly, to pronounce this mummified referent to be irretrievably lost, 
presently inaccessible in the shape that it once had. In this same movement the 
referent  is forever turned into a statuesque sign and sent back to the past—
into an interminable absence, oblivion, deficit, death. This is how the process 
of indicial fixation operates, and one could assume that it thus functions 
globally, in all cases—be it the occurrence of fixation by drawing or by 
photography.28 
 
Through the act of pictorial or written representation, the “image,” which is 
synonymous with the object/event to be captured, is extracted from the ephemeral and 
inserted into a new temporality, which makes it durable and preservable. Its status 
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changes as the object/event is no longer a temporal or spatial element—it has become 
non-existent—but through its reproduction belongs to the realm of physical 
concreteness, having become “iconic;” a symbol for what is past. This icon stands in 
for its origin, proving that the object/event was once “there” and that it still is present, 
despite its absence, in a different form. The awareness of the absence is evident, as is 
the conscious giving back of the origin to the past (time). No complete loss of the 
origin has occurred, since the object/event is retained in space, and will be accepted as 
a representative of that origin. Despite the relief of having averted the total loss of the 
object/event, the photographic or written record can never be more than a reminder or 
a “souvenir,” in critic Susan Stewart’s terms, which “may be seen as emblematic of 
the nostalgia that all narrative reveals—the longing for its place of origin.” 29 
Photography and the diary thus rise out of a yearning for reconnection with the 
reproduced original object/event. 
  The French film critic André Bazin (1918-1958) has insisted on the 
fragmentary status of the photograph as a visual splinter of a past reality rather than a 
living work of art whose meaning will evolve through time. Ruskin felt the same 
limitations as Bazin did, deeming the photograph to be too firmly tied to its origin—
or “referent,” which is the term commonly used by photography critics— and leaving 
too little space for the interpretations of its viewer to be admitted as a timeless artefact. 
Bazin writes that: “Photography does not, like art, create eternity, but rather embalms 
time, and subtracts only for its own profit. Photography benefits from a transfer of 
reality between the thing and its reproduction.” 30  Interestingly, Bazin deems the 
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photographic gesture as an act of withdrawing the object/event from reality and 
holding on to its reproduction, which is a non-creative transposition of a past reality 
onto an “embalming” surface.  
Bazin’s argument evokes Philippe Dubois’s comments on photographic space, 
presenting an analysis of the fundamental differences between photography and 
painting in the context of time. His comparison between the photographic and the 
pictorial moment could situate the diary entry as in between the two on a temporal 
axis, enabling us to identify the decisive difference between the photographic nature 
inherent in the photograph and that of the diary: 
Photographic space is not given. Neither is it constructed. On the contrary, it is a 
space to be taken (or to be left), an appropriation of the world, subtracted by the 
bulk. The photographer is not in the position to progressively fill an empty 
frame that is already there. His gesture rather consists in snatching a space that 
is already ‘full’ in one strike. The question of space to him is not one of input 
but of removal in one piece.31 
 
The selected object/event is chosen from infinite possibilities but is not assembled, 
even if previously staged, because it already exists in its entirety. By photographing, 
the object/event is immediately represented and completely fills the designated 
physical space: the photograph. This process was evidently prolonged in Victorian 
times, but nonetheless the nineteenth-century photograph depicts the totality of the 
object/event presented to the photographer’s lens.  
Unlike a painting, which is a slow, arbitrary assemblage of shapes that, when 
finished, can constitute a work of art, a photograph can only benefit from the 
corrective moves of “composition” after it has been shot and developed.32 The diarist 
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makes a similar decision to the photographer in that he or she “snatches” 
objects/events essential enough to be recorded, picking them from the realm of 
present reality (although there can be embellishment and the unavoidable 
fictionalisation by language), but then moves on to the techniques of the painter, by 
inscribing them one after another, as synaesthetic immediacy in the writing process is 
not possible. Unlike in painting, editing after inscription violates the representational 
codes of the diaristic genre as it implies a falsified rendition of the object/event, 
disobeying the careful adherence to the veracity of the moment. Ruskin, unlike other 
diarists such as Pepys (Introduction), felt deeply uneasy about changing his records in 
any way, as this entry of August 4th 1879 shows: “Monday. I’ve written Saturday 
yesterday—but I don’t like scratching out.”33 Erasing parts of his entries interfered 
with the authenticity of the endeavour and devalued the credibility of the diary by 
interrupting its illusion of immediacy and comprehensiveness.  
Like the diaristic gesture, photographic representation establishes a connection 
between selves—the past self that took the photograph and the present self looking at 
it—as well as between the individual and his or her world. To the aesthetic 
philosopher Vilém Flusser (1920-1991), the representational potential of image and 
text are analogous. He holds that “writing is a mediator—just like the image.”34 
Photographing and (diary-) writing are attempts to materialise and appropriate reality, 
making it more manageable. Ruskin’s desire to embody an object/event in its most 
visually accurate form, render its every feature and inscribe it into an anthological 
record can thus be seen to derive from the photographic gesture. 
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Robert A. Fothergill, whose historical survey study of English diaries 
comprises a wide range of canonical writers such as Samuel Pepys, James Boswell, 
Fanny Burney, Walter Scott, Alice James and Anais Nin, does not explicitly comment 
on the gestural similarities between the diary and the photograph, but employs 
photographic terminology to convey the fundamental constituents of the genre: “the 
imprint is the mark on the page left by a person living.”35 Like reactive film, the 
material surface of the diary registers the intellectual and emotional activity of the 
diarist, which creates a “more or less intricate, variegated, and comprehensive” image 
of the writing subject.36 The desire for such a record is always an act of self-assertion, 
which Ruskin, more so than the other diarists this thesis examines, used as a resource 
for his work. In fact, by making his emotions integral parts of the observational 
process, Ruskin constructed himself as a medium between nature, architecture and 
humankind. 
According to Philippe Lejeune, the diarist’s self-image is based on his or her 
“need” to write and retain the world from his or her subjective perspective: “to the 
writer, the diary presents itself as a literary process which permits him or her to 
simultaneously capture instantaneous impressions, or fleeting nuances of impressions 
and to render the particular nuance that defines a human being.”37 Lejeune refers to 
both the gestural and generic characteristics of the diary. The idea of the diary as a 
“process” to be engaged in implies the conscious framing of the diarist’s mind to 
receive and register the ephemeral, which for Ruskin was part of his professional 
requirements. The consequent rendition of the subjectively felt experience is seen to 
entail and reinforce the self-image of the diarist. 
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The diary is thus constituted of the interplay between the diarist and the text. 
The selected content of the diary influences the diarist’s self-image and from the 
perspective of this constructed identity, he or she proceeds to register future 
experiences. Alain Girard has held that, for the diarist, “the internal landscape 
necessarily reflects the variations of the external landscape,” which is evident in 
Ruskin’s as well as Hopkins’s diary.38 This mimicking of the external environment 
can be seen as the essence of the dynamic inherent in Ruskin’s process of perception, 
which results in emotional exaltation when in the proximity to an exquisite landscape 
and desolation and boredom when surrounded by dullness. Because Ruskin 
professionalised emotion, he reacted against such natural feelings of disinclination 
and this necessity to feel turned pleasure into pressure and indifference into failure.  
 
Ruskin’s Diary and the Photographic Gesture: Visual Truth  
 
For Ruskin, the artist’s duty towards the community consisted of observing and 
preserving natural, artistic and architectural grandeur and guiding the reader towards 
“direct perceptual experience.”39 Ruskin defined the “greatness” of a writer or painter 
“not by the mode of representing and saying, but by what was represented and said.”40 
The vehicle of communication was seen as secondary; the content was essential and 
defined the usefulness of the artist, which accounts for Ruskin’s tireless explorations. 
Ruskin’s attitudes to photography reveal the prominent position the emotions 
occupied in his value system. Because the mass production and ceaseless flow of 
photographic images that Ruskin witnessed during the second half of the nineteenth 
century were devoid of emotional authenticity, they, in his opinion posed a danger to 
artistic genres that were more labour-intensive, such as engraving, and threatened to 
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devalue culture generally. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ruskin was not 
necessarily in favour of excessive labour. He was mainly worried that modern 
techniques of visual reproduction omitted the component of the observer’s subjective 
emotional experience, which determined the value of a work of art. Reacting against 
the ontological void of mechanical reproduction, Ruskin pressured himself to make 
every (developed) aspect of his life meaningful, which meant that the observational 
process had to be conducted using the observer’s full intellectual and emotional 
attention, which then had to be translated in the written or pictorial representation. 
Ruskin’s consistent attempt to execute this ideal in his personal life was the source of 
ceaseless stress, which in the end was responsible for Ruskin’s empty and merely 
gestural appreciation of reality, characteristic of the modern tourist.  
Although Ruskin coveted the photograph’s inclusiveness of detail (at least early 
on in his career), he was skeptical of the medium because he believed that unlike 
pictorial or verbal rendition, photography was unable to capture the feeling that 
dominated the depicted scene. From the perspective of art history, Wettlaufer explains 
that Ruskin, like Turner, broke with “the linear formalism of contemporary academic 
painting and embraced an aesthetic that privileges color, movement, expression and 
imagination over strict mimetic fidelity.” 41  Ruskin indeed remarks that whereas 
photography “renders subtleties of form which no human hand could achieve” and is 
very nearly perfectly accurate, “a certain veracity is altogether wanting.”42  Thus, 
Ruskin privileged the emotional energy conveyed by a painting over its ability to 
mimic reality. As Daniel A. Novak has shown, many Victorians, such as George Eliot, 
associated the photograph with the “distortions of literary fiction.” 43  “Art 
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photography,” as it was practiced in the 1850s, implied the collage-like 
“transposition” of shots of figures, as well as isolated body parts, from “one scene to 
another;” a technique that “[tore apart] the photographic body and its private 
identity.”44 This mutilation of reality involved a desire to improve upon reality and a 
violation of the natural integrity of the depicted objects or scenes, whose authenticity 
was converted into an eerie half-fictional, half-real hybridity; all of which would have 
been “detestable” to Ruskin.45   
Ruskin initially shared his culture’s excited responses to the appearance of the 
daguerreotype in 1839, as it allowed the individual to possess the visual aspect of far-
away buildings or mountains, which could obliterate the spatial distance separating 
the observer from remarkable architecture and nature. Contemporary reactions tended 
to stress the magical simplicity of the photographic process which accentuated the 
idea that “images [painted] themselves,” enabling travelers “to bring back to France 
the most beautiful monuments, the most beautiful scenes of the whole world.”46 In 
this oft-quoted letter to his father from Venice on October 7th 1845, Ruskin writes: 
“Daguerreotypes […] are glorious things. It is very nearly the same thing as carrying 
off the palace itself: every chip of stone and stain is there, and of course there is no 
mistake about proportions.”47 Photography seemed to realise Ruskin’s utopian dream 
of total visual possession, which he tried to imitate in writing. On a practical level, 
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even when his scepticism towards the medium had grown, he still used photographic 
records for the purpose of work on the finesse of architecture, like the companion 
folios to The Stones of Venice. Ruskin considered such spatial copies to be valid tools 
of representation, but because they were reduced to a single momentary angle, they 
could not capture the emotional energy inherent in the process of observation of a 
“good and great human soul,” and hence could not be art.48  
As the century progressed and photography became more widely accessible, 
Ruskin’s attitude towards the photographic medium changed into what many critics 
have read as a fundamental dislike of photography.49 Principally, however, Ruskin 
disliked the “flood of photos [sweeping] away the dams of memory” that came with 
the “capitalist mode of production,” to use Siegfried Kracauer’s expression, not 
necessarily photography itself.50 According to Nancy Martha West, for Ruskin, after 
the 1840s, “photography […] became symptomatic of an age in which the male artist 
had been stripped of his subjectivity by the ease of mechanism, and led to value 
ornamentation of photographic detail rather than the essential qualities of manly 
art.”51 West is right when she suggests that photography’s dissemination may have 
threatened Ruskin’s public appreciation and critical authority. He may not just have 
feared for the status of art generally, but may also have worried about being dethroned 
as a critic.  
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Ruskin would probably have had more respect for the inclusive approach 
demonstrated by photographer Julia Margaret Cameron (1815-1879) with whom he 
corresponded. 52  Heather Birchall has argued that because photographers such as 
Cameron, Peter Henry Emerson (1856-1936) and Frank Meadow Sutcliffe (1853-
1941) “put photography on a par with fine art,” they destabilised Ruskin’s belief that 
photography merely served conservational purposes.53 Birchall contends that Ruskin 
completely ignores artistic photographers in his work, and indeed, nowhere do we 
find a sustained discussion of contemporary photography as art. It does seem that 
Ruskin would have supported, at least in theory, Cameron’s attempts to capture both 
the soul and the body of her subjects in her photographs:  
When I have had such men [“the great Carlyle”] before my camera [,] my 
whole soul has endeavoured to do its duty towards them in recording faithfully 
the greatness of the inner as well as the features of the outer man. The 
photograph thus taken has been almost the embodiment of a prayer.54 
 
Like Ruskin, Cameron was dedicated to producing an all-encompassing visual record 
of her subjects. Seeking with her “whole soul” to penetrate her subject and to depict 
his or her essence, Cameron invested all her imaginative ardour into the photographic 
act, focusing her perceptive powers onto the subject’s entire being. 
 For Ruskin, the beauty of selected visual scenes and his own passionate 
impulse to create records of them (“Vidi”) was far more important than the realism of 
the representation.55 When assessing artistic status, Ruskin did not blame any medium 
for the poor quality of its product, but held the maker responsible for failing to 
                                                 
52
 Heather Birchall, “Contrasting Visions: Ruskin—The Daguerreotype and the Photograph,” Living 
Visions: The Journal of the Popular and Projected Image before 1914, vol. 1, no. 2 (2003), pp. 2-20 
(p.14). Birchall holds that Ruskin thought that the daguerreotype had artistic potential, but that the 
photograph was merely a recording device; a differentiation which, to me, is unnecessary as both stem 
from the photographic gesture that seeks temporal and spatial control. 
53
 Ibid., p. 14.  
54
 Julia Margaret Cameron, “The Annals of My Glass House,” (1874) reprinted in Beaumont Newhall, 
ed., Photography: Essays and Images: Illustrated Readings in the History of Photography, p. 137.  
55
 Ruskin, The Stones of Venice III, p. 37. 
 179 
involve “the inner part of the man” in the creative process.56 He did not differentiate 
between the photograph and the drawing’s artistic status, for neither could be 
considered a work of art if “made directly from nature.”57 All media equally failed to 
produce art without the input of the artist’s full attention: “It is no more art to lay on 
colour delicately, than to lay on acid delicately. It is no more art to use the cornea and 
retina for reception of an image, than to use a lens and a piece of silvered paper.”58 
Skilled drawing, or “detail sought for its own sake” as in the “calculable bricks of the 
Dutch house-painters,” did not produce art; detail had to be “referred to a great end” 
and be “treated in a broad and impressive manner.”59 Ruskin’s “desire for totality,” 
which according to Lindsay Smith consisted in “the dual facility […] to ‘botanize’ 
and to infinitise simultaneously,” required the close study of minute details which 
could only be signified and raised to the status of art when viewed through an “active 
perceiving intelligence,” as Alexandra K. Wettlaufer has held.60  
 In both The Stones of Venice I and in the well-known Lecture on Art VII, 
Ruskin rejects mere replication of the external world and pleads for the viewer’s 
active engagement with his or her surroundings: “Have we only to copy, and again 
copy, for ever, the imagery of the universe? Not so. We have work to do upon it.”61 
As this work consists of establishing an emotional connection to the observed object, 
photographs, although “they are invaluable for record of some kinds of facts,” “will 
give you nothing you do not work for.” 62  The work required to really see an 
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object/scene consists of conscientious study; the observer must see and feel the object, 
devoting “the appointed price of [his] own attention and toil” to capture its essence.63  
Ruskin warned that a photograph could never replace the “eye-witness”-
experience of a landscape that is more than “spoiled nature” and could truly put the 
observer in touch with nature.64 Guido Garboni has noted that in Victorian England, 
especially by the 1880s, “any fool” could take a photograph “without undergoing any 
serious learning experience.” 65  Ruskin was greatly disturbed by this mechanical 
process that, without the sufficient use of human labour, produced an “excess of 
mimesis” and erased the human effort that characterised great art.66 Photography was 
too easy and too perfect to translate the artistic impulse of a great mind. Ruskin’s “all-
consuming desire to make his reader see,” to use Wettlaufer’s phrase, motivates all 
his ekphrastic writings, and he informs his students that once they “learn to watch the 
course and fall of light by whose influence [they] live,” they will not need 
photography.67 “Sun-blackened paper” depicting “a panorama of a belt of the world 
photographed round the equator,” pales in comparison to “the dappling of one wood-
glade with flowers and sunshine.”68 The true observer, who is “in possession of a 
quiet heart, a healthy brain and an industrious hand,” thrives on the contemplation of 
local beauty and is happy to abstain from the “restless, heartless and idle” 
photographic frenzy. 69  Caroline Levine has highlighted that Ruskin, throughout 
Modern Painters, insists that the variety of nature can “[teach] us to resist industrial 
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society.”70 Again, the humble and attentive observer, who appreciates natural beauty 
when he or she encounters it, is closer to the truth than any explorer in possession of 
professional photographic equipment. Truthful observation depends on the observer’s 
mindset even beyond the choice of subject and means of representation. 
In order to see the truth, for Ruskin, the observer of nature and art has to train 
his or her eye and acquire the “habit of representing faithfully all things, that we can 
truly learn what is beautiful and what is not.”71 Crucially, mere observation is not 
enough, but the active rendition of the object/event completes the contemplative 
process. In Modern Painters V, when comparing Dürer’s and Landseer’s glass blades, 
Ruskin invites his reader to “take a pen and copy a little piece of each example, you 
will soon feel the difference.”72 Only in physically imitating the pictorial process can 
the reader understand the visual differences between the two artists’ techniques. For 
Ruskin himself, as this chapter emphasises, the pictorial and linguistic reproduction of 
reality was essential to close study. Gail S. Weinberg has highlighted Ruskin’s life-
long habit of “copying paintings while studying them.”73 She explains this impulse by 
quoting Ruskin’s letter to his father of June 22nd 1845 in which he insists that “unless 
I draw a bit of a thing, I never arrive at conclusions to which I can altogether trust.”74 
Visual truth was thus accomplished by the consistent investment of all of the 
individual’s critical and emotional faculties.  
Driven by his duty to see and to educate, Ruskin himself was unable to maintain 
a calm contemplative stance and constantly pushed himself to maximise his visual 
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intake. Certainly without intending to do so, Ruskin participated in the picture-making 
craze, which, according to Karen Burns, characterised the nineteenth-century tourist, 
by his urge to “[produce] documentation.” 75  Burns’s assertion that despite his 
sophisticated standards, Ruskin “[enacted] the tourist” by “producing diaries, and 
sketches [and] collecting souvenirs such as paintings, bought from artists or dealers” 
is confirmed by Ruskin’s diaries.76 Ruskin involuntarily distanced himself from the 
truth he sought to capture by his very need to ceaselessly observe and appropriate 
what he saw.  
 
The Cumberland Diary: Performing the Observer 
 
Ruskin began to establish himself as an observer at the age of thirteen. The 
Cumberland Diary (1830) documents his nascent urge to chronicle, as well as his 
experimentations as an author. This diary was co-authored by his cousin Mary 
Richardson (1815 - 1849) who travelled with the Ruskins and it is fuelled by the 
notion that unrecorded life is meaningless. Despite the objective stance of these 
entries—they contain very little personal information and are mainly written in a style 
that is typical of travel guides—the Cumberland Diary displays Ruskin’s burgeoning 
desire to possess his visual experience and to counsel and guide his reader.  
Through their highly descriptive entries, Ruskin and Richardson constructed 
themselves as authorities, possessing comprehensive knowledge of the landscapes 
they traversed. Although there were books presenting the same facts in a professional 
fashion, the cousins’ verbal appropriation of visual reality established them irrefutably 
as authors who enjoyed the position of knowing, authoritative signifiers and who 
exercised power over the described objects/events, organising them as they pleased. 
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When young Ruskin and Richardson told themselves/their audience the way to 
Matlock on June 8th 1830, “you enter the dale,” “you have the first view,” “you next 
see Dovedale castle,” they established themselves as instruction-giving agents, 
performing the selves they wanted to be.77 At the same time, they seemed to be aware 
of the performativity of their role, as can be seen in this entry describing the castle, 
greenhouse and Punch Bowl of Leamington as being “so well known we need not 
give descriptions of it” (May 26th-31st).78 This entry considers an audience and clearly 
sets up the authors of the diary as experts on the object/event described, portraying 
their subjective experience as objective fact. 
 In the Cumberland Diary, Ruskin and Richardson cultivated their combined 
self by using the information they inscribed into their common diary to make 
themselves extensions of the prestigious objects/events described. For instance, when 
reporting on the pictures of great artists in Haddon Hall, Thorpe, their entry is 
coloured by a desire for identification and inclusion, which becomes evident in the 
diarists’ ‘critique’ of the paintings, dealing with,  
[works of art] amongst which were some by Carlo Dolce, Claude Lorraine, 
Rembrandt, Caracci, & c they were wonderfully done, and every touch shewed 
the hand of a master, some appeared to be so carelessly thrown off, you could 
hardly distinguish the outline, but yet such an effect was produced you could 
easily see, whose hand pencil had touched the canvas.79 
 
The diary allowed them the space to construct themselves as art critics, capable of 
recognising artists by the ‘touch of hand.’ They not only strove to make the 
object/event their possession by establishing themselves as specialists, but they also 
attempted to possess the virtual authority and agency of the roles they adopted, by 
having the object/event reflect its aura of quality upon them. Their status, or identity, 
                                                 
77
 James S. Dearden, ed. A Tour of the Lakes in Cumberland—John Ruskin’s Diary for 1830 (Hants, 
England: Scolar Press, 1990), p. 34.  
78
 Ibid., p. 30.  
79
 Ibid., p. 35; entry of June 11th 1830. 
 184 
correlated with the chosen content of the diary. In order to perform this role 
convincingly, Ruskin and Richardson endeavoured to dutifully present a complete, 
consistent record. Comments such as “we neglected to say in the morning,” or “we 
must now describe them [Pillars of Gloucester Cathedral]” document both the 
pressure to chronicle and the desire to possess and preserve, if these two are separable, 
which inspired the diarists with the responsibility of reproducing reality.80  
From the beginning, Ruskin used his diaries to construct himself as an 
observer, who processed visual reality for a reader. A much-used source of material 
for his theoretical work, Ruskin’s diaries can be seen to reflect the formative process 
of observation on which his discussions of nature, drawing and art criticism were 
based. Within this process, the diaries were the elements that made the process of 
visual perception complete. Like the preliminary jottings of the composer or the 
painter, Ruskin used them “to fasten down […] an idea in the simplest terms.”81 
Despite Ruskin’s eagerness to capture the immediacy of the moment, the constraints 
of language forbade such simplicity, and many of his entries are long and elaborate. 
Numerous extracts from the diary were copied straight into Ruskin’s published 
works—his autobiography Praeterita (1885) is just one prominent example—which 
shows that the basis for his public persona was crafted in the private realm of the 
diary.82  
 
The 1835-1847 Diary: the Problems of Ekphrasis 
Ruskin’s 1835-1847 diary presents an even stronger preoccupation with visual 
appropriation. Ruskin was keen on possessing the amazing sights he encountered 
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during the extensive travels he conducted during this period and demonstrates a 
compulsive desire to possess the lived moment. Gaps in his visual records were 
odious to Ruskin, and he felt great frustration when his verbal renditions were 
incapable of carrying a precise memory, as can be seen in this entry of 
October 10th 1841: “I have grievously forgot the lovely bit of landscape which we saw 
from the hill above Le Puy this time last year. It made a great impression on me, too; 
but how utterly useless all words are to arrest any of these strong distinctive 
impressions.”83  Upon re-reading his diary of 1840, Ruskin is displeased with the 
limitations of language which caused the loss of a memory he had hoped to keep. 
Oblivion deprives the entry of its signification as it is forever separated from its 
referent and becomes meaningless. The diary entry, like a photograph, represents the 
moment in which Ruskin’s desire for possession became concrete, but although the 
visual experience had been captured, possession was not assured.  
Despite his constant “awareness of language’s expressive insufficiencies,” to 
use Wettlaufer’s term, Ruskin defied the limitations of verbal communication and 
composed innumerable ekphrasic transcriptions, particularly in the 1835-47 diary.84 
Ruskin was driven by what Murray Krieger has called the “ekphrasic ambition” which 
craves to fix “the literally unrepresentable.”85 Words, as Krieger writes, are unable to 
capture spatial and temporal reality as they “cannot have capacity, cannot be 
capacious, because they have, literally, no space.” 86  Words are mere signs, 
symbolising the referent from which they are separated by an insuperable gap. 
Ruskin’s obsessive desire to “have the world captured in the word” is, according to 
Krieger, a fundamental component of the Western imagination: “The exhilaration […] 
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derives from a dream—and the pursuit—of a language that can, in spite of its limits, 
recover the immediacy of a sightless vision built into the habit of our perceptual 
desire since Plato.”87 In Ruskin, the hope that through verbal description some of the 
depicted reality may attach itself to the words is always paired with the utopian desire 
to conquer and possess the mesmerising object or scene.  
 Ruskin’s ekphrastic records were generally attempts to intensify fragile 
memories and make them last. He felt the duty and the insuppressible desire to depict 
extraordinary sights in order to own them in times of want and to open up this visual 
territory to others later. Through the other-oriented nature of his work, Ruskin 
channeled his desire to be the first/only person to have captured the scene, which 
motivated his youthful 1830 diary as well as the following one, towards the education 
of a wider community. On June 20th 1844 in Chamonix, Ruskin described the “most 
beautiful sight that ever morning gave me among the Alps” and subsequently 
rendered this surprising delight of the “whole aiguille du G[oûter] [looking] pure and 
serene in intense light.” This he contrasted with the dreary dullness that followed, 
which made this moment outstanding:88 “But all passed away as soon as seen; the 
bank of grey cloud rose and extended; now all is sunless.”89 Retrospectively reporting 
exceptional beauty, Ruskin refused to let these fleeting moments disappear into the 
realm of oblivion and sought to immobilise and eternalise them through verbal (and 
pictorial) representation, which he later universalised through publication. 
 In some entries, the observation of dazzling beauty and verbal representation 
coincide on a temporal axis, which demonstrates Ruskin’s craving for total possession 
of his immediate visual reality and his indomitable desire to record during observation. 
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On June 23rd 1844, for instance, Ruskin’s compulsion to verbally photograph Mont 
Blanc is evident: 
9 o’clock morning. There is a strange effect on Mont Blanc. The Pavillon hills 
are green and clear, with the pearly clearness that foretells rain; the sky above 
is fretted with sprays of white compact-textured cloud which looks like flakes 
of dead arborescent silver. Over the snow this is concentrated into a cumulus 
of the Turner character, not heaped, but laid sloping on the mountain: silver-
white at its edge, pale grey in interior. The whole of the snow is cast into 
shadow by it and comes dark against it, especially the lower curve of the 
aig[uille] du Goûté.90 
 
This entry’s sense of photographic immediacy is communicated through the use of the 
present tense and the inclusion of the exact time at which the entry was composed. In 
addition, the announcement of rain and the detailed description of such transient 
meteorological phenomena as clouds, which can pass or dissolve, heightens the 
impression that Ruskin has only just caught an ephemeral scene that was about to 
disappear. In this entry, Ruskin’s struggle to verbally render an atmosphere he can 
only describe as “strange” becomes obvious. Despite his employment of visual 
language and the accentuation of the contrasts between materials and colours, he fails 
to find an accurate verbal description of the cumulus cloud and thus resorts to 
labelling it “of the Turner character.”  
 Why did Ruskin not photograph or draw this scene? Martin Seddon has argued 
that Ruskin’s “visual approach to life,” generally did not, as we would expect, 
translate into “a pictorially visual means of expression.”91 The innumerable sketches, 
watercolours, engravings, daguerreotypes and photographs that Ruskin made and 
commissioned throughout his life usually were aide-mémoires that served illustrative 
purposes and scientific study. Seddon’s point that “broadly speaking, Ruskin drew for 
himself whilst he wrote for others” can be confirmed by the fact that even Ruskin’s 
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diaries were not strictly intended for private use because he frequently inserted 
extracts into his published work to support the theories he presented.92 In addition, 
Christopher Newall has argued, Ruskin viewed himself as an “amateur” when it came 
to artistic creation, which is why his drawings were largely kept away from the public 
in his lifetime, apart from an exhibition of his drawings in the United States in 1879.93 
We can deduce from these critical appraisals of Ruskin’s generic choices that in this 
1844 entry, Ruskin sought to render an atmosphere rather than study the physical 
properties of a visual phenomenon. 
Verbal expression was exceedingly complicated. In Modern Painters I, Ruskin 
deplored the ekphrastic problems he encountered when describing Turner’s work, 
establishing that “words are not accurate enough, to express or trace the constant, all-
pervading influence of the finer and vaguer shadows throughout his works, that 
thrilling influence which gives to the light they leave its passion and its power.”94 
Indeed, words could only vaguely approximate the breathtaking gradations of colour 
in a Turner painting and therefore Ruskin supplanted his own efforts to translate a 
visual experience through the verbal medium by exchanging one image (the cloud) for 
another (the Turner painting), thus by-passing language altogether. Wettlaufer has 
noted that for Ruskin, “the artist’s goal [was] not to reproduce the actual scene, but 
the experience of that scene, the mental state provoked.”95 Both the painter and poet 
had to provide an “emotional equivalence” to the original image in order to create 
art.96 Although Christopher Newall has explained that Ruskin “had no professional 
ambitions as an artist,” the expectations he had of his own work come very close to 
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the standards he set for the artist when he sought to “illustrate the whole feeling” of 
this scene. 97 Ruskin tried to “transcend his own language of words,” to use 
Wettlaufer’s term, by forsaking ekphrasis and offering a more powerful visual image 
than his verbal representation of the original object could have rendered. 98 
Significantly, he described clouds in a way that any of his readers would have been 
able to grasp, which again accentuates the semi-public nature of his diary.  
This desire to appropriate visual stimuli through verbal representation did not 
just inform Ruskin’s professional life, but it dominated his personal life as well, if the 
two can indeed be separated. His identities as a critic, an artist and a human being all 
depended on the visual richness of his environment—fascinating scenery tended to 
make Ruskin happy and dullness made him feel like he was neglecting his duty to 
perceive and translate the external world.99  
 
Desire and Duty 
 
Ruskin’s process of perception was greatly disturbed by the dialogical movement 
between desire and saturation, which is most clearly displayed in his 1835-1847 diary. 
Because observation was work for Ruskin, he viewed his failure to feel excited by 
exquisite sights as spoiling a unique and irretrievable opportunity to collect 
experience. As we have seen, the semi-private renditions of visual reality, which filled 
Ruskin’s diary, were the building stones on which his work was based.  
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Ruskin could not realise his “omnivorous” desires, to use the words of John 
Dixon Hunt and Michael Bartram, as can be seen in this entry of December 30th 1840 
from the French Alps:100  
I was tormented with vague desires of possessing all the beauty that I saw, of 
keeping every outline and colour in my mind, and pained at the knowledge that I 
must forget it all; that in a year or two I shall have no more of that landscape left 
about me than a confused impression of cupola and pine. The present glory is of 
no use to me; it hurts me from my fear of leaving it and losing it, and yet I know 
that were I to stay here it would soon cease to be beauty to me—that it has 
ceased, already, to produce the impression and the delight. I believe the only 
part of a journey really enjoyable to be the first six weeks, when every feeling is 
fresh, and the dread of losing what we love is lost in the delirium of its 
possession.101 
 
Although Ruskin longed to be a “true Seer” who “always feels as intensely as anyone 
else; but he does not much describe his feelings,” he did not manage to eradicate his 
human flaw of satiability.102 This entry clearly exemplifies Ruskin’s photographic 
desire to grasp the scene in its entirety and keep a record of it. However, rather than 
describe the beauty of nature, Ruskin’s silenced self flares up with a vengeance and 
he confesses his inability to remain a detached, yet emotionally invested, observer. 
Ruskin cannot clasp ‘that landscape’ in all its magnificence and is only capable of real 
enjoyment during the ecstasy of “the passionate thrill of delight” that comes with 
“novelty.” 103   Pleasure thus inevitably means pain, even at the very moment of 
experience, before the loss has actually occurred. Another time-related issue is 
broached in this entry: the idea that beauty must be mortal in order to be precious; if 
the moment could indeed be captured in its entirety, it would inevitably terminate in 
banality.   
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Possession never led to satisfaction, nor should it, as this annihilated the glory 
and uniqueness of the experience. In The Stones of Venice III Ruskin advocates 
disinterested observation, insisting that rational possession may be coveted but may 
never be fulfilled:  
Once thoroughly our own, the knowledge ceases to give us pleasure. It may be 
practically useful for us […] but, in itself, once let it be thoroughly familiar, 
and it is dead. The wonder is gone from it, and all the fine colour which it had 
when first we drew it up out of the infinite sea.104 
 
Ruskin constantly seemed to find himself in a Faustian dilemma, as possession led to 
stasis and despite the impulse to exclaim: “Beautiful moment, do not pass away,” an 
over-saturation of beauty would put an end to dynamic curiosity, which was fuelled 
by desire, and instate boredom.105 Ruskin could only “feel it” when he was in this 
state of longing for possession; when possession had been completed, he was filled 
with numbness and desired new objects/events, as is manifest in the following entry 
of December 18th 1840: 
I am losing all the feeling of intense interest that the Italian landscape used to 
rouse a few weeks ago. […] I am getting tired of Rome as I thought I should, 
and long for Venice and the Alps. When I get there I shall long for home; and 
when I get home, for Rome.106 
 
The abundance of beauty is impossible to process and Ruskin’s sincere admiration 
cannot be maintained. Ruskin feels guilty for losing the “freshness in feeling” and for 
no longer wholeheartedly appreciating exquisite objects/events.107  
Although in theory Ruskin considered monotony to be the necessary 
contrasting background against which splendid natural and artistic beauty stood out, 
he was intensely bored and frustrated when confronted with a landscape he did not 
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care to possess because it left him indifferent. During his tour of Switzerland in 1835 
he seemed disillusioned with his ekphrastic endeavour:  
The opening to Airolo is beautiful, but what is the use in describing it. There 
were villages and fields, rocks and torrents, and grassy mountains and snow 
covered Alps, and we have had all of that before. Objects on paper are always 
the same, it is by the disposition of them that nature gives variety, and 
therefore you can say no more than that—the opening to Airolo is beautiful.108 
 
The monotony of the landscape is reflected in Ruskin’s unimaginative language. He 
simply offers an uncaring “beautiful” as a description and seems to say that the 
encountered objects in themselves are unremarkable. The passage also indicates 
Ruskin’s frustration with ekphrasis, which fails to clearly distinguish the wide variety 
of “objects on paper” from one another and thus makes the description “beautiful” 
completely meaningless. 
 Because Ruskin was so invested in the perceptive process, he was unable to 
simply overlook repetitive visual reality and was annoyed by the “tiresome enough” 
aspect of the valley connecting the Swiss Grindelwald and Lauterbronn. 109 
Overabundance of geological specimen had dulled his interest and he felt like he was 
merely ploughing through more rock formations: “I had seen so many instances of 
twisted strata that I was little interested in the numerous and remarkable contortions 
of these strata till I observed one very peculiar, fig. 24.”110 An unexpected noteworthy 
layer of soil punctured Ruskin’s boredom and gratified his investigations. 
 Excess of beauty similarly deprived the observer of the desire he or she 
needed in order to conduct his or her visual investigations. In Modern Painters IV, 
Ruskin wrote that “it is not good for a man to live among what is most beautiful,” 
because the constant confrontation with “the utmost the earth can give is the surest 
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way to cast him into lassitude and discontent.”111 On September 23rd 1835 in Bormio, 
Ruskin was taken aback by the beauty of the landscape: “the whole scene foreground 
(or foresnow) and distance, astonish as much as they delight the eye that is not 
accustomed to the scenery of such elevations.”112 He clearly distinguished between 
the eye that was used to mountain scenery, and therefore indifferent, and the 
overwhelming surprise that the unaccustomed eye experienced.  
Ruskin repeatedly voices angry self-reproach due to his lack of necessary 
emotion. On December 30th 1840, he writes: “All was exquisitely beautiful […] and I 
saw this though I could not feel it, and got into a rage with myself, to no purpose.”113 
Here Ruskin, like Henry Crabb Robinson (Chapter One) and Gerard Manley Hopkins 
(Chapter Four), who at times viewed themselves as devoid of creative drive, felt 
powerless to appreciate nature because he felt emotionally drained and could not 
gather the necessary passion to create, or even contemplate, beauty. On June 6th 1844 
after descending from his “old seat on the block of the Breven” in Chamonix, Ruskin 
complains of an inability to surrender to the visual marvels presenting themselves to 
him: “I do not feel as I ought to feel. For the first time in my life I miss the 
exhilaration of spirit which these scenes awakened in my childhood.”114 Desire, once 
satisfied by possession that is achieved through representation and intense study or 
attenuated by the “heavier cares of the world,” fades. 115 The self that once desired 
cannot sympathise with the self that now possesses and vice-versa: 
How little could I have imagined, sitting in my home corner, yearning for a 
glance of the hill-snow, or the orange leaf that I should at entering Naples, be as 
thoroughly out of humour as ever after a monotonous day in London—more so. 
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[…] And I shall read and remember this hereafter and be mad (Naples, January 
9th 1841).116 
 
When, after a long period of anticipation, Ruskin finally reaches the destination he 
has yearned for, he often has difficulty seizing and cherishing the present moment. 
Although in Modern Painters II, Ruskin explains that the “Imagination 
Contemplative” is always superior to lived reality because “there is an unfailing 
charm in the memory and anticipation of things beautiful” that cannot be matched by 
their presence, his diaries show that he never accepted this fact in reality and was 
always eager to engage with reality directly.117  
 In Ruskin, the acknowledgment that the observer was easily “sated” or 
“wearied” by the actual experience of desired objects/events coincided with the moral 
obligation to respond to natural and architectural beauty with intense emotional 
excitement. In The Stones of Venice I, for instance, Ruskin portrays desire as a 
mandatory attitude when he tells his reader: “you were made for enjoyment, and the 
world was filled with things which you will enjoy, unless you are too proud to be 
pleased by them.”118 Beyond the requirement to personally “examine” and “measure” 
the external world, the observer was compelled to “enjoy” the visual delights 
provided for him or her, as failure to do so was equated with unrespectable, 
contemptible arrogance. Although Ruskin’s experience taught him differently, he 
continued, like Bain, to believe in the individual’s ability to control his or her 
emotions through exerting “self-discipline to prevent the mind from falling into a 
morbid condition of dissatisfaction with all that it immediately [possessed], and 
continual longing for things absent.”119 Ruskin actively attempted to counteract this 
attraction to an imagined “self-inscaping” (Chapter Four) experience when he insisted 
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on his duty as an observer, who had to seek out and appreciate the beauty of “God’s 
work” and communicate it to others.120  
When Ruskin did not desire to ingest his visual environment, he forced 
himself through the motions that were necessary to avert the guilt of the ungrateful 
spoiler of precious experience. Ruskin’s diary shows that he was continuously driven 
by his dutiful desire to capture, appropriate and enjoy his experience and, in an 
attempt to artificially create the sensation of novelty and surprise, he incessantly 
hunted for fresh sights and sensations. Although there was a consistent attachment to 
selected places, such as Venice and Mont Blanc, Ruskin tended to be exhilarated by 
the surprise of novelty and then to gradually lose interest as he reached saturation. On 
February 26th 1841 in Sorrento he stated that “I seem always in a hurry, or not where I 
should like to be, now. […] There is a bad restlessness upon me.” 121  Although 
suffering from fatigue, Ruskin was obsessed with taking in and capturing as many 
sights as his limited time allowed him to. He thus rushed from scene to scene and was 
prevented from thorough enjoyment by his “restlessness,” which on February 12th 
1841 he defined as: “the desire to see something finer, newer, different.”122  This 
impatience was followed by “fatigue, with a total loss of all feeling of the place or its 
spirit,” and the pressure to “begin drawing” and “a desire to get it done.”123 Ruskin’s 
fixation with photographic intake, combined with his obsessive fear of wasting time, 
accounts for this hectic type of day, which brought him “twenty-five minutes 
enjoyment and the rest desire.”124 Ruskin recognised that his photographic mindset 
and the inherent pressure to maximise visual conquest, could lead to “discontent,” 
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impeding him from “tasting all these pleasures” and “shutting out” future ones.125 
Nevertheless he was pushed on by his duty to report his visual experience to others.  
As if to rectify and legitimise the behaviour depicted in his diary, in The 
Stones of Venice II, Ruskin theorises the hunt for exquisite sights and the fatigue that 
is its natural consequence. He writes: “we must bear patiently the infliction of 
monotony for some moments, in order to feel the full refreshment of the change.”126 
In reality, as his diaries show, he suffered from the “diseased love of change” that 
made him unable to bear the “pain” of recovering and rushed him onwards in search 
of future delights.127 He had long understood the invincible “weariness which is so 
often felt in travelling, from seeing too much.” 128  Nevertheless he consistently 
neglected to take his own advice of “letting [the imagination] rest” and directly 
experienced the “imaginative faculty [fainting] utterly away, beyond all further 
torment or pleasure, dead for many a day to come.”129 
 The “innocence of the eye” that Ruskin strove to maintain was a utopian 
endeavour because it omitted the period of recovery that the mind needed in order to 
appreciate beautiful objects and scenery.130 The eye was only innocent and could only 
resist conventional thinking if in a state of probing desire. On December 6th 1840 in 
Rome, Ruskin bemoans the fact that he cannot uphold a steady interest in his 
observational work: “I wish I could keep myself in the humour, especially in the 
desire of raking together all possible scraps of information from everyday 
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occurrences.” 131  There were limits to Ruskin’s inquisitiveness and his mind was 
plagued by indifference and fatigue. 
In order to accomplish his duty as an artist, however, Ruskin constantly forced 
himself to develop his “perceptive [and his] sensitive, retentive faculties.” 132 
Moreover, as a human being, he wrote in The Stones of Venice III, it was his 
responsibility to observe the world and be deeply touched by it: “we live to 
contemplate, enjoy, act, adore.” 133  Although these obligations were articulated in 
1853, the diary shows that observation, for Ruskin, had been of a moral nature since 
the early years. On January 27th 1841, near Naples, Ruskin reported that “I am 
gradually losing my zest for scenery.”134  He did not, however, allow himself to relax 
after intensely exciting experiences, but pushed himself to be emotionally receptive: 
“[I] stood at the window to night, while the sunset was touching the sprinkled snow 
on the lovely forms of the Mt. Angelo, rather with the sense of discharging a duty in 
drinking the draught of beauty than because it gave me pleasure.”135 Ruskin expected 
himself to be profoundly moved by this sight that he knew to be exquisite, but he was 
unable to feel the delight that he thought he should: “Yet all this could not touch me. I 
felt as if my whole spirit had been turned into ice.”136 Contemplation, for Ruskin, was 
incomplete without the emotional reaction of the observer, as “perception and feeling” 
had to be inseparably intertwined to assure the “truth of essence” the artist was 
supposed to be concerned with.137 
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Ruskin viewed himself as the recording device that transmitted beautiful sights 
to his audience. In Praeterita, for one, he realises that this self-construction opposed 
the cultivation of human relationships:  
In blaming myself, as often I have done, and may have occasion to do again, 
for my want of affection to other people, I must also express continually, as I 
think back about it, more and more wonder that ever anybody had any 
affection for me. I thought they might as well have got fond of a camera lucida, 
or an ivory foot-rule: all my faculty was merely in showing that such and such 
things were so; I was no orator, no actor, no painter, but in a minute and 
generally invisible manner; and I couldn’t bear being interrupted in anything I 
was about.138 
 
We see that Ruskin feels unable to evaluate his personal value, or lovableness, apart 
from his usefulness. He portrays himself as an essentially empty container, or rather, a 
photographic surface upon which visual objects/events were projected, but who is 
non-creative and merely mimics visual reality. in his professional capacity, Ruskin 
did not enter into direct contact with human beings, but acted as a meta-critic, 
teaching his readers how to see landscapes and paintings other artists had created. 
Stressing his role as a mediator, Ruskin simultaneously asserts and annuls his own 
importance by making his “invisible” actions visible through autobiographical 
intervention. Although, for Ruskin, the artist had to be a disinterested “instrument” 
that faithfully recorded “the visible things around him,” leaving out “no shadow, no 
hue, no lobe, no instantaneous and evanescent expression,” and also capturing “the 
emotions which they are capable of conveying to the spiritual which has been given 
him,” he claims acknowledgment for his work.139  
Failure to conduct private observation adequately had a direct effect on the 
reader who was deprived of valuable lessons. The Stones of Venice I illustrates 
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Ruskin’s firm identification with the artist who had to visualise and “explain” the 
world to others: 
This infinite universe is unfathomable, inconceivable, in its whole; every 
human creature must slowly spell out, and long contemplate, such part of it as 
may be possible for him to reach; then set forth what he has learned of it for 
those beneath him; extricating it from infinity, as one gathers a violet out of 
grass; one does not improve either violet or grass in gathering it, but one 
makes the flower visible; and then the human being has to make its power 
upon his own heart visible also, and to give it the honour of the good thoughts 
it has raised up in him, and to write upon it the history of his own soul.140 
 
Ruskin felt that it was his mission to invest his utmost effort in studying and 
reproducing the visual world in a tangible form in order to enlighten those who had 
not found a way to appreciate the delights of God’s creation. Rather than imagining 
and staging a more stunning reality, the artist had to show the natural beauty of the 
object through communicating the delight he or she received from it. 
Despite the solitary nature of Ruskin’s observational process, he sought to 
interrupt strictly self-centred behaviour and, at least in theory, reach out to a human 
other—his reader. Ruskin’s ekphrastic writing often took on an educational character 
because he did not only feel responsible to worship God’s creations, at least before his 
loss of faith, but, like Eliot, he sought to redeem his ‘guilt of the privileged’ through 
illuminating his readers and providing perceptive skills to those whose sight had been 
obstructed by academic conventions or lack of education. Ruskin was aware of his 
exceptional genius of observation and felt a strong moral obligation to use it, as can 
be seen in the following entry of June 1st 1844 in Geneva: “I think always of those 
who have no power of seeing what I see, and am full of remorse that I see it, and of 
the time that may—and that must—come when I shall not see it myself.” 141 Excited 
discovery thus became a duty. Not only did Ruskin have to compensate for others’ 
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deficiency in visual perception but, with blindness looming, he needed to maximise 
his own visual intake to provide for his old age.  
The duty of the artist to feel his visual sensations was not only a source of 
barely tolerable pressure, but it also established Ruskin as the observing other who 
had to follow the world as it revolved. On December 30th 1840, Ruskin describes a 
French girl and her bonne “laughing and chattering with an expression of perfect 
happiness on their faces, thinking no more of the Alpine heights behind, or the sweep 
of city before—which they never looked at, than of Constantinople.”142  They are 
entirely oblivious to that which formed the content of Ruskin’s life—the observation 
of mountain scenery. Completely unresponsive to the natural grandeur at their 
doorstep, their sensitivity is greatly inferior to Ruskin’s, who has “every faculty 
cultivated and directed to receive the impression of beauty, with every sensation and 
feeling raised […] to a great degree above theirs.”143 Ruskin is theoretically equipped 
and prepared to embrace the “truth of essence” of this wonderful spot, but he, 
although he can see the “glory in things” to which they are blind, cannot feel: “[I] was 
in a state of severe mental pain, because I could perceive materials of the highest 
mental pleasure about me, and could not receive it from them.”144 Ruskin suffered 
from this failure to accept what was so generously offered to him. Instead, he had to 
stay at the surface of creation, having to content himself with the visual aspect of the 
scene and forced to renounce the “whole” experience. The incapacity to feel reduced 
Ruskin to the status of a mere onlooker who was shut out of the sublime, which 
clearly threatened his identity as an observer. Despite his understanding that feeling 
was spontaneous and could not be fully mastered, Ruskin treated feeling like work, 
which caused endless frustration and depression.  
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The diary shows that the reality of successful observation was complicated, as 
Ruskin had to homogenise the enormous responsibility he attributed to the 
artist/observer, the ephemeral nature of his emotions and the changeable external 
environment. Moreover, Ruskin knew his best efforts at verbally reproducing reality 
to be inadequate. His diaries are characterised by the pressure to gather visual 
experience and to unravel the mechanisms inherent in the act of perception, which 
informs The Elements of Drawing, Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice. His 
responsibility towards the unknown reader can be seen to partially motivate his 
restless urge to conquer new visual territories. The pressure to feel became 
particularly strong when Ruskin re-visited geographical places that he had once liked. 
The repeated visits and the ardent admiration for a spot’s beauty inspired Ruskin with 
feelings of deep love, to the point that these places can be seen to have replaced 
human affection. When emotionally numb, Ruskin was forced to question his 
connection with these places because the emotional support he drew from them had 
been destabilised, which perpetuated his isolation.  
 
Attachment to Place and Objects 
 
Although Eastlake had unjustly criticised Ruskin for being indifferent to human 
beings, his diaries clearly foreground nature and architecture over emotional, inter-
human relationships. He consistently silenced experience that gave him personal pain, 
such as his failed marriage, or the bitterness he felt over his disappointed love for 
Adèle Domecq, as can be seen in this entry of December 27th 1840: “This day last 
year was the last I ever spent with [Adèle] I do not like writing on these anniversaries, 
but I must to day for exercise. I am getting confoundedly blue—or black—and must 
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shake it off.” 145  The diary presents very few such explicit invocations to exert 
emotional self-discipline that involve a human being. Generally, Ruskin seems to 
have channelled his personal frustration through a focus on work-related issues.  
In order to counteract his human isolation, Ruskin cultivated and 
anthropomorphised the bonds that connected him to selected places, such as Venice 
and Chamonix, which he considered his “two bournes of earth.” 146  Like Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, Ruskin seemed to feel genuine affection for geographical locations, 
which was in some ways comparable to the romantic love for a person. Ruskin not 
only worshipped and idealised the visual splendour of natural and architectural 
objects, but he felt that they responded to him as well, which again recalls Hopkins’s 
imagined communication between the observer and the observed. This geographical 
romance was subject to the dynamic of desire and saturation I have just examined, 
which led to emotional exhilaration as well as unfulfilled longing and despair. The 
basis for this intense attachment to certain places was their visual attractiveness. 
Indulging in self-assertive impulses, Ruskin yearned for the possession of these 
exquisite sights so intensely that he hungered for fusion with these places and their 
associated objects. Ruskin’s photographic desire to capture every detail of Venice, for 
instance, was motivated by an eroticised craving of complete possession which was 
mellowed by his self-effacing duty as a superior observer towards those he wanted to 
educate.  
The anthropomorphisation of inanimate objects/events through which Ruskin 
counteracted the loneliness of the observer is evident in a sequence of entries of 
March 1841 in which he continuously personified Mount Vesuvius as “an old friend,” 
making this natural structure the recipient of his affection. The parting with the 
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beloved volcano, on March 16th, was extremely dramatic and shows Ruskin’s 
frustration of forever being a spectator, who is always giving but never directly 
receiving love: “Sorry to bid him goodbye. I wish Vesuvius could love me, like a 
living thing; I would rather make a friend of him than of any morsel of humanity.”147 
Feeling always involved an immense personal effort and although Ruskin expressed 
passionate sentiments towards the mountain, he wished the companionship he 
imagined when exclaiming “Adieu mon ami, mon volcan!” to be real.148 Ruskin’s 
relationship with the visual world was always contrived due to the obligation to study 
natural and architectural objects and to feel intensely about them. When thus craving a 
response from non-human objects/events, Ruskin expressed a desire for an organic, 
effortless relationship with his beloved other(s), which could overcome the distance 
between the observer and the observed.  
Dramatic leave-taking became a reassuring, ritualised duty for Ruskin, which 
catered to his possessive desire to supply himself with provisions of memorable 
experience. When in April 1841 Ruskin visited Rome, he is initially enthusiastic and 
“very full of feeling” although he suspects that he has to “go home and get up the 
steam again” in order to refresh his eye.149 Because he cannot “feel now as [he] could 
five months ago,” his exploration of Rome is mechanical and forced, and his goodbye 
consists of a very contradictory evaluation: “I date ‘Rome’ for the last time this year, 
at least; probably for a long time to come, for though I am sorry to leave the place—
more so than I thought—there is something about it which will make me dread to 
return. Farewell Roma mia!” 150  Ruskin pushes himself to acknowledge the 
significance of his departure by emphasising its finality.  He is relieved to leave Rome 
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because he can stop forcing himself to feel, but at the same time he regrets being 
separated from the beauty he will soon long for. In the following days he “bid 
farewell to St. Peter’s with some feeling,” and to his “pet Raphael;” the latter giving 
him the most pleasure, along with the Venus and Michael Angelo’s Bacchus.151 The 
stay in Rome was exhausting because Ruskin, despite trying his hardest, failed to 
develop a meaningful connection with the city. By inscribing these farewells into his 
diary, he accomplished his duty to live correctly. However, representation without 
emotion was a mere performance which Ruskin failed to invest with meaning. 
When in May 1841, Ruskin finally reached the long-anticipated Venice, “the 
Paradise of cities,” he deemed himself “happier than I have been in these five years—
so happy, happier than in all probability I ever shall be again in my life.”152 At the 
heart of human-made beauty, Ruskin felt the exquisite “thrill” of this “feline, sensual 
and orientally feminine” city, to use the words of Clive Wilmer.153 Proximity to this 
“adored object,” as J.B. Bullen has called the city, put Ruskin “in good humour with 
all the world.”154 But even the delight of visiting Venice, his “place of dreams,” was 
no longer “childish” as Ruskin was disillusioned with the decay of the city, finding 
“the canals […] shallower [and] dirtier than they were of old.”155 Ruskin’s disgust 
with modernity’s pollution and architecture, as well as his eagerness to preserve the 
Byzantine and Gothic architecture he so admired, motivated the creation of the great 
ekphrastic record The Stones of Venice, which was the product of the possessive 
photographic gesture.156 
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Ruskin’s desire to identify with and appropriate the city gave rise to an 
immensely large collection of meticulously sketched, and photographed, magnificent 
scenes and isolated visual detail. Ruskin obviously felt the need to create a physical 
copy of lived reality for private use and, through drawing the city, made it into a non-
human, two-dimensional companion. However, Ruskin devoted this selfish 
accumulation of drawings to his readership, as these images formed the basis for The 
Stones of Venice, as the Preface of 1851 shows: “when I planned the book, I had 
materials with me, collected at different times of sojourn in Venice during the last 
seventeen years.”157 J. Howard Whitehouse has argued that “Ruskin rarely sat down 
to paint a picture in the conventional sense. He always drew with a purpose. […] But 
his immediate interest was to record, not to make a picture.” 158  Indeed, Ruskin 
sketched for appropriative reasons rather than for the pleasure of aesthetic expression; 
he drew to take and to teach, rather than to impress. 
Despite Seddon’s argument that Ruskin’s drawings were designed for private 
consumption, the diaries show that he measured them against the very high standards 
he set for his own work as much as for others’. Recording was work for Ruskin, as 
can be seen in the entry of May 9th 1841: “I have got all wrong with my drawing too, 
and that upsets me in humour.”159 Like not being able to feel, the failure to create an 
accurate representation of the city and its atmosphere resulted in deep frustration as 
unrecorded experience was forever lost and thus wasted. Ruskin was relieved when he 
finally managed to “get” his “subject of the Grand Canal,” as it was “almost the only 
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thing I have got in Venice worthy of Venice.”160 The perceptive process was not 
complete until Ruskin had represented, fixed and appropriated the observed scene or 
detail on paper. More generally, Ruskin perceived unrecorded spectating of natural 
grandeur as a waste, as he noted on March 31st 1844: “I am afraid all my watching is 
of very little use unless I get a pencil in hand.” Sketching allowed him to capture 
specific aspects of nature scenes and his vocabulary was often distinctly photographic, 
as for instance in this entry of October 24th 1840 in Nice: “I climbed and sketched; got 
two general views.”161 The verb “get” clearly accentuates Ruskin’s desire to remove 
and own the depicted scene. 
Just like the photograph captivates and represents selected spatial and 
temporal aspects of reality, Ruskin’s diaries are preoccupied with arresting the 
transience of lived experience. His ekphrastic and photographic records of Venice 
respond to a voracious need for appropriative intake, which was intensified by the 
threat which modern industrialisation posed to the authenticity of this masterpiece of a 
city. However, beyond the preservation of Venice, which was intended for his 
personal and the universal good, Ruskin generally tried to evade the passage of time.  
His diary was an essential instrument in his struggle to use his remaining time 
efficiently because its photographic and ekphrastic gesture allowed him to preserve 
and re-appropriate time that had lapsed.  
 
Obsession with Time: the 1835-1847 Diary versus the Brantwood Diary  
 
Before investigating the significance of time in the Brantwood Diary, I shall examine 
the 1835-1847 diary’s preoccupation with remembering the past, which shows that 
Ruskin forced himself to keep a continuous written record for future consumption. 
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Ruskin viewed time as a precious resource, which became the standard against which 
he measured the quality of his life. He frequently debated whether an experience he 
had just noted was worthy of the time spent on it. In the Brantwood Diary (1876-
1883), Ruskin was less concerned with the time occupied with recording; now he 
panicked because the years were “narrowing to end,” as he wrote on July 18th 1879.162 
He anxiously looked into the future and consciously tried to make the most of the past 
(by frequently re-reading his diaries), the present and the future. Ruskin’s health was 
fragile: he had suffered episodes of dementia and feared that the strike of blindness 
might deprive him of the visual delights he so cherished. Accordingly, with death 
looming, Ruskin became all the more determined to “spend” time “well” and was 
obsessed with calculating the days he had left. Diary-keeping and the sensible use of 
time became inseparable tools through which Ruskin intended to maintain his mental 
health. 
During 1835-1847, Ruskin treated the diary as storage for his visual 
memoranda. He sought for the diary to imitate the comprehensiveness of a 
photographic anthology by transferring visual information onto its pages. The process 
of compilation was less important than the hoped-for result—Ruskin consistently 
needed to convince himself that the self-discipline required to verbally encapsulate 
time ultimately served his endeavour to perceive his life as a “whole.” The diary of 
the 1840s is thus scattered with entries in which Ruskin laments the tediousness of the 
task. On December 30th 1840, for instance, he confesses that “I should write much 
more here. […] It is a great bore to keep a diary but a great delight to have kept 
one.”163 Keeping a diary is thus seen as a present investment in the future. The present 
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self anticipates the future self’s need for reconnection and therefore sacrifices time 
into recording visual experience. 
Ruskin measured the magnitude of the depicted experience in terms of how 
much time it deserved in his diary and hierarchically ordered the material that merited 
the diary’s attention. On January 3rd 1841, for instance, Ruskin regrets omitting 
anecdotes from his social life over the depiction of a sublime moment listening to 
music: “I wish I could note more of the conversation yesterday—or rather, all—for it 
was thoroughly interesting or amusing; but I cannot spend much time over this.”164 He 
then at length describes “the purest piece of music I have yet met with,” asserting the 
prominence of art over the self.165 
The scarcity of available time reinforced Ruskin’s tendency to treat his 
professional and private life as one, which is obvious in the occasional conflation of 
his diary and his letters. Shortage of time seemed to temporarily obliterate the diary’s 
need for privacy. The entry of February 8th-11th 1841 indicates that, for Ruskin, in 
imitative representation, the generic outlet used for expression was of minor 
importance, given that expression took place at all: “I have been writing so many 
letters that I forgot [the diary].”166 The letters, although they provided an expressive 
vent, deprived Ruskin of the possession of his experience, which is why the diary 
quickly regained importance after periods of substitution by the letter. 167  On 
September 2nd 1841 in Leamington, Ruskin realises the necessity of diaristic activity: 
“I have considered my letter home as diary enough lately, but in case they are not kept 
I shall begin again. I have had a good deal of pleasure looking over this thing to night. 
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I begin to feel poetical about the places now.”168 Ruskin refuses to be separated from 
the experience that he nostalgically feels belongs to him and resumes the time-
consuming habit of self-writing.  
 The choice to recommence his diaristic activity is significant, because at times 
Ruskin seemed to be not altogether assured of the purpose of these records. The 
amount of time the diary necessitated was a recurrent concern for Ruskin, already in 
the 1835-47 diary, as can be seen in the following entry of March 16th 1941, in Mola 
di Gaeta, now Formia, near Naples: “I have kept this stuff of diary for a year; it has 
taken up quantities of time, and is a heavy thing in one’s desk—I don’t know how 
much else it is good for, yet it may be amusing, some time or other.”169 Again, Ruskin 
debates whether the quality of the amassed memories can justify the time their 
representation requires. The entry of April 10th of the same year similarly ponders 
whether the value of time has exceeded the value of the diaristic record: “I am 
neglecting this at present. I usually consult my inclinations with respect to it, and have 
not made up my mind what time is really due, or whether it is all waste.”170 The 
diary’s content is thus dictated by Ruskin’s emotional preferences, and because of the 
strong emotional bias that is inherent in the compositional process, its value is 
questionable. However, Ruskin seems to distrust neither the quality of his writing, nor 
the remarkableness of his memories, but is most concerned about whether he has put 
time to good use. 
 These doubts relating to the fruitful employment of his temporal resources are 
juxtaposed with entries that display a sheer obsession with the accurate rendition of a 
temporal sequence. On June 27th 1841 in Calais, Ruskin writes up his continental 
journey and displays a strong desire for photographic completeness: “I hardly know if 
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it is wasted time, but I have missed two or three important hours in the hurry of the 
stuff above, which I may as well note; so I go back to Vallombrosa.”171 Ruskin’s 
eagerness to create an all-encompassing retrospective account aims at preventing gaps 
in his memory, because, as I have shown, for Ruskin “wishing [he] had kept more 
diary” was a sinful waste of resources.172 
In the Brantwood Diary, Ruskin’s intense preoccupation with the correct 
employment of time took the shape of retrospective doubt.  His loneliness increased 
as can be seen in this entry of September 3rd 1879: “every year leaves me more lost to 
myself and to my memories—a gleaner in reaped or ravaged fields.”173 Because his 
receptiveness to visual stimulations had decreased immensely, observation, which had 
for so long been the primary content of Ruskin’s life, no longer connected him to the 
external world. Like this entry suggests, he had extracted everything he could from 
ephemeral visual pleasures.  
 Ruskin’s seclusion became manifest when he realised that the insubstantial 
nature of visual reality, which provided but momentary joy, could not console his 
isolation as an ageing man. In March 1878, in his Notes on Turner, Ruskin laments 
the utter futility of his perceptive project:  
Oh, that some one had but told me, in my youth, when all my heart seemed to 
be set on these colours and clouds, that appear for a little while and then 
vanish away, how little my love for them would serve me, when the silence of 
the lawn and wood in the dews of the morning should be completed; and all 
my thoughts should be of those whom, by neither, I was to meet more!174  
 
The discontent behind this passage may stem from the fact that Ruskin, like Hopkins, 
had filled this emotional emptiness with the observation of the external world and 
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never knew the “joy of approved love,” which he greatly laments in Praeterita.175 
Christopher Newall similarly mentions this escapist tendency, referring to an instance 
in Chamonix of 1854 when Ruskin was determined to forget about his failed marriage 
by concentrating on his drawings.176  
Having effaced his needs for human affection through focussing on nature and 
art, by the late 1870s, Ruskin felt that he had invested his energies wrongly. Because 
he had concentrated on the ephemeral all his life, Ruskin felt lost in an increasingly 
depopulated world. A belated return to the self through the creation of self-portraits, 
which the American author and professor of art Charles Eliot Norton (1827-1908) had 
suggested to Ruskin as a means to control his mental illness, proved to be a difficult 
endeavour. There is surprisingly little critical material on these self-portraits, but 
Christopher Newall finds that they “speak of unhappiness and frustration.”177 The 
look in the mirror did not bring about the hoped-for consolidation of the self, but, as 
Newall notes: “as the artist looked at himself, he was confronted by the reality of his 
own isolation.”178 Making himself the object of study might have clashed with his 
early Evangelical beliefs but, most importantly, it seems that Ruskin was confronted 
with a self he had never aspired to and resorted to reading himself instead of seeing 
himself. 
 The Brantwood Diary shows that Ruskin’s rigid adherence to his lifelong 
habit of diaristic recording rose out of an effort to maintain mental sanity. Newall has 
observed that since the 1850s, Ruskin had used drawing as a means to escape 
emotional despair. Furthermore, since the 1860s, “[Ruskin] suffered increasingly from 
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bouts of deep depression [and] turned to drawing as an aid to mental stability.”179 
Whereas drawing allowed Ruskin to “forget himself,” he used his diary as a means of 
keeping himself organised when this became increasingly difficult. The diary became 
a ledger, an organisational tool and a forum for his quantitative approach to time, 
which was seen as both the poison that would kill him and as a life-giving resource. 
Ruskin developed an obsession with the countable nature of time and increasingly 
deplored his own uselessness and that of the material he gathered in his diary. His 
habit of dutifully recording astonishing visual spectacles remained unbroken and 
defied the obstacles of mental illness, blindness and listlessness, as can be seen in his 
entry of October 15th 1877: “I never wrote diary with so little care or satisfaction, 
feeling how the useless mass accumulates—but must note this most terrific morning 
of rain with frantic N.W. wind I have ever seen.”180 Ruskin’s habit of keeping a diary 
is stronger than his languor and the moral necessity to depict outstanding phenomena 
withstands the general “[numbness] and [uselessness]” that he reported in October 
1877.181 The photographic gesture was now devoid of emotional intensity and Ruskin 
at times devalued the content of his diary. Thus, neither desire, nor the typical 
admiration for the subject, motivated this entry, but it was a product of reflex and 
therefore mere gesture.  
 Ruskin sought to stay in control of his life by using the limited time available 
to him as productively as possible through naming time’s entities. In 1883, the dates 
of many of the entries were preceded by the number of days until his seventieth 
birthday, as this entry of July 5th shows: “Wednesday, 2024, [2]6th, [2]7th, 2022, all 
work against me, with great general vexation for a result.”182 Like Eliot and Gissing, 
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Ruskin directly associated time with his sense of self-worth, as can be seen in the 
deep shock he experienced upon the discovery that his system for calculating life 
expectancy was flawed: 
Why,—I have miscounted grievously. There are now only 148 days left of this 
year—the five whole ones—1725 and 39 in 1889, altogether only 1912 [.] 
How I got my number of 2145, at p 62 [March 25] I can’t think—but even 
taking that, there have been 144 days since, so I have missed count of two [.] 
Today, by that count would be 2001, which I’ll go on with—as it is so.183 
 
Ruskin’s obsession with time compelled him to approximate the moment of his death, 
which he deemed necessary to a maximisation of experience. He tried to get as much 
work done as possible and thus needed to know the limits within which he was 
operating.  
  As for Alexander Bain, for Ruskin, the discipline the diary required was a 
deliberate effort to both retain and regain a clear and balanced mind: “I CAN’T 
understand how so extremely rational a person as I am can lose their wits […] I do 
think if it were to go crazy again for the third time I should know I was so.”184 Despite 
its limited efficiency, the diary constituted a reassuring self-monitoring device, which 
offered an opportunity for therapeutic self-retrieval through re-reading, allowing 
Ruskin to see himself as a “whole.” However, Ruskin seemed to find the diary an 
effective monitor of his professional output. Work and rigid self-control were needed 
to keep Ruskin’s condition from getting worse, as his entry of February 15th 1878 
shows: “I must get to work,—or I shall get utterly into dreamland.”185 Ruskin was 
exceedingly busy with other-directed study during the last years of his life; he 
founded the Guild of St George, wrote Fors Clavigera, numerous lectures and his 
autobiography. He also taught at Oxford.  
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 As with the other diarists, work and emotional agitation often interfered with 
Ruskin’s duty to keep a diary, despite his best efforts to be disciplined, as he reported 
on January 5th 1882: “It is infinitely strange to me that I can’t keep this book 
regularly—resolve as I will.”186 Like reading Plato, writing the diary was seen as a 
necessary and beneficial form of mental exercise, as this entry of January 27th 1879 
shows: “Monday. After the most solemn resolutions always to do this first thing, here 
I’ve missed two days.”187 Ruskin equated the interruption of the regularity of these 
healthy activities with self-neglect, which was the source of guilt: “A whole week 
unrecorded—no Plato done—nor much else.”188 Although his experience proved the 
contrary, Ruskin believed he could be in control of his mental health by exerting 
rigorous self-discipline and he thus viewed the deterioration of his condition as his 
personal responsibility. Ruskin’s honest account of his deficiencies, which recalls 
Eliot, takes on a confessional character that denotes a desire for an absolving other to 
forgive the shortages that even extreme self-control and incessant effort to be both 
creative and efficient could not equalise.  
 
Ruskin’s diary resembles George Eliot’s and George Gissing’s diary in that it 
treats the execution of duty towards the self and the other as a primary subject. Like 
Eliot, Ruskin was uncomfortable with cultivating the self without being socially 
conscious and desired to educate those that were not given his extraordinary 
perceptive skills or the opportunity to travel. His diary’s concern with work is 
comparable to Gissing’s, but since Ruskin had no money worries, the premises of the 
lives of these two diarists are radically different. However, we can identify a principal 
characteristic that unites these three diarists: the duty to observe the external and 
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social environment and create didactic (Gissing to a lesser extent) representations 
with ceaseless energy and motivation. The accomplishment of this duty determined 
the value of the individual.  
Despite his intense dislike of the ontologically void mechanisation that came 
with modernity and despite his humanistic defence of fallibility in The Stones of 
Venice, it seems that Ruskin expected himself to function with the regularity and 
precision of a machine. The fact that no visual medium could render the reality 
Ruskin sought to represent in satisfying quality reveals that Ruskin did not accept his 
own imperfections. Like Eliot and Gissing he constantly strove to achieve the 
humanly impossible and even his own realisation that perception was governed by an 
inherent emotional dynamic did not lessen the disappointment he felt about his 
shortcomings as an observer. The diary was seen as a means to capture, organise and 
preserve Ruskin’s visual and professional experience and was both the product and 
the witness of his photographic possessiveness. 
Ruskin’s obsession with arresting ephemeral visual reality can also be seen in 
the diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins, whose desire to possess the visual aspects of the 
natural world was so intense that he longed to be part of them. Ruskin’s 
anthropomorphist attachment to places and nature can also be found in Hopkins’s 
work. However, Hopkins, the Jesuit, obviously lacked the large audience that Ruskin 
enjoyed and was forced to keep his creative work to himself. Because he was 
motivated by a strong desire to observe and appropriate visual sights, he emphasised 
the religious importance for the observer to establish a dialogue with the natural world, 
responding to nature’s fundamental need to be seen. Hopkins’s diary presents 
photographic representations of nature scenes that could be compared to Ruskin’s, but 
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Hopkins, much more so than Ruskin, kept the emotional self out of his diary and 
constructed himself purely as an observer.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Finding a Place for the Self: the Ontological Struggle of Gerard Manley Hopkins 
(1844-1889). 
 
In the work and diary of Gerard Manley Hopkins, the pressures that the previously 
discussed diarists perceived to be acting upon them, such as emotional repression, 
self-discipline and the obligation to record visual experience, mingled. All his life, 
Hopkins struggled to reconcile his homosexual emotions with his love of poetry and 
his need for ascetic order and human affection. Hopkins greatly exerted himself trying 
to settle the quarrel between socio-religious convention and personal fulfilment. This 
chapter argues that in order to evade shameful, unrespectable emotion and contain his 
ongoing internal conflicts, Hopkins converted to Catholicism and joined the Jesuit 
order, which promised him shelter through self-effacement. However, this religious 
choice could not quench Hopkins’s need for validation as a human being and a poet. 
Because his desire to assert himself violated the ascetic stance that he sought to adopt, 
he designed a system of signification that was based on the concepts of “inscape” and 
“instress” in order to convert undesirable emotions into divine praise through 
aesthetic contemplation.1  
Through imagining nature to be dependent on the human observer for 
signification, Hopkins could theoretically combine self-effacement and self-assertion 
and construct his sensual desires as essential to the execution of God’s will. In reality, 
although the Jesuit doctrines provided Hopkins with the tools to exert self-control, he 
was unable and unwilling to give up his love of beauty. The inability to develop his 
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poetic talent, the frequent logistic changes and the lack of a human “other” can be 
seen to have led to the desolation of the “terrible” sonnets of 1885, which, as I shall 
show, mark the collapse of Hopkins’s ontological construct, crumbling under the 
weight of the demands of asceticism.  
The vast body of religious scholarship dealing with Hopkins has tended to 
read the “spiritual desolation” of the “terrible” sonnets as an abstract despair in which 
“the self, abandoned of all support, dwells in a space which is entirely without 
contents,” as J. Hillis Miller has noted.2 I, on the other hand, will show that this “lack” 
of content was not purely of a spiritual nature, but had material implications: 
Hopkins’s gradually decreasing ability to suppress his emotional self and to focus 
only on nature and God can be traced back to a lack of interpersonal bonding, the 
mental exhaustion due to a lifelong lack of belonging and the lack of sources of 
natural beauty through which to compensate for said lacks. While Miller has rightly 
observed that Hopkins refused to take responsibility for the “terrible” sonnets and 
attributed them to “inspirations unbidden,” I will explain that he associated 
involuntary emotion with those aspects of his self he sought to silence, namely, his 
homosexual otherness.  
Generally, religious critics tend to appropriate Hopkins’s terminology, such as 
“inscape” and “instress,” in order to conduct an analysis of his work; an approach that, 
through sympathetic immersion, attempts to recreate Hopkins’s thought processes and 
perpetuates his circular, self-inscaping ontology.3 Although the frequently discussed 
religious elements such as Duns Scotus’s “hacienda” (thisness) and Ignatian 
Meditation reinforced Hopkins’s preoccupation with the external environment, they in 
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themselves did not motivate Hopkins’s decision to convert to Catholicism, but were 
part of his attempts to ground himself in the world. I will therefore not analyse the 
impact of religious practices on Hopkins’s mental states but argue that the perceived 
pressure to conform to the codes of respectability (Chapter One) caused Hopkins’s 
conflicted identity, which he sought to resolve through religion.4   
Throughout his life, Hopkins demonstrated an unquenchable need to write. 
Whereas his early confession notes were written in response to the duty to purge his 
soul, his poetry was a source of pleasure, his diary contained his observations of the 
external world and represented a forum for his etymological findings. Through 
writing, Hopkins sought to mediate between the visual and the spiritual realms of 
experience, which allowed him to maintain a safe distance from the world while 
crafting the illusion of proximity. Hopkins’s need for ontological integration is 
obvious in his diary, as he performed the role of masculine poet (Chapter One), 
describing and poeticising nature rather than processing “dangerous” emotion.”5  The 
diary can be seen as a basis for Hopkins’s poetry; from its beginnings in his 
undergraduate years, he noted “etymological speculations,” which Miller 
convincingly reads as “the first examples in his work of a reconstruction of the world 
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through the discovery of rhymes.”6 Beyond the onomatopoeic connections between 
words that Hopkins was searching, he used the diary to construct himself as an 
observer. 
Hopkins, like Ruskin (Chapter Three), needed to invest both his visual and 
emotional capacities into the observed object in order to fulfil his perceived function 
as an observer. The observer’s emotions had to be passionate, yet devoid of selfish 
motivations, which shows that Hopkins strove to achieve the delicate balance between 
the cultivation of his talent and the silencing of the self. Although this tension 
between self-effacement and self-assertion characterises all the diarists this thesis has 
dealt with, for Hopkins, giving in to his physical desires for the male body represented 
a serious transgression against his own masculinity and Victorian sexual 
conventions. 7  By joining the Jesuits, however, Hopkins compromised both his 
effeminate sexual desire for men and his masculine wish for the publication of his 
work. The result was that Hopkins felt like an ineffectual “eunuch,” who violated 
conflicting codes of behaviour, because none of his identities could be developed.8 
Like Justus George Lawler, I would like to clarify that for Hopkins, manliness never 
“entail[ed] anything like bluff, male assertiveness.”9  It is more likely that he thought 
along the lines of Pater’s 1893 essay on Plato’s aesthetics, which viewed a “man” as 
an “apt” person advocating “temperance;” someone “full of consciousness of what 
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one does […] of intention and of consequent purpose,” which reflects some of the 
codes of respectability that Chapter One has described.10 
Although Howard J. Fulweiler has called Hopkins “the Victorian poet of the 
self,” his “self” should not be understood as fulfilled, actualised, or unified. 11 
Throughout his life, Hopkins struggled to reconcile his emotional self, the self that 
society deemed acceptable and an ideal ascetic self. In the 1860s, Hopkins first 
attempted to redeem his unrespectable emotions through his confession notes (March 
1865-January 1866), which he used to monitor and purge his shameful longings for 
Digby Dolben. Significantly, in the 1860s, Hopkins sought to contain his urges to, if 
not physically, then definitely visually, establish homosexual contact by using his 
diary and poetry to affirm his position as a passive observer, wooed by nature. 
Looking at boys was supplanted by the consistent observation and description of 
nature. Because Hopkins diverted his gaze and his emotions from the human being to 
the natural world, he needed to legitimise his attachment to plants and animals by 
constructing them as animated beings that invited his gaze. Hopkins viewed himself 
as connected to nature through a relationship of magnetic symbiosis: through 
investing all his emotional energy into observing natural objects and realising their 
inscapes, he worshipped God, who had created all this splendour. By thus portraying 
his emotions as necessary components of an interconnected universe, Hopkins both 
normalised their subversive nature and validated himself in God’s eyes. 
 In the 1870s, Hopkins’s diary displays an increased identification with nature 
which was evidenced by a consistent personification of natural objects. The 
consciousness he ascribed to the plants he observed became progressively 
anthropomorphised, as he described the physical particularities of natural objects as 
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their “behaviour.” Hopkins’s attempt to humanise the natural world can be compared 
to Gissing’s identification with his literary heroes as both compensated their lack of 
companionship through clinging to an ideal. Despite actively positioning himself at 
specific spots from which to conduct his studies of the visual world, Hopkins still 
insisted on portraying himself as a passive observer. His desire to be an integral part 
of nature was reflected in this habit of including his own presence in his ekphrasic 
records. 1875 is the last year of which we possess a diaristic record, but Hopkins’s 
subsequent poems, letters and sermons provide evidence of a gradual disillusionment 
with his religio-aesthetic system and a forced resistance to the threat of ontological 
annihilation.  
 This disenchantment culminated in the 1880s, a period of much emotional 
turmoil. Hopkins manifested an immense discontent with his work at University 
College Dublin which the Jesuits had assigned to him. He felt a growing need to 
assert his individuality and counteract his feelings of eunuchal ineffectualness through 
the publication of his poetry. Hopkins realised that, paradoxically, he had lost power 
over his life by trying to gain control over his emotions, which triggered his 
simultaneous desire for a total seclusion from the world and a more direct engagement 
with it. At this point, it seems that Hopkins would have liked to devote his life to his 
poetry, if this desire for personal validation had not violated the vows of self-
effacement that determined his life. His frustration over being a “eunuch” who could 
produce neither poetry nor offspring culminated in the crisis of 1885, which is 
represented in the “terrible” sonnets, a sequence of poems that is characterised by 
intense despair and religious doubt. Because his ontology no longer offered the 
necessary support, Hopkins found himself in a hell of self-reflexive barrenness in 
which self-inscaping alone arrested the ever-increasing effacement of his self. 
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Hopkins prevented a total collapse by admitting his need for a human other and this 
refusal to give in to despair reflects the same emotional self-discipline the other 
diarists under examination administered.  
 However, we see that Hopkins attempted to silence his self more pitilessly 
than any of the other diarists did. Intending to maintain order in his emotional life, 
Hopkins gave up personal agency both through substituting his will for God’s and 
handing his body and mind to the Jesuits. Because both work and charity were a 
necessary part of Hopkins’s vocation, his other-directed behaviour seems less 
heartfelt than George Eliot’s as he did not feel attracted to community work. Although 
George Gissing was forced to work ceaselessly, he had the relative luxury of being 
able to pick the professional occupation he desired; an avenue that was closed for 
Hopkins. Hopkins was even less free to travel than Gissing, which intensified his 
indifference towards the community. For Hopkins, much like the other diarists, albeit 
for different reasons, the pressure to work with absolute self-discipline was a source 
of great discontent. Whereas for Eliot, Gissing and Ruskin, the diary offered a forum 
for constructing a ‘work identity’ as it were, and allowed them to vent and relativise 
work-related frustration, Hopkins’s diary tends to only portray the self as an observer 
of nature, displaying relatively few emotional struggles or complaints. This can partly 
be attributed to the fact that Hopkins expressed his meditations on the self in his 
retreat notes and redeemed his sins in his confession notes (at least early on in his 
career), which shows that he abstained from contemplating his self except through the 
veil of religious practice.  
Although Victorian Oxford, according to Alison G. Sulloway, “fostered 
[intense male friendships] as pedagogical weapons in forming and chastening the 
young,” Hopkins’s sexual orientation placed him outside of the realm of respectability, 
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which he could only re-enter if he permanently distanced himself from his emotional 
urges.12 I agree with Julia F. Saville that Hopkins seems to have developed an interest 
in ascetic religion due to his pathologisation of “same-sex passion as a malady 
associated with self-indulgence and insidious languor to be remedied with strict self-
discipline.” 13  Because homosexual emotions were regarded as completely 
unacceptable, Hopkins felt guilty of violating the codes of propriety that Chapter One 
has described, even if he never physically acted out his passions. Hopkins’s drastic 
decision to convert to Catholicism and to join the Jesuits, by which he hoped to 
acquire total self-mastery, represented both a “source of spiritual strength” that 
counteracted emotional subversion and a “regrettably oppressive regimen” from 
which poetry was the only escape, as Saville has rightly claimed.14 As I shall show, 
the temptations of the external world constituted both the source of disgust and fear 
which Hopkins was glad find shelter from, and a well of fascinating, self-affirming 
avenues, such as thrilling friendships and the prospect of literary fame which Hopkins 
longed to take part in. However, the self-abnegation that Hopkins strove towards 
condemned him to invest his work in unappreciative congregations and students and 
to reserve his poetry for selected friends.  
Hopkins’s diary, in its dual role as both the voice and ‘silencing tool’ of his 
self, reveals very little personal information. This chapter’s chronological structure 
aims to decode Hopkins’s poetic diaristic records and reveal their function in the 
legitimisation and channelling of his shame over his homosexual desires. Before 
analysing Hopkins’s role as a static, yet dynamic observer in his diary, I will offer a 
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biographical account of his religious career and explain his terminology. I will then 
read Hopkins’s “terrible” sonnets of 1885 in light of contemporary critical views of 
the relation between place and subjectivity.  
 
Hopkins’s Religious Career 
Gerard Manley Hopkins was born on July 28th 1844 in Stratford to Manley Hopkins 
and Kate Smith. Manley Hopkins was a successful marine lawyer who had a strong 
interest in literature and published several books of poetry and critical reviews. 
Although Kate had been mildly interested in modern languages in her adolescence, 
she did not pursue these once she was married. The family was quite well-off 
financially and their religious beliefs can be described as “mainstream Anglican.”15  
After spending nine years at Highgate School, Gerard entersed Balliol College, 
Oxford in April 1863.  
 Hopkins’s life was dominated by an alternating desire to embrace and reject 
human contact. As his homosexual emotions established him as other to his cultural 
and familial background, his decision to convert to Catholicism, which involved a 
drastic dissociation from his family, friends, and a traditional home, caused him both 
relief and intense anxiety. Converting to Catholicism and joining the Jesuit order can 
therefore be seen as a resolve to permanently adopt a respectable identity, which made 
Hopkins disregard his need for a human other. 
When Hopkins went to Oxford in 1863, he spent the first months in an excited 
social frenzy, making many friends and, as he wrote to his mother, he was “almost too 
happy.”16 According to Hopkins’s biographer Norman White, Oxford in the 1860s 
was populated by different “sets” of students who grouped together according to their 
                                                 
15
 Norman White, Hopkins: A Literary Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 13.  
16
 Claude Colleer Abbott, ed., Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins, Including his 
Correspondence with Coventry Patmore (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 79.  
 226 
aesthetic tastes and artistic and leisurely interests. Because Hopkins was not gifted 
when it came to sports, he befriended the “readers,” who, like him, cultivated a life of 
the mind. 17  It soon became obvious that Hopkins could not share his friends’ 
attraction to girls and was extremely uncomfortable with sexuality in general, which 
can account for his efforts to minimise his bodily desires and his focus on the visual. 
Even before the events of February 1865, Hopkins was extremely concerned with the 
propriety of his own behaviour, to the point that he felt that others’ unrestrained 
indulgence in the pleasures of the senses corrupted his own purity. Hopkins seems to 
have been strongly influenced by the cultural scepticism towards unconcealed sexual 
emotions (Chapter One), which explains his disgust with the coarse, unrespectable 
behaviour which his friends Alfred Erskine Gathorne-Hardy and Edward Bond 
displayed on their reading holiday in Wales of August 1864. Hopkins generally had “a 
hard time of it to resist contamination from the bawdy jokes and allusions of Bond 
and Hardy,” as his letter to Mowbray Baillie of July 24th shows. His friends’ 
excitement at the presence of four girls from Reading, which degenerated into an 
“unacademic romp,” to use Michael Matthew Kaylor’s term, intensified his aversion 
to this giddy debauchery. 18 Hopkins found himself in a liminal space between (at 
least) three conflicting value systems: first, his culture’s general scepticism towards 
the display of emotion, second, his own homosexual preferences and third, the 
heterosexual curiosity and titillation of his friends from which Hopkins wanted to 
abstain.  
During his first months in Oxford, Hopkins felt attracted to Liddon and 
Pusey’s Anglo-Catholic aestheticism, and, as Jill Muller has convincingly argued, “he 
might have remained in the Church of England all his life […] were it not for the 
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emotional and religious crisis he experienced in the early months of 1865.”19  In 
February 1865, Hopkins made the acquaintance of Digby Mackworth Dolben, a 
young religious poet who was going to convert to Catholicism but was impeded from 
doing so by his tragic death by drowning at age nineteen. Hopkins was extremely 
taken by Dolben’s beauty and religious devotion. This strong attraction resulted in 
sexual guilt, which Hopkins immediately counteracted by starting to write confession 
notes to increase his self-mastery through rigorous self-monitoring. When 
encountering Dolben, Hopkins’s homoerotic desire flared up and caused anxiety and 
shame, which he, like many homosexual men of the nineteenth century according to 
David Hilliard, expressed through the “codes” of Anglo-Catholicism, but particularly 
through his concepts of “inscape” and “instress,” as I shall show.20 Hopkins’s desire 
for a consistent and unified self that could transcend emotional confusion and 
fluctuation, can thus partly be traced back to romantic disappointment, such as his 
obsession with Dolben or the friendship with Alexander Strachey, which like many 
Oxford friendships “hovered somewhere in the undefined area between friendship and 
love.”21 David Hilliard’s suggestion that Catholicism might have offered a structure 
repelling all sexuality, thus sheltering a distressed young Hopkins, seems very 
convincing:  
It seems inherently possible that young men who were secretly troubled by 
homosexual feelings that they could not publicly acknowledge may have been 
attracted by the prospect of devoting themselves to a life of celibacy, in the 
company of like-minded male friends, as a religiously-sanctioned alternative 
to marriage.22 
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Because his sexual orientation established Hopkins as “other” to the cultural norm, he 
consciously turned his otherness into a virtue by joining a community that validated 
non-participants in traditional sexual politics. 
Arguably, Hopkins effaced his emotional needs in a radical attempt to silence 
his homosexual self through converting to Catholicism, which permanently alienated 
him from his parental home. His “dear” Anglican family experienced a serious shock, 
prompting their “terrible” reaction at his decision to convert. 23  Manley Hopkins 
implored his son to forbear the conversion and maintain the integrity of the family in 
a very moving letter: “O Gerard my darling boy are you indeed gone from me?”24 
Hopkins’s conversion inflicted a severe wound to the family unity and the experience 
was equally painful for him, as this extract from a letter of October 20th 1868 to his 
mother shows: “You might believe that I suffer too.”25 Despite the deep conviction 
that Hopkins’s need for conversion was beyond his need for human support, he was 
relieved that his family did not exclude and shun him, as can be seen in this letter to 
his father of October 16th 1866: “you are so kind as not to forbid me your house, to 
which I have no claim, on condition, if I understand, that I promise not to try to 
convert my brothers and sisters.”26 The conversion did not fully sever the family 
bonds but Hopkins’s new identity permanently altered his position in the family. He 
was still organically connected to his family, but they were “in Christ not near,” 
which made them spiritual strangers.27  
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Despite his obvious need for the affection of his family, Hopkins longed to be 
part of the eclectic Jesuit community of the select few, who had absolute control over 
their senses. Roman Catholicism, more so than “effeminate” Anglo-Catholicism, 
offered Hopkins the high standards of behaviour which he hoped could help him 
overcome his sexual self. 28  In an attempt to efface his homosexual tendencies, 
Hopkins handed all control over the physical and emotional aspects of his self to the 
Jesuits by entering the Novitiate in 1868. With the consequent abnegation of personal 
agency Hopkins abdicated his right to enjoy emotional groundedness and to develop 
tenderness for a geographical spot, which caused his life to became marked by many 
abrupt and involuntary shifts in location.  
After leaving Oxford in 1868, a place he truly loved, Hopkins grew very fond 
of Stonyhurst where he studied philosophy (1870-1837), but his inability to reside in 
the location of his choice impeded him from allowing his roots to extend and 
prevented a secure identification with place. Hopkins was forced to repeatedly retract 
his emotional bonds and transfer his existence to a new location, which meant that he 
had to be constantly ready for “instant despatch,” as changes in professional position 
were announced unexpectedly with no more than a few days notice.29 For instance, at 
Stonyhurst, “binding attachments to place or person were never encouraged to 
develop. Similarly, students were not allowed to keep the same rooms for long 
periods, but were shifted around.”30 The objective was of course to force the novices 
to surrender their need for worldly possessions and to maintain a consistent focus on 
God.  
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The Jesuit insistence on the erasure of the physical was geared to eradicate 
personal agency in order to bring about a closer proximity to God. In Roehampton, 
the place of Hopkins’s noviceship 1868-1870, he was not given a new habit, but “an 
older Jesuit’s cast-off,” which impeded any formation of worldly vanity or pride.31 
The Jesuits recognised the importance of dress in the construction of the self, as 
Joseph M. Becker explains: “Dress serves as a shorthand expression, generally 
understood by all, of how one sees oneself and how one wants to be understood by the 
society in which one lives.”32 Clothing one’s body in unpretentious second-hand attire 
accentuates a deliberate disregard of the body that is comparable to an obliteration of 
physicality. This uniform, worn every day, deprives the Jesuit of the choice of how to 
present himself to others and leaves him always already dressed—the habit becomes 
and replaces the body, thus guaranteeing chastity. 
Material possessions are another aspect of individuality denied to the Jesuit.  
To let the novices “experience dependence first hand,” Alfred Thomas SJ. has 
explained, they “had to ask permission from the novice master to be allowed to retain 
the use of certain personal belongings such as a watch, razor, a pocket-knife, or 
scissors. ‘Little leaves,’ as the practice was called, were renewable monthly.”33 The 
cultivation of the self thus had to be purely internal, with the vows of poverty and 
obedience encouraging a modest life of chastity. The personal space available to a 
novice was extremely limited, consisting of a small cubicle that resembled a “stall in a 
well-kept stable, except for the red curtains that could be drawn across the front,” 
according to the autobiography of the Jesuit Denis Meadows.34 The cubicles were 
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empty except for an “iron bedstead, a washstand with a pitcher, and a […] chamber 
pot.” We see that, Hopkins’s environment, like Gissing’s, encouraged his aspirations 
to lead a life of the mind.  
The Jesuit life offered little space for self-assertion as both work and leisure 
time (retreats) were determined by Hopkins’s superiors and he had no say in 
determining his own future. This complete dependence could feel homely and a 
comfortable relief from the emotions of a conflicted self. Hopkins initially found the 
Catholic community to resemble a family that provided warmth, friendship and 
entertainment, but often felt depressed over his lack of control. As early as 1868, at 
the debut of his Jesuit career, Hopkins voiced apprehension at the want of assurance 
concerning his future. He wrote to Bridges from Croydon on January 9th:  
The year you will be away I have no doubt will make a great difference in my 
position though I cannot know exactly what. But the uncertainty I am in about 
the future is so very unpleasant and so breaks my power of applying to 
anything that I am resolved to end it, which I shall do by going to a retreat at 
Easter at the latest and deciding whether I have a vocation to the priesthood.35  
 
Presumably still filled with the rather romantic hopes which influenced his decision to 
convert to Catholicism, Hopkins seemed threatened by the impending and 
incomprehensible change.36 The “unpleasantness” connected to an undefined future 
prevented him from forming a concept of self that was adapted to the upcoming 
situation.  
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This constant uncertainty dominated Hopkins’s life. At several instances in his 
career, Hopkins was content in the environment in which he was placed and was 
unwilling to leave the geographical place he had become accustomed to. After being 
ordained as priest, in 1877, Hopkins was forced to leave his beloved St Beuno’s 
College as this letter from Hampstead of August 10th 1877 shows: “Much against my 
inclination I shall have to leave Wales.”37 Hopkins was rendered ineffectual like a 
child, defenceless against the incontestable decisions of his superiors. Hopkins’s letter 
to Bridges from Bedford Leigh near Manchester of October 8th 1879 is one of many 
instances in which he was unsure as to the direction his life was to take: “I have left 
Oxford. I am appointed to Liverpool, I do not know for what work.”38 In Liverpool, 
Hopkins had to deal with impoverished crowds and was frequently confronted with 
alcoholism; social work he was in no way qualified for. A letter to Baillie from 
Liverpool of May 22nd 1880 shows that Hopkins regretted his lack of authority over 
his own place of residence or his occupation: “I do not think I shall be long here. I 
have been long nowhere yet.”39 Thus deprived of the possibility to plan ahead and 
anticipate future tasks and accommodation, Hopkins’s self was reduced to a dynamic 
of pressure and release: extreme involvement in the trivial world in the form of his 
clerical and educational duties, counterpoised by invigorating spiritual retreats and 
holidays—none of which Hopkins chose himself. 
  Similarly, after having taught Classics for about a year at Stonyhurst College 
(1882-84), a place that he was particularly fond of, he contemplated the prospect of 
being transferred with a certain degree of fatalism in a letter to Bridges of July 26th 
1883:  
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It seems likely that I shall be removed; where I have no notion. But I have long 
been Fortune’s football and am blowing up the bladder of resolution big and 
buxom for another kick of her foot. I shall be sorry to leave Stonyhurst; but go 
or stay, there is no likelihood of my ever doing anything to last.40 
 
Hopkins’s consideration of himself as “Fortune’s football” constitutes a critical 
allusion to the arbitrariness with which he was pushed around by his superiors. The 
image of himself as humbly preparing to receive the impact of another shock denotes 
a self-ironic acknowledgment of his personal powerlessness and questionable 
manliness. This lack of self-direction was even experienced as shameful as he 
admitted on retreat in Tullabeg on January 1st 1889: 
 Five wasted years almost have passed in Ireland. I am ashamed of the little I 
have done, of my waste of time, although my helplessness and weakness is such 
that I could scarcely do otherwise. […] what is life without aim, without spur, 
without help? All my undertakings miscarry: I am like a straining eunuch. I wish 
then for death: yet if I died now I should die imperfect, no master of myself, and 
that is the worst failure of all. O my God, look down on me.41 
 
Hopkins’s life as a teaching fellow in Greek at University College Dublin (1884-1889) 
was distinguished by ceaseless, tedious work and the despair of this retreat note is a 
combination of his frustration over bodily illness and a general lack of command over 
his actions. He was “helpless” because the locus of control was outside of himself as 
he had allegedly handed over his will to God, to be administered by his superiors. 
Although, as he wrote in the same note, in general, Hopkins was “only too willing to 
do God’s work,” this particular task, “my work at Stephen’s Green,” proved to be too 
draining.42 Hopkins felt the dishonour of unmanly passivity despite his eagerness to 
worship God and display a diligent work ethic because his work did not afford him 
the validation that he needed. 
This eunuchal ineffectuality which was the product of Hopkins’s constant 
confrontation with unmanageable tasks is apparent in the oft-quoted passage from 
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Liverpool of October 26th 1880: “one is so fagged, so harried and gallied up and down. 
And the drunk go on drinking, the filthy, as the scripture says, are filthy still: human 
nature is so inveterate.”43 Unable to change the chronic vices of those under his care, 
Hopkins was never fully successful in his endeavours and remained “a lonely 
began”—not even a beginning which is necessarily followed by a consequence, but a 
being that had achieved absolutely nothing.44  
To Hopkins, the distance from the social community was both desirable and 
hateful—Ireland, his perceived exile, constituted a “third remove” (l. 9-10), as he 
wrote in “To seem the stranger lies my lot” (1885), from his worldly core and 
impeded necessary identification with others. Seclusion from the worldly, however, 
was necessary to the cultivation of his interiority through which he could “give and 
get” “kind love” (l.10). At the ultimate remove from the world, such as in retreats, 
Hopkins was the most able to enjoy his life, as we see in “The Habit of Perfection” 
(1866):45 
Elected silence, sing to me 
And beat upon my whorled ear, 
Pipe me to pastures still and be 
The music that I care to hear (l.1-4).  
 
This poem from his pre-conversion days demonstrates Hopkins’s need for silent 
meditation during periods of spiritual and emotional turmoil and the healing powers 
of deliberate withdrawal from the world. The absence of sound was as pleasant and as 
real as music because the speaker had “elected” it. Sheltered from work-related 
pressures as well as homoerotic temptations, Hopkins thrived on the calm and silence 
he experienced when in deep religious thought. This was the spiritual home from 
which he drew emotional strength.  
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Despite the very tiring activity of daylong prayer, which was common during 
the years of training and which reoccurred periodically during the retreats he went on 
throughout his life, Hopkins reported genuine happiness when he was able to lead a 
life of the mind. On 12/17 October 1881, during his tertianship in Roehampton, he 
wrote to his friend Dixon:  
My mind is here more at peace than it has ever been and I would gladly live all 
my life, if it were so to be, in as great or a greater seclusion from the world and 
be busied only with God. But in the midst of outward occupation not only the 
mind is drawn away from God, which may be at the call of duty and be God’s 
will, but unhappily the will too is entangled, worldly interests freshen, and 
worldly ambitions revive. The man who in the world is as dead to the world as if 
he were buried in the cloister is already a saint. But this is our ideal…46 
 
Hopkins had joined the Jesuits in order to be “dead to the world” but his mission work 
forced him to engage with the social community very closely. He frequently resented 
these tasks, particularly the years as a professor of Greek at University College Dublin 
(1884-1889). Hopkins shared Ruskin’s moral obligation to represent visual reality 
through writing and sketching and located his real task in the observation of nature.  
 
The 1860s: “Silencing” the Eye 
Because Hopkins had abnegated his body and renounced his ability to travel, his eye 
represented his principal connection to the external world. Like the body’s, the eye’s 
movements needed to be closely monitored as, for Hopkins, both were equally 
capable of sinful sexual behaviour. As I have explained, Hopkins began writing 
confession notes (March 1865-January 1866) when he struggled to contain his 
amorous feelings for Dolben. The initial attempts to control his gaze that these notes 
display can be seen as the foundation of Hopkins’s ontology. 
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In March 1865, Hopkins began to give confession regularly to Canon Liddon 
(1829-1890) as well as Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-1882) at Oxford. Significantly, 
Hopkins’s predominant concern in his confession notes was already his behaviour as 
an observer, as he self-consciously censored his visual intake. Norman H. Mackenzie 
has proposed that in order to make the confession as beneficial as possible, Hopkins 
may have responded to a set of questions from a manual, such as Questions for Self-
Examination: For Common Use:47 “Have I sought to be noticed, especially by the 
opposite sex? Have I taken undue notice of them? Not ‘made a covenant’ with mine 
eyes?”48 The religious framework Hopkins chose for his life thus encouraged the 
“silencing” immobilisation of the eye by portraying gazing at humans as lustful and 
inappropriate, which motivated him to monitor his physical attraction to men even 
more carefully and candidly. Mackenzie has claimed that through such measures, 
“Hopkins tried to catch at the earliest stage any natural physical impulses that might 
cripple his ambition to develop to their highest degree his mental and spiritual 
capacities.”49 By conscientiously noting down these visual “sins” and presenting them 
at confession, Hopkins tried to not only to silence but to purge these emotions. 
We can see that Hopkins sought to repress his homosexual desires through 
controlling his visual intake because the confession notes portray the eye as directly 
corresponding to the (physical) emotions. Hopkins attempted to impede his active eye 
from protruding into forbidden territories, as can be seen in a multitude of confession 
notes: “looking at a face in the theatre” (June 20th 1865), “looking at boys, several 
instances, and foolishness also. Vanity after looking into glass” (July 5th), “imprudent 
looking at organ-boy and other boys” (July 8th), “looking at temptations, esp. at 
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Geldart naked.”50 It is obvious that Hopkins had sexual feelings for these boys, which 
he perceived as sinful. It is thus conceivable that Hopkins deflected his gaze from the 
male body onto unthreatening natural objects. 
 Although homosexuality was at the top of the hierarchy of inappropriate 
behaviour, it was not the only type of conduct that Hopkins sought to eradicate. In the 
confession notes, Hopkins tended to reproach himself for lacking self-control 
generally, which resulted in “inattentions at morning chapel” (March 25th 1865), 
“speaking impertinently to Liddon (about Jowett)” (March 26th-29th), or “laziness in 
getting up” (April 5th).51 Hopkins’s standards of behaviour became startlingly high as 
he aimed to attain his ascetic ideal.  
Self-control was essential to Hopkins’s existence, because the senses, when 
unmonitored, threatened to take over and destroy his entire being. The following, oft-
quoted, entry of January 22nd 1866 was written several months before Hopkins 
committed himself to the ascetic life of a Catholic novice. It shows that, following the 
shock of his attraction for Dolben, Hopkins was determined to abstain from 
unnecessary pleasure and to force himself to keep his focus on his religious duties: 
For Lent. No pudding on Sundays. No tea except if to keep me awake and then 
without sugar. Meat only once a day. No verses in Passion Week or on Fridays. 
Not to sit in armchair except can work in no other way. Ash Wednesday and 
Good Friday bread and water.52 
 
Although this entry reflects a particularly stern attitude because it addresses Lent, it 
seems that Hopkins attempted to purify his emotions by pushing his body to the limits 
of endurance. Hopkins’s confession notes show that he looked to Catholicism to 
acquire techniques by which to strengthen his will power and maintain control over 
the senses. This argument confirms Norman Mackenzie’s suggestion that: 
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the unruliness of [Hopkins’s] passions was the principal hidden emotional spur 
to his determination to devote his whole being to God, and for his choice of the 
Order reputed to be the most exacting, the Jesuits. Certainly his decision against 
the life of a painter was associated with his resolve to avoid a dangerous ‘strain 
upon the passions.’53 
 
Catholicism, and the Jesuits in particular, offered Hopkins an opportunity for 
complete self-mastery through guaranteed self-effacement in the worldly sense. Even 
if Hopkins’s will had failed to restrain his emotions, his sexual curiosity would have 
been prostrated by the rigid regime of the Jesuits. Significantly, writing was an 
integral component in exerting self-control as it increased Hopkins’s grasp on reality 
through the visualisation of abstract ideas. However, because poetry for Hopkins was 
an expression of sensual experience, he burnt most of his poems in 1868. At this point, 
the diary became the only immediate extension of the eye, as it had been for Ruskin.  
 
“Inscape” and “Instress”  
In order to escape from the temptations of the body, Hopkins sought to tame his gaze 
through a conscious aversion from the human object to the natural object, which 
became the only stimulant allowed into his visual consciousness, apart from 
representations of Christ. Around 1868, Hopkins started validating himself by 
constructing an ontological system, built on the concepts of “inscape” and “instress,” 
which allowed him to unite the human being, all natural objects and God.54 Hopkins 
imagined himself as spiritually connected to nature through the eye; with the natural 
object depending on the observer’s attention in order to be realised. Although he 
positioned himself as a passive observer within this interactive system, he integrated 
himself as a necessary part of its functioning.  
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The turn towards nature can be seen as a deliberate movement away from 
dangerous human beauty into the safe realm of natural shapes. Rebecca Boggs has 
suggested that due to the impurity of the act of observing human objects, Hopkins 
devoted his meticulous poetic mind to the portrayal of nature: “Sensual perceptions 
can be trusted to yield moral truths only when objects in nature are the focus of 
perception; seeing and admiring other human beings, in contrast, is fraught with 
difficulties.”55 Sensuality being the “enemy,” Hopkins can indeed be seen to hide 
behind the God-given responsibility of the observer to concentrate on the natural 
world, which is in need of human contemplation.56  
This ontological system was essential to Hopkins’s self-fashioning because it 
determined the way he positioned himself in the world throughout his life. According 
to philosopher J.E. Malpas, an individual’s identity is formed by the narrative 
framework with which he or she interprets the events of his or her life and which 
motivates his or her actions: “The construction and reconstruction of our selves in the 
stories we tell ourselves or that we employ in understanding ourselves—both with 
respect to our pasts and our futures—is integral in the very content and identity of our 
attitudes and actions.” 57  Through animating his physical surroundings, Hopkins 
established himself as the centre of creation around which the natural objects revolved. 
He was able to legitimise his passion for observation by employing it to praise God. 
Throughout his work, Hopkins aimed to maintain emotional stability by stressing the 
connections between all of God’s designs. Although observation without feeling was 
as unsatisfactory to Hopkins as it was to Ruskin, he rationalised this process through 
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the neologisms “inscape” and “instress” in order to evade the dangerous, erotic aspect 
of emotion. The diary played a crucial role in the conventionalisation of these terms 
on the level of subjective semantics. 
Through his gaze, Hopkins sought to protrude into the natural object and gain 
access to its “inscape,” which J. Hillis Miller has described as “the inner law or 
pattern which any one oak tree, cloud, or flower shares with similar trees, clouds or 
flowers.”58 In Hopkins’s narrative, any natural object belonged to a patterned system, 
but was ultimately unique in itself. As Walter J. Ong has explained, “the ‘inscape’ of 
a being is the distinctive controlling energy that makes the being itself and connects it 
distinctively with all else.”59 Margaret R. Ellsberg has brilliantly defined “inscape” as 
“universality and particularity unified in a precise identity,” as the form an object or 
being takes, which makes it recognisable in its individuality.60  Hilary Fraser has 
emphasised the direct link between Hopkins’s aestheticism and his religion, which 
presented nature as a mirror of Christ. Animated natural objects constantly strove to 
reach as high a level of perfection as possible:  
Christ incarnate, the physical manifestation of God, represented for Hopkins, 
in His selfhood, the pattern, the inscape, to which all created forms aspire. The 
distinctiveness of certain forms, of certain experiences of beauty, was 
explained by their resemblance to the uniqueness of Christ’s religious, 
aesthetic, and poetic experience alike. Christ represented the ultimate inscape, 
and through His Incarnation the principles of perfect physical and moral 
beauty, love and sacrifice became manifest in the created world.61 
 
Christ was thus the corporeal representative for divine perfection; a view which 
Hopkins designed to remove the dangerous aspects of beauty.62 Through observing 
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and “inscaping” Christ in and through nature, Hopkins stressed his own resemblance 
to Christ, which allowed him to sanctify himself as God’s virtuous servant, 
consciously extinguishing his sexual self. 
 The term “instress” designated the energy that communicated the inscape of 
the object/being to the perceiver. Ellsberg has characterised “instress” as the 
“undercurrent of energy, the inner pressure that holds things up and together and gives 
them observable intelligibility.”63 “Instress” thus shaped the object and allowed it to 
maintain its “inscape,” which made perception and realisation by the observer 
possible. Beyond that, however, as Ong has argued, “instress” denominated the 
observer’s reaction: “‘Instress’ is the action that takes place when the inscape of a 
given being fuses itself in a given human consciousness in contact at a given moment 
with the being.” The “instress” of an object/being entered the consciousness of the 
perceiving other, which then allowed the “inscape” to be realised. Thanks to these 
definitions, Hopkins could consolidate his belief into the interconnectedness of all of 
God’s creations.  
“Inscape” and “instress” emphasise the interdependence between the observer 
and the observed, opposing community to individualism and competition. These 
metaphors helped Hopkins to counteract his fundamental loneliness, as, through his 
ontological narrative, he reacted fervently against “atomism,” both in science and 
society.64  Hopkins had to believe in the existence of an essence within the observed 
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object so that it could carry the meaning he projected upon it and signify him in turn 
as a vital part of creation. He considered “inscape” to be god-given, which negated the 
atomist[s’] sense [that] the properties of an object such as the consecrated 
bread, were caused by the atoms of which it was composed; therefore what 
appeared as bread had to be bread, and not the flesh of God as the doctrine of 
transubstantiation required.65  
 
Conversely, for Hopkins, the external aspect of natural objects confirmed, rather than 
denied, the existence of a divine creator, as can be seen in this oft-quoted entry from 
his diary of May 18th 1870: “I do not think I have ever seen anything more beautiful 
than the bluebell I have been looking at. I know the beauty of our Lord by it.”66 
Hopkins’s observations of nature were thus affirmations of his faith, as, in his 
narrative, God was embodied in his creations.  
 
The Passive Observer in Hopkins’s Diary 
Starting with his early poetry, Hopkins adopted the stance of the receiver of 
impressions in order to guarantee his emotional purity. However, even at this early 
stage in his religious career, Hopkins was not altogether comfortable with the 
questionable masculinity which resulted from considering himself as an “all-accepting 
fixèd eye” (l. 6).67 Hopkins therefore appointed himself as the signifying centre to the 
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natural world in a Platonic fashion, as his poem “The Earth and Heaven so Little 
Known” of 1866 shows: “I am the midst of every zone/And justify the East and West” 
(l. 1-4), which stresses the human being’s active power to organise and possess nature 
by linguistic and scientific categorisation. Hopkins’s identity as an observer was 
divided between his role as an independent agent seeking out fascinating sights in a 
Ruskinian fashion, gratifying nature’s need to be seen, and the unjudging, charitable 
and endlessly receptive spectator of the natural world. 
Although Hopkins selected objects to which to devote his attention, in his 
diary, he portrayed himself as an observer who waited for the natural objects to 
present themselves to his gaze and who graciously tended to the dynamic vibrancy of 
a world in constant movement. He constructed himself as the realiser of “inscapes,” 
denying his freedom of choice in an effort to silence the selfish pleasure inherent in 
the observational process. Heuser has proposed that, for Hopkins, “the observer, the 
fixed register of sense-impressions, became the focus both of reception, acceptance, 
and of quickening participation.”68 In the figure of the observer, Hopkins tried to 
reconcile his conflicting desires: his love of beauty, his need for divine and human 
affection and the pleasure he took in describing and signifying his external 
environment. 
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The diaristic record of Hopkins’s trip to Switzerland, which he undertook in 
the summer of 1868, presents him as a static onlooker, observing a quickly changing 
landscape: 
Walked up the valley of the Aar, sallow-coloured and torrent, to the Grimsel. 
The heights bounding the valley soon became a mingle of lilac and green, the 
first the colour of the rock, the other the grass crestings, and seemed to group 
above in crops and rounded buttresses, yet to be cut sharp in horizontal or 
leaning planes below.69  
 
Hopkins stressed his agency as an observer when he included himself in the scene, 
explained his route and stressed the pains it took to position himself as the spectator 
of this magnificent panorama. However, Hopkins presented the changing colours of 
the landscape in a way that recalls the motion picture, or the lighting of the stage in a 
theatre: dazzling mixtures of lilac and green, moving across the frame of his focus, 
accentuating the dizzying height of the mountains. Nature was established as an 
animated agent eager to impress the observer, inviting and accommodating the latter’s 
gaze by its visual infrastructure: “at times the valley opened in cirques, 
amphitheatres.”70  
In order to avert an existence as a completely passive, unmanly observer, 
Hopkins elevated himself to the position of an active signifier of the external world, 
insisting on his environment’s need for his input. For instance, on July 31st 1868, 
when visiting the cathedral in Geneva, Hopkins was confronted with an inscape that 
time impeded him from tending to: “the mouldings too of two arches near the door we 
came in by were very beautiful and elaborate and wanted long study, which I could 
not give.”71 The structure “wanted” Hopkins’s complete attention, which denotes that, 
without his meaning-giving gaze, its existence was futile. Hopkins’s personal 
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investment was essential to the communication between subject and object and 
absolutely necessary to realising “inscape.”  
Hopkins’s explanation of dreams confirms this idea that, for him, the eye 
functioned independently of the analytical mind. When on December 23rd 1869, tired 
Hopkins “shut [his] eyes” during Father Rector’s instructions, he “began to dream.”72 
He identified these “impressions of sight” as “dead,” meaning that the mind did not 
substantiate them into fully developed visual images, “either because you cannot 
make them out or because they were perceived across other more engrossing thoughts, 
[the mind] has made nothing of [them] and brought [them] into no scaping.” 73 
Catherine Phillips has remarked that in the diary manuscript, Hopkins had initially 
written “inscaping” and then struck through the “in.”74 This corrective move seems 
indicative of Hopkins’s desire to differentiate between complete images and those that 
remained fragmentary because, as Phillips holds, the latter “[lacked] a relation to 
other things, or meaningful context.”75 These perceptions entered the “all-accepting 
eye” but were not duly registered by the observer, who consequently was unable to 
realise the “inscapes” of the objects that had forced themselves into the space 
“between our eyelids and our eyes.”76 Only in dreams could these spectral images be 
revived: “you cannot make them at will when awake, for the very effort and 
advertence would be destructive to them.”77 Dreams are seen to be revived imprints of 
the visual impressions that the eye admitted during the day: “The eye in its sane 
waking office kens only impressions brought in from without, that is to say either 
from beyond the body or from the body itself produced upon the dark field of the 
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eyelids.”78 Scapes penetrated Hopkins’s consciousness through the opening of the eye, 
but when the observer’s mind was oblivious to this process, these objects remained 
unsignified. By thus stressing the observed object’s absolute dependence on his 
wholehearted acknowledgment, Hopkins established himself as the authority around 
whom nature revolved.   
Accordingly, Hopkins interpreted his own amazement with natural splendour 
as his reaction to nature’s active efforts to capture his gaze. When in autumn 1869, 
Hopkins looked at a “fine sunset […] from the upstairs windows,” he felt enraptured 
by nature’s luminous plenitude: 
My eye was suddenly caught by the scaping of the leaves that grow in allies 
and avenues: I noticed it first in an elm and then in limes. They fall from the 
two sides of the branch or spray in two marked planes which meet at a right 
angle or more. This comes from the endeavour to catch the light on either side, 
which falls left and right but not all round.79 
 
Significantly, Hopkins’s “eye” became aware of the spectacular appearance of the 
leaves before his “I” did, which indicates that he considered his visual consciousness 
to precede his analytical mind. Observation thus consisted of the mental process of 
interpreting visual stimuli. Hopkins again presented himself as having little control 
over the scapes of the leaves that took control over his eye and ensnared him like 
lianas. Their “endeavour” to “catch the light” presupposed a desire to shine in order to 
alert the attention of the perceiver and be inscaped.  
 Hopkins’s construct of himself as observer was thus a utopian endeavour to 
simultaneously “silence” his eye and insist on its essential role as a signifier. He 
sought to distance himself from the guilty pleasure inherent in observation by 
stressing that natural objects entreated him to “inscape” them and that by doing so he 
followed God’s will, not his own. In his diary, Hopkins sought to realise his own 
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“inscape” by including himself into the scenes he described and by observing himself 
in the process of observation. The diary helped Hopkins to strengthen his faith in the 
indispensability of his input in creation, which allowed him to consolidate the identity 
he had fashioned through self-signification.   
 
The 1870s 
This decade of Hopkins’s life comprised seven of the nine years of training before his 
ordination as priest in September 1877. As I have explained in my section on 
Hopkins’s religious career, these years were characterised by frequent, unannounced 
changes in location and assignment. Hopkins sought to counteract his lack of control 
over his geographical environment and his inability to create a sense of “rootedness” 
within a stable home by imagining nature as a nourishing, helpful instance.80 He not 
only channelled his sexual energies by focussing his eye on natural objects that were 
not sexually charged, but, through increased personification, he also perceived these 
objects as independent agents which provided him with guidance. So far, for Hopkins 
the process of observation had consisted of the human subject signifying the natural 
object. In the 1870s, however, Hopkins increasingly anthropomorphised his 
environment and demonstrated an eagerness to depict this “inscaping” interaction in 
its fullness, by not only rendering the spectacle that nature staged in order to attract 
his gaze, but also including his own perspective and specifying his exact position in 
this process more frequently. This need to be “inscaped” by nature can be interpreted 
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as a response to loneliness and lack of control and choice, which impeded Hopkins 
from forming a sense of belonging. 
 Hopkins’s insistence on his inclusion in the world through his religio-aesthetic 
ontology can be seen to have become more pronounced as he was sent across the 
country by his superiors. Since entering the Jesuit order in 1868, Hopkins studied in 
Roehampton, Stonyhurst and St. Beuno’s in Northern Wales. He taught at Mount St. 
Mary’s near Sheffield, went back to Stonyhurst and then was sent to Farm Street, 
Mayfair (1877-78). Further placements included St. Aloysius at Oxford (1878-79) and 
Bedford Leigh near Manchester (1879, October-December).  
The diaries until 1875 still display countless personifications of natural 
elements, such as the attribution of agency to the wind operating the clouds in March 
1870: “in the Park in the afternoon, the wind was driving little clouds of snow-dust 
which caught the sun as they rose and delightfully took the eyes.”81 In this entry, 
Hopkins bestowed consciousness upon the clouds, which are pushed into a favourable 
light in order to conquer the observer’s eye.  
Arguably, Hopkins attempted to render his isolation less hostile by assigning 
human qualities to natural objects and imbuing them with agency. Through this 
consistent anthropomorphism, the “inscaping” communication resembled actual 
human interaction to a greater degree if Hopkins imagined the contemplated natural 
objects to be infused by consciousness. On March 17th 1871, for instance, he reported 
that: 
The sycomores [sic] are quite the earliest trees out: some have been fully out 
some days (April 15). The behaviour of the opening clusters is very beautiful 
and when fully opened not the single leaves but the whole tuft is strongly 
templed like the belly of a drum or bell.82 
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Mary Ellen Bellanca has argued that “the journal can […] be read as a prose text in 
the tradition of British nature diaries.”83 Although the inclusion of the date in this 
entry and the engaged description of the growing process demonstrates Hopkins’s 
interest in natural history and scientific observation, he did not write in the naturalist 
tradition.84 Hopkins embraced the re-population of nature in the spring because nature 
provided him with the sense of being needed; he was not purely interested in form. 
Similarly, his interest in patterns was intended to produce a sense of 
interconnectedness that was opposed to scientific atomism. The “behaviour” was 
“beautiful” because it translated God’s presence, not merely because it was 
aesthetically pleasing and scientifically interesting. Thus, for Hopkins, observation 
should be concerned with a plant’s “successive sidings of one inscape,” as can be seen 
in the respectful attention he devoted to the “‘behaviour’” of the flag flower on June 
13th 1871.85 The observed object thus deserves earnest consideration, as can be seen in 
this entry of May 9th 1871: “A simple behaviour of the cloudscape I have not realized 
before.” 86  Meteorological forces are similarly attributed consciousness which 
heightens Hopkins’s responsibility to “realize” their “inscapes.” Although created by 
God, the clouds are seen as self-directed beings, again looking to be completed by the 
inscaping observer’s gaze.  
Hopkins’s ontological narrative, which was exhibited in and reinforced by his 
diary, can be seen to compensate for the lack of coherence his life afforded. Until 
about 1877, his conceptualisation of reality determined his perception of the world 
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rather than vice-versa. Geographer D.W. Meinig has stressed the symbolic 
components of landscape description: “any landscape is composed not only of what 
lies before our eyes but what lies within our heads.” 87  In Hopkins’s diary, his 
immense efforts to find meaning in nature represent a compensation for the home he 
had renounced, which explains the urgency with which he sought to establish an 
ontological connection between the observer and the observed. Indeed, as Anthony 
Mortimer has convincingly argued, Hopkins’s descriptions of nature put across a 
nervous tension, which translates the poet’s eager anxiety to find “rootedness” in 
nature: “trees, plants, rocks, clouds, ice, waves, flowers—all appear as in some way 
stretched, drawn out, strained, under pressure.” 88   Hopkins’s writing was indeed 
characterised by “intense stylization,” which reveals that he was “doggedly 
determined to find inscape.”89 In order to make up for the deprivations of his life, 
Hopkins looked for the universal in the particular and for the human in the non-human. 
Mortimer has also remarked that Hopkins’s ontological narrative shaped the way he 
perceived reality: “what Hopkins describes is not what the eye normally sees, nor 
even what a trained eye sees, but what a trained eye forces itself to see.”90 Hopkins 
needed to scrutinise “the glories of the earth,” in order to feel connected to “the hand 
that wrought [it] all.”91  
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Not only did Hopkins’s ontological outlook ascribe a conscious desire to be 
looked at to natural objects, he also imagined them to return his gaze: “what you look 
hard at seems to look hard at you.”92 This undated entry of 1871 epitomises Hopkins’s 
utopian hope of overcoming the isolation of the observer and establishing a mutually 
nourishing relationship with nature. Daniel Brown has read this crucial extract as 
evidence of Hopkins’s belief in the power of the “human percipient” to “bring the 
expressive potential of nature […] to energeia or […] ‘consciousness’ as a 
manifestation of divine being.”93 I would contend that in this instance, Hopkins took 
the interactions that he imagined to be at work between subject and object beyond 
mere “inscaping” as he conceived of a response to his presence. He sought to 
surmount his basic belief in what William A. Cohen has called the “continuity 
between the external form of natural objects and their effects on human subjects’ 
interiors,” when he invested natural objects with a gaze.94 This imagined interaction 
was no longer between the eye and the form of the object, but between the human eye 
and the (invisible) eye of the object, which created a direct, equal and humanised 
relationship. Michael Matthew Kaylor has argued that although for Hopkins natural 
paradises were “sensually suggestive in their flow and foliage, they [lacked] the 
reciprocity necessary to satisfy fully.” 95  I would like to take Kaylor’s argument 
further by noting that Hopkins did not only “realize that without human intimacy even 
the presence of God amidst his creation [implied] an infelicitous loneliness,” but that, 
by furnishing nature with a gaze, he attempted to simulate the mutual action and 
reaction he longed for.96 
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In August 1871, during a visit to Scotland, Hopkins portrayed the realisation 
of inscape as an act of listening to the imagined voice of the object. In order to 
establish the communication between object and observer, Hopkins depicted himself 
at once as a passive openness and a focused lens, as the following two entries show. 
On August 24th, Hopkins deplored that the limited time available to him impeded him 
from fully connecting to Edinburgh’s magnificent architectural objects: “I should like 
to stay here long enough to let the fine inscape of the Castle rock and of Arthur’s Seat 
and Salisbury Crag grow on me.”97 Hopkins exposed himself to the city, waiting for 
the essence of these monuments to permeate him and to inscribe itself upon him, 
which denotes that he viewed himself as a blank surface, resembling photographic 
film. At the same time, Hopkins had to actively think about the objects he 
contemplated and mentally dig into them in order to penetrate their “inscapes,” as his 
entry of August 28th, depicting his visit of Glasgow cathedral, shows: “[I] had not 
time to study the tracery well.”98 Whereas in the previous entry the objects failed to 
reach Hopkins and “grow on” him, this entry reveals the importance of Hopkins’s 
knowing appreciation in seeking out—catching—the “inscape” of the building and 
establishing a dialogue.  
Hopkins not only anthropomorphised the “behaviour” of specific objects but 
also their shape, when he described the “beautiful changes” of a streamer in an 
undated entry of 1871.99  Although Hopkins had assigned human qualities to natural 
and architectural objects for years, in the 1870s the complexity of their imagined 
consciousness augmented, which demanded more input from, and hence more 
validation for, the observer: “unless you refresh the mind from time to time you 
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cannot always remember or believe how deep the inscape in things is.”100 Objects 
were no longer easily knowable; instead, the elaborate, ever-changing “inscapes” 
required greater involvement from the part of the observer. Hopkins perceived his role 
as an observer as gradually more challenging, because he needed a reliable source of 
personal validation and longed to feel grounded in nature.  
In order to place his trust into nature, Hopkins had to establish its benevolent 
disposition, which is reflected in his portrayal of natural objects as assisting the 
observer. For instance, in an undated entry of 1871, Hopkins described a nature walk 
during which he “saw the water-runs in the sand of unusual delicacy and the broken 
blots of snow in the dead bents of the hedge-banks I could find a square scaping 
which helped the eye over another hitherto disordered field of things.”101 Clearly, 
nature was an animated whole, an aggregation of flora, fauna and geological features 
which bent over to accommodate the observer and direct his gaze through the visual 
field. Hopkins’s eye was “helped” to visually organise the objects it perceived by the 
very elements composing the scene. Again, in the same year, on March 17th, he 
remarked that “the swelling buds carry [the spraying trees] to a pitch which the eye 
could not else gather.”102 Without this “selving” of the natural objects, boosting their 
“pitch,” the observer would not notice them. Hopkins stressed nature’s need for 
human inscaping and her cognisance of the human observer in his diary, because he 
needed to create a balance between the mateless existence of the Jesuit and the 
longing for physical expression.  
Hopkins went so far as to replace his need for human affection by a strong 
personal identification with nature. He did not merely establish a connection to nature 
through visual contemplation, but he almost felt physically joined to specific natural 
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objects, through, as Rossana Bonadei has pointed out, a specific fondness for trees, 
which is well-illustrated in this entry of April 8th 1872: 103   
The ashtree growing in the corner of the garden was felled. It was lopped first: I 
heard the sound and looking out and seeing it maimed there came at that 
moment a great pang and I wished to die and not to see the inscapes of the world 
destroyed anymore.104 
 
Hopkins’s distress is palpable through the breathless urgency with which the entry is 
composed; it seems that he sought to write down the painful news as quickly as 
possible.105  The word “maim” recalls a permanent human injury, which Hopkins 
seems to have felt himself when he was overcome by “a great pang.” The depth of 
Hopkins’s shock would constitute a typical response to the death of a loved human 
being, but since he had anthropomorphised nature through cultivating his connection 
to specific objects, the damage done to a tree harmed Hopkins personally. J. Hillis 
Miller has similarly argued that, for Hopkins, “natural objects [were] not dead, but 
[were] sustained from within by a vital pressure,” which was “inscape.”106 Hopkins 
felt honest grief over a felled tree because to him it was a living being, created to 
worship God, “the world’s great landlord, owner of earth and man.” 107  The 
destruction of a natural object that was suffused with God’s energy was not only an 
act of blasphemy, but hurt Hopkins personally, as he spiritually dwelled within the 
“wild and self-instressed (l. 5)” “homing nature (l. 6)” he was to describe in his poem 
“The Handsome Heart” of 1879.108  
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 In his descriptions of nature, Hopkins, more consistently than in the 1860s, 
included his personal point of view, which can be seen as an attempt to overcome the 
irreconcilable gap between the observer and the object. Hopkins yearned for inclusion 
into the natural realm, but, as his diary shows, he also longed to be perceived by a 
human other and to avoid the dangers of eunuchal self-inscaping. By indicating the 
angle from which he observed specific natural scenes, Hopkins made it possible for an 
imagined other to relive his experience, as these entries show: “A lunar halo—I 
looked at it from the upstairs bathroom” on February 23rd 1872; or “With Wm. Kerr, 
who took me up a hill behind ours (ours is Mynefyr), a furze-grown and heathy hill, 
from which I could look round the whole country, up the valley towards Ruthin and 
down to the sea” on September 6th 1874. 109  The precise standpoint offered an 
opportunity for identification to a possible reader of the diary, thus universalising 
Hopkins’s very private experience.  
Despite his muted longing for a human companion, Hopkins was never able to 
reconcile his experience of nature and the presence of a human being, which to him 
was an annoying distraction interrupting the sacred communication between the 
object and the observer. Hopkins first mentioned this dislike of human company 
during his trip to Switzerland in 1868, when he insisted that solitude was a 
prerequisite for inscaping and complained that “even with one companion ecstasy is 
almost banished: you want to be alone and to feel that, and leisure—all pressure taken 
off.”110  Hopkins could only mentally integrate himself into creation during solitary 
contemplation when the human element was blocked out. Hopkins’s diary entry of 
December 12th 1872 repeats the irony that he felt himself to be incomplete when in 
company: “I saw the inscape though freshly, as if my eye were still growing, though 
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with a companion the eye and ear are for the most part shut and instress cannot 
come.” 111  It seems that the human companion scared “instress” away—both the 
natural object and Hopkins were incapable of the deep connection that the realisation 
of “inscape” necessitated.  
The diary can be seen as an attempt to substantiate the “inscaping” 
communication, which, through the mental revisitation of natural or architectural 
objects, represented a magnification of “inscape” through writing. The ekphrasic 
transmutation of visual experience into a written record helped Hopkins gain control 
over his responsibilities as an observer, as it prolonged the communication between 
object and observer and made it permanent. The following entry of April 20th 1874 
shows that the diary represented a channel for Hopkins’s pleasurable emotions as well 
as a guarantor that this (legitimate) pleasure could be maintained:  
My eye was struck by such a sense of green in the tufts and pashes of grass, 
with purple shadow thrown back on the dry mould behind them, as I do not 
remember ever to have been exceeded in looking at green grass. I marked this 
down on a slip of paper at the time, because the eye for colour, rather than the 
zest in the mind, seems to weaken with years, but now the paper is mislaid.112
  
Hopkins’s immediate, almost instinctive, reaction to represent the experienced 
luminosity on paper can be seen as an effort to complement the bodily deficiencies of 
the observing eye “[weakening] with years” that Hopkins expected. The “slip of 
paper” had been lost, so Hopkins compensated for the consequent loss of memory by 
entering the experience into his diary and thus making it durable. This entry is a rare 
case in which Hopkins simply described his observations and actions and did not 
poeticise either, as he did in most of his diary records. Here, Hopkins neglected to 
transmute the visual into the verbal, which perhaps announced his increasing 
realisation that he had “[overtrusted] the magic of words,” to cite Jeffrey B. Loomis’s 
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analysis of Hopkins’s poem “The Lantern out of Doors.”113 In this instance, Hopkins 
did not seem to feel restricted by the boundaries of the verbally expressible, because 
he did not even attempt to specify the shades of green and purple through ekphrastic 
metaphorisation. We see however, that for Hopkins, as for Ruskin, the process of 
perception was not complete unless written or pictorial representation had occurred. 
Through this necessity to “‘catch’ one moment of static vision” and possess it, as 
Heuser has noted, the diary acquired the status of materialised memory, which 
Hopkins called his “treasury of explored beauty.”114  
Hopkins frequently recreated his experiences of nature walks after a 
considerable lapse of time and even if the precise memory was by then lacking, he 
insisted on retaining the remaining impressions. This is evident in this entry from 
August 14th 1874, which depicts Hopkins’s recollections of Little Haldon, near 
Dartmoor: “I have forgotten even now much but this was a very beautiful sight.”115 
The wish to acknowledge even what had been forgotten, and was therefore absent, 
recalls Hopkins’s descriptions of the Little Matterhorn of 1868, is indicative of a 
strong desire for control. The same aspiration to possess his experience, even as it had 
already fled, is evident in the entry from the following day, August 15th: “Exeter 
Cathedral. […] Some notes to remember it by.”116 Presumably, Hopkins could not 
transcribe the notes for lack of time, but still insisted on briefly mentioning the 
experience in his diary and adding the comforting reassurance that some notes 
commemorating the event existed. The diary as a recording device was thus superior 
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to flimsy notes, whose immediacy could only be given the status of memory by 
inscription.  
For Hopkins, writing lent permanence and depth to the observer’s perceptions 
and reinforced the dutiful engagement with God’s creations. As Rebecca Boggs has 
argued, “Hopkins [wished] to seize the moment when man [was] at the height of his 
moral power and purity rather than of his sensual and sexual prowess.”117 The diary’s 
almost exclusive focus on natural phenomena is thus representative of Hopkins’s 
desire for moral purity, using the ontological metaphors “inscape” and “instress” for 
mediated, but never direct, personal gratification.  
 
1875: The Silence of the Diary  
Hopkins’s last extant diary ends in February 1875 and we cannot be sure whether he 
kept similar records of his life after that. As I have shown in the previous section, both 
Hopkins’s deeply felt need to inscribe his visual experience and affirm his religio-
aesthetic ontology through his diary indicate that he was likely to have continued this 
habit. Nevertheless, as his decision to burn (most of) his poems in 1868 proves, 
Hopkins was prone to drastic changes of mind. The fact that in December 1875, 
Hopkins, after seven years of silence, composed his ode “The Wreck of the 
Deutschland” seems unrelated to the abandonment of the diary as ten months elapsed 
between these events. A possible reason for ceasing to keep a diary could be that 
Hopkins may have begun to sense the “danger of self-preoccupation,” to use Saville’s 
phrase, which would lead to the crisis of the 1880s.118 Although it is impossible to 
determine the exact reason why Hopkins did not maintain his diary habit, it is an 
undeniable fact that the many distractions of his life as a priest (ordained in 1877) did 
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not allow for the extensive observations of nature that Hopkins had been used to in 
the previous years and thus made him unable to sustain his ontology. In addition, as 
the gesture of taking up poetry again, as well as the explicit discussions of the 
possibilities for publication in his letters indicate, Hopkins began to crave the 
impossible wider acknowledgment of his work which fuelled the despair of the 1880s. 
 The years following 1875 were characterised by growing discontent, which, 
like biographer Norman White, I shall trace to the unpleasant nature of Hopkins’s 
ever-changing environment, over which he had no control.119 Morally obligated to 
“carry on work for which he had no talent or inclination,” Hopkins was forced to 
invest most of his physical and mental strength into the professional requirements of 
the priesthood.120 Although he had wished to channel his homosexual desires by a 
focus on legitimate natural beauty, he had never coveted a life that was devoid of 
pleasure altogether. The lack of free time that this role afforded and the uninspiring 
surroundings of his external environment—with the exception of Oxford, Stonyhurst, 
and Roehampton—can account for the diminishing ontological grounding that 
Hopkins demonstrates in his letters and poems during the last fifteen years of his life. 
Only on retreats was Hopkins able to re-connect with the core of his ontology, as the 
absence of worldly distractions was the prerequisite for upholding his ascetic ideals. 
Hopkins’s deep connection with the natural world suffered enormously from 
the frequent moves he had to undertake, to the point that it transformed his 
ontological outlook from forced optimism to fatalistic pessimism. Hopkins confirms 
philosopher J.E. Malpas’s thesis that: “the structure of the mind, and of mental 
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content, cannot […] be severed from the structure of the world in which the subject is 
necessarily located.”121 For Hopkins the natural world had provided a resource which 
he moulded into his ontology and the absence of such inspiration aggravated his 
isolation and powerlessness; the very condition he had longed to escape from when he 
devoted his life to religion.  
As we have seen, nature provided an affirmation for Hopkins’s faith and his 
inability to tap into this source of signification can be held accountable for his crisis 
of faith. This again reflects Malpas’s insistence on the interdependence of space and 
subjectivity: “Place is […] that within and with respect to which subjectivity is itself 
established—place is not founded on subjectivity, but is rather that on which 
subjectivity is founded.”122 The individual’s self-concept is formed in relation to the 
spatial limitations and privileges he or she encounters that represent the necessary 
other against which individuality takes shape. White supports this idea when arguing 
that “[Hopkins] reacted most constantly to place: while the Welsh countryside 
charged his optimistic spirits, the town of Rhyl provoked his disgust at Man.”123 Like 
Ruskin, Hopkins was revolted by the pollution and the careless treatment of nature 
that came with industrial modernity.  
Starting in 1877, with his placement at Mount St Mary’s College in 
Chesterfield near Sheffield (1877-78), the focus of Hopkins’s life switched from study 
and observation to teaching and community work. His letters began to resemble 
George Gissing’s in that they were characterised by complaints over the impediments 
to creativity posed by the obligation to work. As White has explained, in 1877, 
Hopkins’s  
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daily theological work and [his final] examinations [were] always mentioned 
in Hopkins’s letters in connection with emotions of worry, tiredness, and 
tension; not once during the year did he write enthusiastically about his 
professional studies. He could focus his mind and emotions on nature only 
when he was off-duty, on half-days, Blandykes, and vacations, officially let 
loose from work.124  
 
Work presented a great distraction to the mental focus that Hopkins’s observational 
process necessitated. Hopkins neglected the responsibility he felt towards the natural 
world: “the world is full of things and events, phenomena of all sorts, that go without 
notice, go unwitnessed.”125  Although he did not explicitly express guilt over the 
reduced attention he was able to devote to nature, work had a destabilising effect on 
Hopkins’s self-concept because he no longer received validation from the 
communication between object and observer. 
Although Hopkins still created magnificent poetry, his lack of agency and his 
dissatisfaction with the locations of his appointments stifled his imaginative impulse. 
St Mary’s, for instance, offered no opportunities to conduct excursions into nature. 
Hopkins deplored that “the air [was] never once clear in this country, not to see 
distances as in Wales or at Hampstead.”126 The claustrophobic atmosphere rendered 
“inscaping” impossible and threw Hopkins back upon himself, which set the premises 
for the self-inscaping distress of the 1880s. With life “dank as ditch-water” and the 
industrial environment lacking inspiration, Hopkins’s “muse [had] turned utterly 
sullen in the Sheffield smoke-ridden air and [he] had not written a line till the 
foundering of the Eurydice the other day.”127 Hopkins’s poetic creations (and until 
1875 his diary) represented linguistic vents that permitted him to channel his physical 
and mental passions through indirect, stylised and therefore ascetic expression. 
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Obviously, uninspiring places and the constant duty to work did not arouse Hopkins’s 
need to process reality in poetic form. 
The absence in Hopkins’s life of what J. Douglas Porteous has called the 
“satisfactions” provided by the possessive “[assertion] of exclusive jurisdiction over 
physical space” can thus be seen as the cause of Hopkins’s despair. 128 Porteous has 
convincingly argued that “the personalization of space is an assertion of identity and a 
means of ensuring stimulation. The defense of space is the means by which 
stimulation is achieved and security assured.”129 Subjecting himself to the vows of 
poverty and chastity, Hopkins abjured any form of worldly possession or deep 
emotional attachment and thus forever abandoned claims to personal space and a 
worldly identity. Hopkins did not only suffer from this lack of territorial authority, but 
he also lamented the related impossibility to cultivate his identity as a poet. 
In the late 1870s, Hopkins felt the emasculating futility of producing poetry 
for the “banal company” of the self, to use Saville’s term, and he increasingly 
demonstrated interest in publishing his work. However, any act of poetic self-
assertion was quenched by his unappreciative superiors: “all that we Jesuits publish 
(even anonymously) must be seen by censors.”130  After both “The Wreck of the 
Deutschland” and the “The Loss of the Eurydice” had been rejected by publishers, 
Hopkins was deeply offended when, during his three-month stay in Stonyhurst of 
1878, the authorities refused to place his poem “The May Magnificat” in front of the 
statue of the Virgin Mary. As White has argued, in his letter to Canon Dixon of June 
6th 1878, Hopkins insisted not only that validation be given to the former’s poetic 
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talent, but this letter “is as close as [Hopkins] came to speaking the truth about his 
own case:”131 
It is not that I think that a man is really the less happy because he has missed 
the renown which was his due, but still when this happens it is an evil in itself 
and a thing which ought not to be and that I deplore, for the good work’s sake 
rather than the author’s.132 
 
White has noted that Hopkins’s “emphasis on the work, rather than the author 
underlines his chagrin by trying to hide it.”133 Indeed, in this instance, Hopkins can be 
seen to have practiced self-effacement whilst asserting himself. Contending that the 
absence of praise for work of great merit was unnatural and almost morally wrong, 
Hopkins gave Dixon the encouragement that he himself was craving and thus covertly 
vindicated his own poetic genius.  
Despite his growing desire to communicate with a wider audience, which 
became all the more accentuated in the 1880s, Hopkins tried to reconcile himself with 
the reality of forced muteness, as can be seen in his letter to Bridges of February 15th 
1879: 
When I say I do not mean to publish I speak the truth. I have taken and mean 
to take no step to do so beyond the attempt I made to print my two wrecks in 
the Month. If some one in authority knew of my having some poems printable 
and suggested my doing it I shd. not refuse, I should be partly, though not 
altogether, glad. But that is very unlikely. All therefore that I think of doing is 
to keep my verses together in one place—at present I have not even correct 
copies—, that, if anyone shd. like, they might be published after my death. 
 
Hopkins felt torn between his desire to be an ascetic saint and a free creative agent. 
Significantly, he dissimulated his obvious desire for public acclaim by further 
abnegating his agency and putting an unknown editor in charge of publishing his 
manuscripts. By preparing his poems for publication, Hopkins adopted the position of 
the object that needed to be “inscaped” by the “other”—a very emasculating attitude. 
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The 1880s: Poetic Dryness 
The 1880s were characterised by an alternation between moments in which Hopkins 
admitted that his escape from society and the restrictive identities it permitted had led 
to endless disappointment, and instances at which he forced himself to restore his 
faith. Hopkins’s lifelong difficulties to negotiate his masculinity accentuated his 
feelings of having failed, both as a man and as a poet, which shows that he never 
freed himself from societal conventions in determining the value of individual. As 
Saville has held, for Hopkins, his homosexuality was the source of an intense anxiety 
that went beyond the discomforts of social judgment that Chapter One has described, 
but that threatened his sanity:  
attraction to men was—along with nocturnal emissions and masturbatory 
pleasure—a manifestation of unrestrained male lust liable to lead to moral 
degeneracy and even mental decline, hence [Hopkins’s] anxious insistence on 
the need for rigorous self-discipline to cultivate manliness in both 
comportment and poetic style.134 
 
Saville has convincingly argued that Hopkins’s extremely crafted poems reflect his 
efforts to ‘re-masculinise,’ as it were. Through his intricate poetic technique, Hopkins 
distanced himself from effeminate and unrespectable writing (Chapter One).  
 Hopkins portrayed himself as a eunuch in several different contexts 
throughout his writing, which demonstrates the impossibility to be wholly respectable 
and to live correctly. Indeed, as John D. Rosenberg has suggested, Hopkins’s self-
conceptualisation as an infertile eunuch “changes from the unjust thwarting of his 
chances in life to his impotence as a begetter of poems.”135 Like the eunuch, Hopkins 
was always in some respect incomplete: had he asserted himself and devoted his life 
to poetry, he would have released the dangerous silenced physical and emotional 
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impulses that threatened his very existence. On the other hand, eradicating his love for 
beauty and his need for ontological groundedness would have robbed Hopkins of all 
livelihood. Hopkins found himself in a constant crisis of conscience because he could 
only ever reconcile self-assertion and self-effacement temporarily through an 
enormous effort of the will and an elaborate ontological construct. We see that any 
code that Hopkins sought to live up to made him violate another code and that 
consequently he was caught in a web of mutually exclusive duties. 
The artificial harmony that Hopkins’s religio-aesthetic system created was 
fragile, as he could only maintain the illusion of groundedness for as long as he had 
enough time to observe nature and was placed at a strikingly attractive location. When 
the reality of Hopkins’s life changed in the late 1870s, he acutely felt the lack of 
“presence” in his life, which was primarily built on abstract foundations. Nature had 
functioned as a signifying mediator between Hopkins and God but this 
communication became increasingly difficult.  Terry Eagleton has similarly suggested 
that the cause of Hopkins’s depression lay in the tragic recognition that his 
communication with God was in fact one-sided: “a mere awareness of God’s presence 
behind or beneath Nature [was not] enough; some strenuously subjective, realising 
response to that presence [was] also demanded.”136 Until the late 1870s, Hopkins had 
relatively successfully, if arbitrarily, imagined that his role as an observer connected 
him to God.  
 When his ontological construct became shaky, Hopkins did not only accuse 
himself of being unable to keep an optimistic outlook and to remain steadfast in his 
faith, but he also blamed nature’s inadequacy to provide accurate proof of God’s 
magnificence. Hopkins’s sermon of October 25th 1880 suggests that he attempted to 
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locate the discordant element—the “something”—that prevented him from durably 
achieving ontological groundedness:   
But yet […] providence is imperfect, plainly imperfect. The sun shines too 
long and withers the harvest, the rain is too heavy and rots it or in floods 
spreading washes it away; the air and water carry in their currents the poison 
of disease. […] everything is full of fault, flaw, imperfection, shortcoming; as 
many marks as there are of God’s wisdom in providing for us so many marks 
there may be set against them of more being needed still, of something having 
made of this very providence a shattered frame and a broken web.137 
 
In this sermon Hopkins universalised his personal discontent, forcefully stressing his 
connectedness to the rest of creation. Hopkins did not blame God for the imperfection 
of providence or the unstoppable destruction of all worldly life. Instead, he isolated an 
unnamed force that broke the interconnectedness of God’s creations. While thus 
affirming the groundedness of the individual in the universe, Hopkins also blamed 
nature’s flaws for his increasingly insecure relationship with God. Nature did not live 
up to the narrative framework Hopkins had constructed to provide personal validation 
through universal groundedness and thus rendered universal communication 
impossible, which alienated Hopkins further and further from God.  
In the 1880s, after years of trying to unite the universe through narrative, 
Hopkins struggled to view nature and humanity as a commonwealth governed by God 
the “landlord” and could no longer deny the division between God, divine creations 
and himself. Hopkins’s religio-aesthetic system had been specifically constructed to 
circumvent the atomistic view that because all creatures were “unlike” himself and 
unlike each other, he was alone in the world. In “On Principium sive Fundamentum” 
(1880), however, Hopkins established his individuality as radically different from 
“and more important to myself than anything I see.”138 To himself, Hopkins was the 
“highest pitched” creature in the universe: “Nothing in nature comes near this 
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unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. 
Nothing explains or resembles it.” This growing conviction that in fact there were no 
connections between creations and that religio-aesthetic communication was an 
arbitrary construct of the mind stands in stark contrast to earlier writings in its 
insistence on the insuperable division between the human, nature and God lies at the 
root of the “world-sorrow” (l. 6) which had replaced the celebration of the signifying 
interplay between all creations. 
Despite this disillusionment, Hopkins consistently attempted to revive his faith 
by emphasising the productive interplay between God’s creatures, which, although 
not responsive to each other, nevertheless ensured the flawless functioning of creation 
as a whole. In his sermon of probably 1881, Hopkins presented duty as the glue that 
prevented the universe from disintegrating: 
The sun and the stars shining glorify God. They stand where he placed them, 
they move where he bid them. ‘The heavens declare the glory of God.’ They 
glorify God, but they do not know it. The birds sing to him, the thunder speaks 
of his terror, the lion is like his strength, the sea is like his greatness, the honey 
like his sweetness; they are something like him, they make him known, they 
tell of him, they give him glory, but they do not know they do, they never can, 
they are brute things that only think of food or think of nothing. This then is 
poor praise, faint reverence, slight service, dull glory. Nevertheless what they 
can they always do.139 
 
God’s creations were still animated but Hopkins no longer attributed consciousness to 
them. Hopkins absolved nature’s flawed ignorance because all natural objects 
accomplished the tasks they were designed to do without fail. Hopkins again 
established himself at the top of nature’s hierarchy as the observer on whom all 
objects depended for being interwoven into the universal web of communication, 
which can be seen as an endeavour to counteract his status as a eunuch. Hopkins’s 
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obstinate efforts to ground himself in creation of the early 1880s did not suffice to 
arrest the intense crisis of faith of 1885.  
 
The Crisis of Renunciation: the “Terrible” Sonnets 
The group of autobiographical poems that Hopkins composed in the spring and 
summer of 1885 bear witness to a personal crisis that was directly tied to the downfall 
of his religio-aesthetic system. Hopkins at that time no longer possessed the necessary 
mental and physical strength to uphold his signifying narrative and to view the world 
in terms that stressed his inclusion in a conscious and caring universe. As Loomis has 
noted, “a man of even such firm faith as Hopkins’s [needed] more trustworthy bonds 
with Christic substance on which to rely than visions from the landscape.”140 Nature, 
once perceived as deliberately inviting the human gaze, was now presented as an 
atomised, self-contained entity. Hopkins felt offended by nature’s disinterested and 
cold attitude; running its course independently of his input. As a consequence of this 
altered attitude towards nature, disillusioned Hopkins felt caught in a circle of 
unnatural, suffocating self-inscaping.  
Hopkins was obligated to attribute meaning to himself in the absence of a 
response from the natural environment. Because his self was no longer needed as a 
beholder, it became both object and subject of its contemplative energies, as J. Hillis 
Miller has claimed: “Within this vacant creation the self is imprisoned in its own 
immobile self-consciousness.” 141  The unresponsive “behaviour” of nature, not 
requiring Hopkins’s “inscaping,” and the consequent silence of God established 
Hopkins as the ultimate eunuch; an impotent, ineffectual and superfluous creature. As 
Bell Gale Chevigny has rightly argued, Hopkins viewed his earlier nature poems as 
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the joint effort between himself and nature, representing “a demonstration, or 
revelation, of [their] fused gaze.”142 When this imagined cooperation was obliterated, 
Hopkins’s “eye on God,” was blinded, “as if he were suddenly deprived of vision.”143 
Thus, not only had his religio-aesthetic foundation collapsed because of emotional 
desolation; but Hopkins’s depression escalated due to the ontological consequences of 
this break-down.   
Many critics agree that Hopkins’s “terrible” sonnets are the products of 
loneliness, overwork, alienation from the homeland and spiritual confusion. Whereas 
Loomis, in accordance with Robert Boyle, has viewed the sonnets to enact the 
“tormenting pangs of rebirth,” of an individual who is desperately willing “to 
participate in an archetypal process of Christian sacramental biography,” I on the 
contrary find the sonnets to represent obstructed conception and impossible birth.144 
As opposed to Loomis’s interpretation of the sonnets as a process of spiritual 
maturation in which “Hopkins’s sanctified soul is readied for its ultimate dwelling 
place: Heaven,” I believe that the sonnets represent a continuation of Hopkins’s 
lifelong struggle to maintain and regain an optimistic outlook, which ends in a forced 
settlement in which Hopkins accepts, but does not embrace, the reality of inevitable 
renunciation. 
There is no known chronology to the “terrible” sonnets but “No worst there is 
none” can be seen to present the cause of Hopkins’s spiritual crisis. A confirmation of 
the fears expressed in “Nondum” (1866), this sonnet expresses the inconsolable 
misery of an isolated being. In a pained cry, the speaker shouts into the void: 
“Comforter, where, where is your comforting? / Mary, mother of us, where is your 
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relief?” (l. 3-4). The speaker’s desperate pleas to God, “wince and sing” (l. 6) and, 
without being heard or answered, finally capitulate and “leave off” (l. 7). The 
consolations of religion are revealed to be futile as God and Mary, the sacred 
immaculate couple do not offer shelter to the speaker’s lonely soul. He must thus rely 
on the “mind” (l. 9), but the mental constructs he tries to cling to, which could 
represent Hopkins’s religio-aesthetic system, resemble the slippery “steep”-ness (l. 12) 
of “mountain” (l. 9) slopes, which cannot ground the human being ontologically.  
Yet, the despair does not escalate in suicide because the speaker of “Carrion 
Comfort” contains his strong emotion through rigorous self-discipline: “NOT, I’ll not, 
carrion comfort, Despair, not feast on thee (l. 1).” Despite God’s cruel oppressive rule, 
the speaker rejects the possibility of ever taking his own life: “I can […] / not choose 
not to be” (l. 3-4), which is both an assertion of his masculinity and his compliance to 
the Jesuit codes of conduct. In a poem that is distinguished by its homosexual imagery, 
Hopkins addresses the conflict between traditional masculinity and religious servitude 
and attempts to assess whether self-assertion or self-effacement is more laudable. By 
“wrestling with (my God!) my God” (l. 14), Hopkins defends his masculine pride, but 
violates God’s authority, whereas the reverse situation would make him a docile and 
therefore virtuous disciple of God but dishonour him as a male. 
The blatantly autobiographical “To seem the stranger lies my lot” illustrates 
the multiple forms that Hopkins’s “remove” from the social community took. 
Hopkins’s “lot” was determined by his sexual orientation, which established him as 
the eternal “other.” His homosexual nature irreconcilably alienated him from the 
shelter of the traditional family: “Father and mother dear, / Brothers and sisters are in 
Christ not near” (l. 2-3). Hopkins’s association with Christ represents the alienating 
factor: “my peace my parting, sword and strife” (l. 4), who has both soothed 
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Hopkins’s spiritual anguish but enkindled new conflicts of an interpersonal and 
political nature.  
 “I wake and feel the fell of dark” epitomises this hell of self-reflexive 
barrenness in which all communication that could give meaning to Hopkins is 
obliterated: “My lament/ Is cries countless, cries like dead letters sent/ To dearest him 
that lives alas! away” (l. 6-8). In the absence of a signifying “other,” Hopkins 
discovers that his religio-aesthetic system, which he believed to be “God’s most deep 
decree” (l. 9), requesting him to realise the inscapes of the world, was futile and that 
in fact no such communication ever existed. Instead, the only reality was Hopkins’s 
bodily self, “bones built in me, flesh filled” (l. 11), which he “inscapes” by observing 
and materialising it in his poetry. But this “inscaping” brings no religious satisfaction 
without the contemplation of nature: “my taste was me” (l. 10). The corporeality of 
his self inspires him with disgust and he likens the secretions of his body “blood 
brimmed the curse” (l. 11) to the “sweating selves” (l. 14) of the “lost” (l. 13), who 
are tied to their physical desires and obliged to fulfil them—slaves under their own 
tyrannical rule. In his self-disgust, Hopkins positions himself with the “simple 
people,” whose self-obsession is “their scourge” and to whom “beauty of inscape [is] 
unknown and buried away” because they do not “[have] eyes to see it,” as he wrote in 
his diary on July 19th 1872. 145  The double-consciousness inherent in self-
consummation is a sterile and repetitive process and cannot lead to “inscaping:” 
“Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours” (l. 12). The self does not have the power to 
“inscape” itself but must depend on God or a signifying human being to attribute 
meaning to it. J. Hillis Miller has similarly claimed that the self “absolutely requires 
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help from the outside itself in order to be.”146 Hopkins’s realisation of his paralyzed 
and uncreative self leaves him utterly depressed.  
Hopkins’s conviction that he must passively hold out until his condition 
changes—one which characterises “Patience, hard thing!”—recalls the cultural 
demands imposed on the Victorian artist by critics such as Eastlake and Crabb 
Robinson, which simultaneously required him or her to exert self-assertion and self-
effacement (Chapter One). In this poem, Hopkins portrays patience as a strength that 
arises from an inner core and the individual cannot effect its emergence. Even to 
“ask” (l. 3) for it would destroy its delicate essence.  
“My own heart let me have more have pity on” is a more sustained attempt to 
break through the hell of self-reflexivity by asking God to “let” him be gentle and 
“charitable” (l. 3) with his fallible self and requests permission to stop “tormenting” 
(l. 4) his already “tormented mind” (l. 3). Daniel A. Harris has argued that through 
this poem, Hopkins tries to abort his “masochistic scrupulosity in ferreting out his 
sins” and to employ the “discipline of charity.”147 The self then, by force of will 
chooses to be a Christian and have mercy on his soul. The meticulous self-monitoring 
voice with which Hopkins administers his inner self is replaced by “self-mercy.”148 
Significantly, this poem represents a decision to refrain from self-inscaping and to 
stop blindly “groping round” in an effort to realise the self and to find meaning in the 
world.  
The fact that Hopkins asked God for permission to have compassion on 
himself signals a suffocated act of emancipation and a continuation of eunuchal 
dependency which was representative of the remainder of Hopkins’s life as well. 
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Although Hopkins was entirely conscious of the futility of his endeavours to assert his 
individuality and publish his work, he nonetheless kept working, as this letter to 
Bridges of January 12th 1888 shows:  
I am now writing a quasi-philosophical paper on the Greek Negatives: but 
when shall I finish it? Or if finished will it pass the censors? Or if it does will 
the Classical Review or any magazine take it? All impulse fails me: I can give 
myself no sufficient reason for going on. Nothing comes: I am an eunuch—but 
it is for the kingdom of heaven’s sake.149  
 
Like Henry Crabb Robinson, Hopkins longed for an audience but was deeply 
concerned that his readers’ judgment might not be favourable. The numerous 
perceived and real obstacles to literary fame caused intense frustration for Hopkins as 
much as for Crabb Robinson; both can be seen to hide behind the seemingly 
insuperable impediments to publication. Hopkins thus found himself without 
motivational drive; at this point his religious duties, besides the academic work in 
Dublin, consisted simply in non-activity, which was a forced and to some degree 
chosen, paralysis. 
 In conclusion, Hopkins was unique among the diarists this thesis has examined 
in that he silenced his emotions and aspirations much more fiercely than any of them. 
He experienced his homosexuality as a stigma of otherness, which he sought to hide 
under the Jesuit habit. Unable to assume the traditional role of husband and father, 
Hopkins’s virginity was a “countercultural sign,” to use Philip Healy’s term, which 
alienated him both from his social community and deprived him of the fruits of his 
labour.150 Unlike all of the other diarists who, each for different reasons, felt it was 
their duty to publish their work, Hopkins was impeded from publishing his poetry by 
the duty to efface, rather then assert, his worldly self. The following extract of 
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Hopkins’s letter to Bridges of October 13th 1886 epitomises the unnatural, eunuchal 
state of forced muteness: “By the bye, I would have you and Canon Dixon and all true 
poets remember that fame, the being known, though in itself one of the most 
dangerous things to man, is nevertheless the true and appointed air, element, and 
setting of genius and its works.”151 Publication was the only solution to prevent self-
inscaping and although it catered to and created feelings of vanity, only the reader 
could validate the author, as we have seen in Eliot and Gissing.152  
 Hopkins’s and Ruskin’s visual aesthetic has been compared by numerous 
critics. Both writers insisted on gaining access to the universal by dutifully tending to 
the particular and felt the strong compulsion to appreciate God’s work. Both 
contended that the act of observation was beyond the mere reproduction of the visual 
object and needed to be fuelled by the observer’s full emotional and intellectual 
capacity. Ruskin saw himself as an educator, Hopkins, on the other hand, was a 
socially isolated observer who did not share Ruskin’s desire for total temporal 
possession—his diary entries are less elaborate than Ruskin’s and display less 
emotional investment in the scenes depicted. For Hopkins, observation was an 
ontological necessity from which to draw the validation that the other diarists received 
through satisfying family lives and/or professional success. Unlike them, Hopkins was 
not integrated in society and led “a single life,” which was a “difficult, not altogether 
[…] natural life.”153 For Hopkins, of all the Victorian spheres, Roman Catholicism 
was the most welcoming because it discouraged worldly competitiveness and offered 
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a life of the mind at the margins of society, one which contained Hopkins’s 
undesirable emotions but asphyxiated, but perhaps beneficially concentrated, his 
poetic genius.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The analysis of the ideal self of which Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and particularly 
Eliot, Gissing, Ruskin and Hopkins conceived and which they attempted to construct 
in and through their diaries can be seen to reflect the value system of the cultural 
context in which they wrote. We see that Felicity Nussbaum is right when asserting 
that, in the diary, “linguistic constructs of the self (or, more accurately, the 
significations of the subject) are produced through social, historical, and cultural 
factors; and the ‘self’ both positions itself in the discourses available to it, and is 
produced by them.”1 The study of diaries is of great significance for deepening our 
understanding of nineteenth-century subjectivity and the codes of respectability that 
moulded individual selves. As this thesis has shown, all these diarists were influenced 
by their culture’s equation of productivity with personal value, which drove them to 
strive for professional progress at the expense of personal emotions, time and space—
the concepts through which the self articulates itself in these diaries. I have interpreted 
the striking absence of confession as a deliberate attempt to merge the personal with 
the public so as to construct a professional self. Hence I have read these diarists’ 
general omission of personal experience, their frequent silences concerning the self, 
their recurrent calls for discipline and their expressions of dissatisfaction with 
personal progress as symptoms of a cultural need for selected repression. Juxtaposing 
the diarists’ utterances with seminal Victorian texts propagating a diligent work ethic, 
this thesis has presented some of the socio-cultural influences—the push towards self-
improvement and altruism—that acted upon the diarists, who then reinforced and 
disseminated these standards of conduct through their work.  
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Chapter One illustrated the disdain of self-obsession in literary and art 
criticism and analysed the ways in which Victorian psychology—a burgeoning 
science—prescribed an ideal human being who was in perfect control of his or her 
emotions and used them to good effect. Through reading Alexander Bain’s The 
Emotions and the Will in light of contemporary theories of the civilising process, I 
have visualised a model of the process of ideological indoctrination as proposed by 
Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault. Through reading the diary, as well as the 
publications, of the remarkably harsh art critic Elizabeth Eastlake, I have drawn 
attention to both the pressure that she exerted upon her fellow females— instructing 
them to be family-oriented, well-travelled and well-dressed at all times— and the 
intimidation she instilled in the artists who would necessarily have known of her 
influential work. As a counterpart to this unforgiving cultural commentator, I have 
presented Henry Crabb Robinson, who, although seemingly less eager to correct the 
moral flaws of his contemporaries, displays similar convictions regarding the 
association of both complete self-effacement and self-assertion with weakness in his 
diary. Eastlake, Crabb Robinson and Bain, as well as the other diarists this thesis has 
examined, likened strength of character to willpower. The psychological discourse of 
the time unquestionably reinforced this equation of complete emotional mastery with 
talent, intelligence and quality.  
Through analysing a variety of historical documents, such as religious and 
anti-theistic psychology handbooks, literary reviews, conduct manuals, letters and 
diaries, Chapter One highlighted the many sources of cultural prescriptiveness to 
which a diarist reacted from childhood onward. As even the purpose of the diary was 
delineated by psychologists such as Bain, it becomes clear that for the writers under 
investigation, writing a diary was only partially an act of self-assertion, as specific 
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conduct, such as self-referencing, expressions of pride, feebleness and doubt, as well 
as laziness, was consistently toned down. The diaries discussed in this chapter were 
heavily edited, and it is essential that further research considers the manuscripts in 
order to assess the extent and possible purpose of these editorial omissions. 
Additionally, a new study based on diaries could compare and contrast the moral, 
altruistic purposes attributed to the emotions which this thesis has described and the 
late-Victorian decadent beliefs in the individual’s right and duty to experience 
pleasure. 
The examination of the silence of the self in the professional diary consists of 
an evaluation of the predominance of certain values over others. Chapter Two 
explained that the selected diarists filled this silence with an intense preoccupation 
with professional productivity. It illustrated this claim by juxtaposing two very 
different novelists, who are often mentioned as the prime Victorian advocators of 
social reform: George Eliot and George Gissing. The study of their diaries calls for an 
adjustment of these beliefs. Eliot, as assumed, firmly believed in the individual’s duty 
to extend altruistic emotion towards the community. Gissing, however, despite his 
subject matter, did not fight for social change. Rather, he needed to produce literature 
for financial survival. Despite these fundamental differences in philosophical outlook, 
both writers defined their personal value in relation to their professional output, in 
proportion to the efficiency with which they used the time available to them. They 
both treated emotion with professional diligence and generally left emotion out of 
their diaries, because, for them, personal joy or trauma had no place in the diary but 
were to be communicated in letters. Future research should therefore compare the use 
that these writers made of the letter to the function that their diary held and discuss the 
importance of audience. As Eliot and Bain were friends, it would be rewarding to 
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analyse their correspondence—as well as other texts attesting interactions between 
them—revealing the ways in which they influenced each other. Reading Eliot’s diary 
in conjunction with George Henry Lewes’s and/or her great admirer and friend Edith 
Simcox’s could shed light on the subjectivity of a group of influential Victorian 
figures.  
 The analysis of John Ruskin’s diaries conducted in Chapter Three makes clear 
that Ruskin’s obsession with productivity and his total identification with his work as 
an observer can be held accountable for the despair and bitterness that characterised 
the latter half of his life, which are not to be solely attributed to his disappointing 
romantic experiences. The diaries reflect Ruskin’s choice to cultivate his self as an 
observer who professionalised emotion and sought to eradicate human fallibility from 
the persona he constructed. Like for Eliot and Gissing, emotion was an integral part of 
Ruskin’s work. His diaries show that his inability to feel awe on command increased 
his urge to be stunned by great beauty and left him in a state of over-stimulation and 
perpetual hunger for more excitement. Reading the diaries in light of Modern Painters 
and The Stones of Venice, Chapter Three has exemplified that despite his apparent 
acceptance and even praise of fallibility, Ruskin was consumed by his efforts to 
eliminate satiability, boredom and indifference from his professional self. Because he 
expected himself to function as a human camera obscura, eagerly taking in and 
reproducing visual objects/events for his own possession and for his audience, Ruskin 
was no longer able to enjoy the act of observation, but still performed the motions of 
pleasure.  
Ruskin, although seemingly existing on the margins of Victorian culture, re-
inscribed and reinforced its call for professional and emotional self-discipline. His 
lessons to his audience were heavily didactic, as can be seen in the introduction to The 
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Elements of Drawing of 1857, in which he advised that parents should sternly instil 
self-discipline in their child by “[praising] it only for what costs it self-denial, namely 
attention and hard work; otherwise they will make it work for vanity’s sake, and 
always badly.”2 This passage, as well as the assiduity with which he treated his own 
work, shows that Ruskin did more than initiate his readers to a “method of study;” 
namely, through his teachings on art, he communicated his take on the codes of 
respectability disseminated in his culture.3 Ruskin just as severely reproached himself 
in his diary when he failed to pay sufficient attention to the observed object or scene, 
namely, when an intrusion of personal emotions, such as over-saturation by visual 
stimulation and fatigue, made proper observation impossible.  
Future research might consider the importance of Ruskin’s diary as a pre-work 
in the writing of Praeterita. It might also inspect the self-concept expressed by his 
self-portraits of the 1870s, as well as Fors Clavigera, and juxtapose it to his diary 
entries of that time. Because Ruskin’s diaries can further our understanding of his 
subjectivity to such a significant degree, there is a definite need to introduce 
undergraduates to these crucial documents with the help of a companion book, 
proposing ways in which to read this immense diaristic record.  
The study of Gerard Manley Hopkins’s diary conducted in Chapter Four, has 
revealed that Hopkins, even more so than Gissing or Ruskin, existed on the periphery 
of culture. Because of his homosexuality, physical and mental emotions were doubly 
subversive to Hopkins, which explains his diary’s stern focus on the visual 
characteristics of natural objects. This targeted silencing of the unrespectable aspects 
of the self shows that, through drastic measures (such as joining the Jesuits), Hopkins 
sought to respect the cultural codes of respectability. His diary reflects cultural 
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circumstances through its deliberate silence and is thus the pinnacle of the selective 
repression at work in many Victorian diaries. Further research might investigate, 
contextualise and theorise the interplay between the strict, alternating focus on 
semantics and visual sights that characterises Hopkins’s diary. There is also a need for 
a study reading Hopkins’s diary, letters and poetry in light of the attitudes towards 
homosexuality he encountered during his lifetime, as for example in textbooks, 
general medical practices and both explicitly and implicitly stated codes of propriety.  
While this thesis has focused on the private records of canonical Victorian 
writers, it is essential to extend the range of diarists to non-artists and workers, male 
and female, in order to develop a more in-depth understanding of the relationship 
between the Victorian culture of self-improvement and individual subjectivity through 
exploring and comparing the degree of professional zeal and self-conscious repression 
of emotional needs in their diaries. As the discourse on the emotions can provide such 
illuminating information on the “spirit of the age” of any period or culture, the 
methodology used in this thesis would also lend itself to a comparative study of 
diaries of different languages and nationalities in order to investigate the ways in 
which individuals have sought to create and negotiate their own value.  
Undoubtedly, the diary genre generally deserves further study, both from a 
generic and a historical point of view. The diary as a literary form should not be 
discredited as a mere source for biographical references, which, very often, it does not 
offer. Rather, like novels, diaries deserve to be treated as primary texts and to be read 
in light of the socio-cultural context in which they appeared, as, without question, 
they are indispensable documents that allow us to further our understanding of 
persons and periods. 
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